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ABSTRACT 
The Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) was officially established in 
1994. Its primary objective was to help its member states attain sustainable economic growth 
and development through regional integration and trade. In this regard, the region’s specific 
goals encompassed: (a) comparable and balanced development of human capital, production 
and market structures in its respective member countries. (b) harmonization of the individual 
economic and trade policies among its member countries in line with its collective regional 
growth and development goals. Among the tools for the realisation of these goals, is a coherent 
and consistent development financing plan for the essential investments across its sectors. 
Accordingly, focusing on the region’s core objective of economic growth, this study empirically 
investigated how foreign aid, as one of the region’s vital development financing resource has 
influenced economic growth in the respective COMESA countries.  
Contrary to the existing literature, this thesis adopted a comprehensive approach that 
encompassed aggregate and sectoral implications of aid receipts in the region without 
undermining the role of the factors affecting its utilization as mostly discussed in the literature. 
From the political economy perspective, recent debates on Africa’s inclusive and sustainable 
growth have focused on structural transformation as a critical priority in transforming its 
development platform. Based on these debates, the thesis focused on two crucial sectors for 
comprehensive econometric assessments of direct and indirect effects of sectoral aid on 
growth. For direct effects of aid on growth, the work chose the agricultural sector, which 
continues to sustainably support the region’s structural transformation process through the 
provision of at least 50% of the raw materials to the industrial sector. The agricultural sector 
also supports livelihoods of at least 60% of the region’s population. For indirect effects, the 
thesis selected economic infrastructure as a critical enabler of effective backward and forward 
linkages between the agricultural sector and the industrial/ service sectors.  
This comprehensive assessment was therefore accomplished firstly by assessing the extent to 
which the received aid volumes in the respective COMESA countries consistently closed their 
overall and specific sectoral development financing gaps. Trends analysis of aid and economic 
growth performance showed that foreign aid is the dominant source of foreign capital, 
accounting for an average of 60 percent of the development financing gaps annually in 
COMESA countries. Although better growth performances were expected among aid 
recipients, erratic growth rates below the 7% minimum stipulated in the Sustainable 
Development Goals are widespread across the countries. Aid volatility and misalignment of 
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the aid allocations across (within) sectors and among countries compromise the potency of aid 
in the region. Incidences of foreign aid receipts over and above the estimated external 
development financing gaps are partially due to the large share of humanitarian assistance in 
some countries. However, they also imply a lack of systematic assessment of the region’s 
development financing needs, particularly in countries whose public investments were fully 
covered by domestic resources yet these countries received foreign aid. Furthermore, sectoral 
prioritization in favour of non-growth enhancing consumption, mostly in the social sectors, 
may be redundant as far as growth is concerned. In this regard, the thesis recommends a joint 
donor-recipient country financing needs and COMESA-wide capacities assessments for 
effective targeting to improve growth outcomes of aid. This approach to development financing 
will be more effective if accompanied by policies that focus on strengthening domestic 
institutions and increasing domestic resource mobilization. 
Secondly, contending for comparable impacts of aid across the countries in the region for the 
attainment of unified regional growth and development goals, Chapter 5 assessed how the 
received aid affected growth in the respective countries using the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
estimator. The thesis found that although aid had a significant positive impact on growth in the 
short run, its long-term effect was negative. The results show that the long-term impact of 
grants on growth is positive and significant, while the net effect of loans on growth was 
negative and significant. In line with the visible adverse effects of corruption on aid utilization 
in the short run in most countries, the results show that corruption has a net negative impact 
on the utilization of loans and grant. Accordingly, the short-run effects of loans and grants 
varied significantly among the countries in the region, potentially reflecting which component 
of aid is mostly affected by their respective weak institutions. Overall, the results show thart 
the potency of total foreign aid is equally compromised by corruption in the long term . 
Furthermore, Chapter 5 found that domestic savings have a positive effect on growth both in 
the short and long run. Therefore, the chapter postulates better outcomes from aid if COMESA 
effectively addresses corruption in all its member countries. This should be complemented with 
policies and strategies that focus on effectively increasing domestic revenue (savings) to 
further enhance their growth outcomes complemented with foreign aid. Lastly, rationalisation 
of the region’s exports to enhance their competitiveness remains imperative if the exports are 
to productively contribute to its regional growth goals. 
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Thirdly, Chapter 6 analysed the impact of agricultural foreign aid on agricultural productivity 
and growth in a Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) framework. The chapter finds a 
significant unidirectional causality from agricultural growth to foreign aid and thus 
confirming the theoretical dispositions of the developmental role of foreign aid. However, 
instead of complementing domestic resources in this regard, the results showed that foreign 
aid in the sector substitutes government financing, which effectively reduces its effectiveness. 
A mismatch in government resources and aid allocations to a sub-sector erodes the synergy 
that should typically exist between donor aid and government expenditure in a sector. This 
mismatch implies that a policy shift towards Result-Based (Aid on Delivery) approaches in aid 
disbursements will be critical to eliminating fungible resources. Misalignment of aid 
allocations with the respective sub-sectoral relative importance in the sectoral development 
goals was further found to undermine the potency of aid in the sector. Accordingly, the thesis 
contends for a better understanding of the role various sub-sectors play to the overall growth 
of the agriculture sector. This understanding will be crucial for equitable resource allocation 
and enhanced aid effectiveness. Moreover, the higher impact of domestic resources compared 
to foreign aid calls for policies to increase domestic resource mobilization and a broader focus 
on reducing aid. 
Lastly, the thesis assessed the contribution of foreign aid to the region’s infrastructure 
development in Chapter 7. Using the Blundell-Bond (BB) system Generalised Methods of 
Moments, the paper found that foreign aid has a net negative effect on infrastructure 
development mainly because of corruption which increases the cost of its loans. Although the 
results shows that corruption does not affect net utilization of grants, the regional effect of 
grants on infrastrucutre development negative. Notably, grants have been steadily declining 
since 2009 (Figure 3). Overall, the chapter shows the potential that loans have in turning 
around the infrastructure deficit in the region, particularly if corruption is effectively 
addressed in all the COMESA countries. Thus, the chapter concludes that unless COMESA 
countries effectively addresses corruption, it cannot adequately close its infrastructure gaps 
and cannot enhance its growth with foreign aid.  With the highlighted positive and significant 
impact of domestic resources on infrastructure development in its core model, the chapter 
further recommends the exploring of other avenues of revenue for closing the infrastructure 
gaps. This examination will be beneficial in fast-tracking infrastructure development and 
enhance economic growth in the region. 
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Overall, notwithstanding the comparable short-run positive effects of aid on growth across the 
countries in the region, the research failed to conclude that foreign aid positively contributes 
to the region’s long- term sustainable growth and development objective. While it marginally 
enhances productivity and growth of its core growth sector, foreign aid in the region has failed 
to bring about the desired changes in the growth-enhancing support sectors (economic 
infrastructure and social sectors). High levels of corruption in some of its member countries, 
which potentially lead to unnecessary increases in the overall financial costs of its loans, 
undermines the potency of foreign aid. Similarly, the substitution effect of aid on domestic 
resources further compromise the performance of foreign aid in the region. In this regard, “aid 
on delivery” (result based) approaches remain the best policy option to effectively eliminate 
fungible resources in all countries in the region. 
Furthermore, poor alignment of aid to the respective development financing gaps both across 
(within) sectors and countries is vital in accounting for aid inefficiency in enhancing the 
region’s growth. On the one hand, there is evidence of the lack of systematic assessment on the 
part of the region’s development partners (donors) to properly align aid to the region’s 
development financing gaps as reflected by episodes of aid over and above existing 
development financing gaps. While the large component of humanitarian aid in some of the 
countries in the region comprehensively explains this mismatch, it does not provide enough 
explanation about other countries in the region, including those whose investments were fully 
covered by domestic resources in the presence of aid receipts. On the other hand, poor sectoral 
prioritization of the received aid across the countries in favour of non-growth enhancing 
consumption, mostly in the social sectors, is redundant for the attainment of its growth-
enhancing objectives. In this regard, a thorough understanding of the region’s development 
financing needs and capacities to ensure the right targeting and effective utilization of both 
foreign aid and domestic resources remains imperative. Enhancing domestic resource 
mobilization will further be beneficial in reducing aid dependency in the region. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Sustained economic growth in comparable fashion among the countries in the Common Market 
for East and Southern Africa (COMESA)1 is crucial to achieving their collective regional 
growth and development goals. Among the tools for the realisation of this trend, is a coherent 
and consistent development financing plan for the essential investments across the region. In 
this regard, this thesis empirically investigates how foreign aid as the region’s vital development 
financing resource, has influenced economic growth in the respective COMESA countries. A 
thorough investigation is accomplished firstly by assessing the extent to which the received 
foreign aid volumes in COMESA countries consistently closed their overall and specific 
sectoral development financing gaps. Secondly, the thesis assessed how the received foreign 
aid affected growth and development goals in the respective countries. Third, the thesis 
evaluated the effect of foreign aid to the core growth sectors and, lastly, the thesis analysed how 
foreign aid contributes to the development of the region’s economic infrastructure. The thesis 
noted that key factors that can compromise the effectiveness of foreign aid need to be 
controlled. Therefore, foreign aid is disaggregated into loans and grants to highlight their 
relative contribution to the region’s economic growth. 
1.1 Background 
The primary objective of foreign aid is to stimulate economic growth and development of the 
recipient economies. According to the Gap models, the key objective of foreign aid is 
accomplished when it supplements domestic capital resources (savings) for the required 
investments to help attain specific growth levels (Chenery and Strout, 1966; Snowdon, 2009; 
McGillivray, 2009). It is postulated that with an injection of foreign aid, beneficiary economies 
would be propelled onto a self-sustaining and satisfactory growth track  (Rostow, 1959; 
Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; Chenery and Strout, 1966; Equilibria, 1980; Mubarak, 2008). This 
assumption focuses on just the complementary role of foreign aid to the resources needed for 
sustainable growth and development in the recipient economies. As such, the assumption is that 
 
1 Currently, COMESA has 21-member states following the admission of Somalia and Tunisia in July 2018. The 
other member states are: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe 
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the recipient economies would exhibit maximum efforts by ensuring the existence of requisite 
institutions/structures and relevant skills in translating foreign aid resources into the plausible 
growth outcomes (Chenery and Strout, 1966). Therefore, it is mostly up to the recipient 
economies to turn the received foreign aid into the desired growth outcomes through, among 
other things, skills development as well as relevant institutional and policy changes (Chenery 
and Strout, 1966). 
Notably, the consideration of foreign aid as a temporary solution to growth and development 
financing needs in the gap models has remained farfetched in most foreign aid recipient 
economies. Most of these economies have neither sustained nor improved their growth levels 
following decades of foreign aid receipts. These countries have been characterised by 
elementary production and marketing structures coupled with minimal transformation in their 
population’s skills mix. COMESA countries have exhibited these negative attributes. 
COMESA was officially established in 1994 to help its member states attain sustainable 
economic growth and development through regional integration and trade. This objective was 
to be achieved by focusing on the development of human and natural resources, among other 
things (COMESA treaty, 1993). While commendable strides have been attained on regional 
integration such as the signing of the Free Trade Area (FTA) in 2000, the overall economic 
performance of most economies in the region remains unsatisfactory.  
Overall, countries in COMESA have been consistently registering low positive economic 
growth rates with a few periods of negative growth rates in some countries. Growth in the region 
has been weak and erratic at an average of about 3.8% over the last three decades (See Figure 
1.1; Appendix 1.1A). Production and marketing structures are basic, with inadequate economic 
infrastructure.  Moreover, underdeveloped human capacities have also characterised most of 
the economies in the region (Muuka et al, 199; Karamuriro, 2015; Woofrey, 2016). In fact, most 
economies in the region are not on the path to self-sustenance with the possibility of terminating 
foreign aid in the short to medium term. In the light of the above, it is important to consider 
whether foreign aid has been effective in augmenting resources to eliminate physical and human 
capital bottlenecks towards investments enhancement to realise individual and collective 
sustainable growth and development objective. 
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Figure 1. 1: Economic growth in COMESA (1990-2017) 
 
 
Source: WDI and UNCTAD Stats, December 2019. 
Note: Take note of the different scales on the embedded charts 
 
1.2 Problem Statement and Significance of the Study 
Foreign aid to most COMESA states dates back to the early 1950s and 1960s when these 
countries became politically independent. Before COMESA was formed, individual countries 
failed to achieve economic growth even with increased foreign aid volumes. This was due to 
the countries minute individual production structures and markets which resulted in little 
bargaining power in the international markets (COMESA Brief, 1994). The establishment of 
COMESA was aimed at addressing this problem. Economic theory postulate that the increased 
foreign aid inflows alleviated resource bottlenecks and led to an acceleration in the growth and 
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development of most of COMESA member states (see Chenery and Strout (1966) . Specifically, 
real foreign aid to COMESA has been steadily increasing at an annual average of about 3.5% 
since 2005 (Appendix 1.1B). Overall, COMESA is among the primary beneficiaries of foreign 
aid in Africa. On average, it has been receiving about 39% of the total foreign aid to Africa, 
with the highest of 49.2% in 2003 and the least of 32.9% in 2006 (Figure 1.2).  Despite this 
increase in foreign aid, for the last three decades, growth in most of these economies has 
remained very modest at an average of 3.8%. This is indicated in Figure 1.1 above (see also 
Appendix 1.1A). 
 
Figure 1. 2: Foreign Aid to COMESA as a percentage of the total Foreign Aid to Africa 
(2000-2017) 
 
Source: OECD Database accessed on April 23, 2018 
 
Despite the constant flow of foreign aid to COMESA, the region continues to host 12 (36%) of 
the 33 African Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and this accounts for 63% of its membership 
(UNCTAD, 2020). Accordingly, domestic resources and structures in most of the COMESA 
countries remain far from adequate to meet their individual growth and development needs. 
With the continued existence of weak institutions, production, and market structures, most of 
these countries cannot attract foreign capital through markets to augment their domestic 
resources for growth. Hence, the continued overdependence on foreign aid in the medium to 
long term precludes the guarantee of advancing the blocs key objective of increased growth. 
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Thus, these countries are unlikely to meet the 7% minimum SDGs stipulated growth rate (UN-
ECOSOC, 2016).  
Little research has been conducted to determine why COMESA (both at the regional and 
country-level) has failed to achieve substantial economic growth despite being the main 
recipient of foreign aid in the past two decades. For example, Bitew (2014) only sought to 
establish short and long-term aggregate relationships between foreign aid and economic growth 
in Ethiopia. Using the cointegration technique, he concluded that foreign aid positively 
influences growth only in the long term. However, he failed to support the assertion that foreign 
aid is endogenously determined in the foreign aid-growth model, that is, the conditions that 
influence the decision on whether donors will disburse foreign aid or not. Similarly, focusing 
on the indirect impact of foreign aid on economic growth through investment, Ejigu (2015) 
concluded that foreign only had an effect on the long-term growth of Ethiopia.  He dismissed 
capacity constraints issues for foreign aid effectiveness in Ethiopia as reflected in the positive 
but insignificant effect of foreign aid on growth in the short run.  He concluded that growth in 
the short term was due to long-term investments that accounted for most of the foreign aid 
inflows (also see Tadesse, 2011). 
Using Autoregressive Distributed lag techniques (ARDL), Odiambo (2009) also concluded that 
foreign aid had an overall positive impact on growth in Kenya in the long term. This positive 
relationship was however found to be very weak by Morrissey et al. (2008) because the 
relatively low levels of grants vis-à-vis loans which adversely affected growth in the country. 
On the contrary, Mwanamanga (2015) concluded that foreign aid had negative consequences 
for growth in Malawi because of the misallocation of foreign aid resources. This observation 
conforms to Msowoya (2013) who found that foreign aid fungibility2 is persistent in 
Agriculture, the country’s key growth sector.  
In Egypt,  three studies by Abu Al-foul (2013), Emara et al. (2013) and Ali (2013) produced 
inconsistent results. Abu Al-foul (2013) did not see any meaningful relationship between 
foreign aid and growth in Egypt in the long term. However, Emara et al. (2013) rejected the 
existence of this relationship only in the short run but concluded that foreign aid had a negative 
impact on growth in the long term. Yet, Ali (2013) found that foreign aid negatively influences 
 
2 Foreign aid fungibility is generally defined as a state in which categorical foreign aid in the recipient economy 
has at least one of the following features (i) substitutes for government financing (ii) is used to reduce domestic 
taxes (iii) diverted to other unintended sectors. 
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growth in Egypt both in the short and long term. Significantly, these three studies used the 
ARDL technique which addresses possible endogeneity bias of variables in the model. Unlike 
in Ejigu’s study (2013)3, no test was done in these three studies to justify the treatment of 
foreign aid as exogenous which could partly explain the inconsistencies in their results. 
While all these studies focused on the impact of foreign aid on growth in the various COMESA 
economies with country-specific conclusions without country heterogeneity bias, their 
concentration remained on the aggregate foreign aid impact without exploring the possible 
causes of that outcome. Furthermore, the studies focused on one or two aspects of the possible 
causes such as policy environment, quality of institutions or recipient economy absorption 
capacity with very few (if any) delving into in-depth analysis of how different sectors of the 
economies are rendering foreign aid effective or ineffective. This study differs from previous 
studies because it carefully assesses the effectiveness of foreign aid from a multidimensional 
perspective. Moreover, no study has evaluated the implications of foreign aid on collective 
growth and development aspiration of COMESA as a regional bloc.  
Contending for comparable effects of foreign aid across sectors and countries in the region, the 
study provides insights on the impact of foreign both on sectoral growth outcomes and on 
country-specific economic growth. The thesis applied appropriate econometric techniques to 
address specific elements, including the endogeneity of relevant variables. Among the studies 
that have used the two-gap models to assess the economic growth impact of foreign aid, this 
study provides the first attempt to assess the consistency of foreign aid inflows as regards 
financing gaps both across (within) sectors and countries. Therefore, it postulates that received 
foreign aid volumes below minimum levels for meaningful impact is as redundant for enhanced 
growth outcomes as are quantities above the existing development financing gaps. Notably, too 
much foreign aid, above what is necessary to close the current development financing gaps, has 
a higher potential of creating inefficiencies in the public systems through corruption, among 
other things. (see Alesina and Dollar, 1998; Rajan & Subramanian, 2011; Easterly, 2014). 
Lastly, this study provides valuable policy insights to COMESA. By focusing on foreign aid in 
both its key growth and support sectors, the study unveils mechanisms through which foreign 
aid links to various elements of economic growth and the nature of this linkage in the region. 
 
3 He used the granger causality test to conclude a one-way causality from foreign aid to growth in Ethiopia. This 
test has however been criticised for its inability to capture true causality though effective in detecting correlation 
linkages between variables. 
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This, it is envisaged, will effectively inform the future direction of foreign aid as it relates to 
the region’s collective growth and development objectives. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study  
This study seeks to determine the impact of foreign aid on economic growth in the COMESA 
economic bloc. Specifically, the study investigates and establishes how foreign aid links with 
the various aspects of growth in the region. It intends to unveil how foreign aid influences key 
outputs of the respective sectors to establish both direct and indirect linkages to economic 
growth. The study intends to answer the following questions: 
i) How does the disbursed aid match with the region’s foreign capital requirements to 
effectively provide the needed big push into self-sustaining growth?  
ii) What is the aggregate impact of foreign aid on economic growth in the COMESA 
regional economic bloc  and on individual member countries?   
iii) What has been the role of foreign aid in the growth and development of the region’s 
productive sectors? 
iv) How effective is foreign aid in indirectly stimulating growth through the growth 
enhancing support sectors?  
In answering questions (i) and (ii), the study goes beyond the traditional growth accounting 
framework of the Harrod-Domar (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946) model to test whether foreign 
aid is effective in enhancing economic growth in developing economies. The study assesses 
whether foreign aid is key in pushing recipient economies into self-sustaining growth levels 
through its impact on the core growth sectors. These questions are addressed in chapters 4 and 
5 respectively.  
Questions (iii) and (iv) are complementary to the first two because they explain the productivity 
of foreign aid in more concrete terms than just growth rates. Specifically, question (iii) 
establishes the direct effects of foreign aid on growth in the region by analysing its impact on 
the growth and development of the core growth sectors. On the assumption that growth support 
sectors do not directly contribute to a country’s GDP but indirectly by effectively supporting 
productivity of the core growth sectors, question (iv) establishes how foreign aid indirectly 
promotes growth in the region through its impact on these sectors. The detailed analysis of 
foreign aid in these sectors provided in chapters 6 and 7 respectively. 
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Consequently, the study assesses the following null hypotheses in the order of the research 
questions above: 
a) The disbursed foreign aid volumes vis-à-vis resource gaps are irrelevant in its 
effectiveness.  
b) Foreign aid does not affect economic growth. 
c) Foreign aid does not affect core growth sectors. 
d) Foreign aid does not have any indirect impact on economic growth. 
 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
This study investigates how foreign aid is linked to economic growth and the nature of this 
linkage in COMESA. To this end, the thesis has four analytical chapters that are jointly related 
to these objectives. The thesis also has preliminary chapters and its layout is as follows: 
Chapter One provides a brief background and highlights the study objectives. Chapter Two 
describes different conceptualizations of foreign aid and provides an overview of the political 
economy of foreign aid. Chapter Three provides a systematic review of the theory and empirics 
of foreign aid to give comprehensiveness on the literature not covered in specific analytical 
chapters. Chapter Four focuses on external financing in COMESA with the aim of assessing 
the extent to which the received foreign aid closes the region’s development financing gaps and 
whether its inflows are consistent. The chapter provides an overview of external financing in 
the region with emphasis on foreign aid as a core external development financing resource. It 
discusses key features of foreign aid in terms of trends about its weight in external development 
financing resources, prioritization across sectors, its volume vis-à-vis developmental needs, and 
its overall linkage to economic growth. The chapter is premised on the hypothesis that effective 
foreign aid is signified by a decline in its relative weight in the total foreign capital inflows over 
time, and its volumes are consistent.  
Chapter Five assesses the impact of the total (aggregate) received foreign aid on growth in the 
region. The chapter argues for comparable growth outcomes from foreign aid in the respective 
COMESA countries if it is to effectively contribute to their collective regional growth and 
development goals. Chapter Six provides a detailed assessment of the role of foreign aid in 
agricultural productivity and growth in the region in a Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) 
framework. The chapter analyses the nature of the direct linkage between foreign aid and 
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economic growth through its impact on the region’s core growth sector. The chapter focuses on 
the response path of agricultural productivity and growth to changes in foreign aid. The chapter 
also highlights how government agricultural financing responds to changes in foreign aid and 
how sub-sectoral allocations affect its overall effectiveness.  
Chapter Seven assesses the indirect impact of foreign aid on growth through economic 
infrastructure development by using the Blundell-Bond (BB) (1998) system Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM). The chapter highlights the indirect linkage between foreign aid 
and growth in the region by assessing the role of foreign aid in the region’s economic 
infrastructure development (transport, energy and ICT). The chapter also analyses the effects 
of corruption on foreign aid utilization in the sector in general and which components (loans or 
grants) and which sub-sectors (Transport, energy, and ICT) are being adversely affected by 
such corruption. Lastly, Chapter Eight synthesises the key findings from the four analytical 
chapters, concludes the thesis, and provides policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2. DEFINITION AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN AID  
The premise that foreign aid has a positive impact on the growth of recipients explains the 
significant volumes of aid that have been channelled to developing countries over the years. 
Although empirical evidence is inconclusive particularly in the least developed countries, there 
is quite a large body of the literature arguing that aid has stimulated growth, structural change 
and improved social indicators in developing countries (Arndt et al., 2015). It therefore remains 
imperative to understand the concept of foreign aid, what determines its direction, and whether 
such determinants have any impact on its potency in stimulating growth. Specifically, whether 
aid inflows are systematically dependent on certain characteristics of the recipient countries or 
are largely dependent on donors’ interests has remained a contentious issue in the political 
economy of foreign aid. In this regard, this chapter conceptualizes foreign aid and highlights 
key features in its allocation process without undermining the perspectives of the recipient 
economies in such a process. 
2.1 Defining and Measuring Foreign Aid    
2.1.1 Defining Foreign Aid 
There are varying conceptualisations of foreign assistance in the literature. These definitions 
include all transfers of physical goods and technology, grants, and loans from donors to 
developing economies (Riddell, 2007). In this study, foreign aid refers only to the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) as defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). OECD defines ODA 
as the flow of official grants and concessional loans to developing countries with the primary 
objective of promoting the economic and social development of these economies (F?̈?hrer, 1994; 
OECD, 2018).  By official grants on the one hand, the OECD refers to disbursements in cash 
or kind from the donor’s public official sources (including the state, local governments or the 
state’s executive agencies) to a recipient economy for which there is no repayment required.  
On the other hand, concessional loans are provided at concessional rates comprising at least a 
25 percent grant component and are calculated at a discount rate of 10 percent (F?̈?hrer, 1994; 
OECD, 2018). Thus, compared with other commercial loans, ODA concessional loans have 
lower interest rates and have an extended repayment period. Another key feature of these 
concessional loans is their ability to be converted (part or whole) into grants. In exceptional 
cases,  upon meeting mutually agreed specific conditions, the debt repayment period is deferred, 
or the debt interest is reduced, or in the extreme case, it is altogether cancelled and, converted 
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into a grant. An example in this regard is the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative 
which was launched in 1996 by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  The main objective of the HIPC initiative was to ensure sustainable debt levels in 
developing countries. The necessary conditions to benefit from the initiative include tangible 
outputs on the mutually agreed milestones in the specific pro-poor programmes and policy 
reforms.  
Overall, ODA includes technical cooperation grants such as capacity development, 
development of nuclear energy for civilian and not military purposes. Notably, ODA excludes 
grants, loans and credits that are meant for military purposes less 6% of the multilateral 
peacekeeping expenditures which is recorded as ODA, donations from international civil 
society organizations, commercial loans4 and political development programmes as well as 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)5 (OECD, 2011; Reci, 2014). This definition distinguishes 
ODA from Official Foreign Aid (OA) and Other Official Flows (OOF) in that ODA refers to 
foreign aid that only originates from the official public sources to the lower and upper-middle-
income countries. While OA refers to ODA channelled to the upper-income economies, and 
OOF are official loans and grants that do not meet the ODA eligibility as described above 
(Riddell, 2007). 
2.1.2 Foreign Aid Transmission Channels  
ODA comprises official bilateral and multilateral flows from donors to developing countries. 
On the one hand, bilateral aid flows refer to official foreign aid that is transmitted directly from 
a donor to a recipient developing country. Although largely disbursed through the public sector 
financing mechanisms, bilateral aid flows are also channelled to the respective developing 
countries through specific Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or multilateral 
institutions. On the other hand, multilateral aid flows are those ODA flows that can only be 
channelled through multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to a given 
country. In this regard, several donors pool their resources together for common development 
goals of the recipient economies. As such, the key distinguishing feature between the two flows 
is that while the respective donor of the bilateral foreign aid is identifiable and potentially have 
an influence on the disbursed foreign aid usage, it is not possible to align specific components 
of the pooled resources (basket fund) to specific donors under the multilateral channel. 
 
4 These are loans whose interest rates are defined by the market forces 
5 FDI can be defined as a business with at least 10% ownership by foreign investors. 
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Accordingly, donors under the basket fund barely have any influence on what or how their 
individual contributions are utilised by the recipient economy. These are largely foreign aid 
resources that are financed directly into the recipient’s treasury as General Budget Support 
(GBS) or Sector Budget Support. While the sector budget is earmarked for specific sector 
concerns, the GBS do not target specific concerns. Nevertheless, in both cases, allocation and 
utilisation in specific components (programmes and projects) remains the prerogative of the 
recipient economy.  
Although both bilateral and multilateral aid are believed to ultimately serve the development 
objective of ODA as defined by DAC above, they each possess salient factors that are key in 
influencing the disbursement options of the respective donors. Gulrajani (2016) assessed 6 
comparable advantages of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid flows that are commonly 
discussed in empirical literature. Notably, she only found strong evidence on three of these 
factors as summarized in Table 2.1 below.   
Table 2. 1: Comparative Advantages of Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Channels 
ODA is highly Politicized This is largely centered on the level of control over the 
disbursement and utilization of foreign aid by the respective 
donors. On the one hand, bilateral foreign aid flows carry the 
flagship of the its respective donor who is seen to potentially 
have an influence on what and how the received foreign aid is 
utilized. Therefore, bilateral foreign aid flows are perceived to 
be more aligned with donors strategic and political interests 
(Faye and Niehaus, 2012; Qian, 2014). Notably, these motives 
have been empirically validated to compromise the potency of 
foreign aid. This is particularly the case when these motives 
compromise aid utilization by fostering corruption and bad 
policies, among other things (Radelet, 2006; Sorens, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, once foreign aid is pooled into one basket 
either as BGS or SBS, it loses its donor identity and is perceived 
to serve the collective growth and development objective of the 
developing country. In this regard, respective donors in the 
pooled fund are seen to be less incentivized to pursue the vested 
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interests in foreign aid allocation. As such, Gulrajani (2016) 
finds strong evidence that multilateral foreign aid is more 
objectively given in line with the development financing need 
in the recipient economy. This implies that multilateral foreign 
aid is more effective in enhancing growth than bilateral foreign 
aid.   
Preferences of the aid 
recipient economies 
Due to its flexibility in terms of donor interference in its 
utilisation, evidence suggest that multilateral foreign aid is 
generally mostly preferred by recipient economies than 
bilateral foreign aid. Specifically, empirical research indicates 
better alignment with domestic strategies and development 
financing mechanisms as key in enhancing its effective 
utilisation vis-à-vis bilateral foreign aid flows.   
Aid Fragmentation With several donors pooling their reserves into one basket for 
a unified cause, multilateral foreign aid is more effective and 
efficient in addressing the development concerns of developing 
countries. Specifically, while GBS or SBS provides one big 
development financing thrust to the recipient economies, 
bilateral aid flows are seen to be thinly spread across sectors 
and programmes/projects. On the one hand, regional or sectoral 
mandates that guide multilateral foreign aid flows are key in 
controlling multilateral disbursements. On the other hand, the 
pursuit of visibility by bilateral foreign aid donors is the driving 
force for them to be potentially spread thinly across sectors and 
regions. Moreover, the control that the respective bilateral 
donors have over allocations and utilization can potentially lead 
to concentration of foreign aid in one sector at the expense of 
other potentially growth enhancing sectors with more pressing 
development financing gaps. This would particularly be the 
case if the sectoral goals are not aligned with the interests of 
the respective donors, ceteris paribus. 
With increased donor and, hence, aid fragmentation, Gulrajani 
(2016) finds strong evidence of increased transaction and   
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administrative costs with bilateral aid flows vis-à-vis 
multilateral aid flows. For example, the Tanzanian government 
had to produce about 2000 reports on aid utilization to her 
respective donors annually (Gulrajani 2016:14).  
 
Source: Gulrajani N. (2016:10-16) 
 
Despite overwhelming evidence of the advantages of multilateral over bilateral foreign aid, the 
ultimate decision on the preferred channel remains with the respective donors. Overall, all 
donors disburse their foreign aid through channels that best address their interests either through 
multilateral or bilateral channels. In the case of COMESA, at 63% of its total aid since 2000, 
bilateral foreign aid continues to lead on the foreign aid platform. However, trend lines in Figure 
2.1 show that bilateral foreign aid flows to the region have been steadily decreasing over the 
last three decades. 
Figure 2. 1: Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Aid Flows to COMESA (1985-2017) 
Source: OECD Database accessed on 16th January, 2020 
2.1.3 Monitoring of Foreign Aid 
Although motives and conditions for giving foreign aid vary among donors (Quian, 2014), the 
overall objective remains developmental, as highlighted by the DAC definition above. To this 
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end, it is recognized that its efficiency in attaining this objective lies in how well it is aligned 
with the development goals of the recipient economies, among other things. Consequently, 
through the Paris Declaration on Foreign Aid Effectiveness (PDAE) (2005) and the Accra 
Agenda for Action (AAA) (2008), both donors and recipient economies resolved to ensure that 
all foreign aid is properly aligned to the development strategies, institutions and procedures of 
the recipient economies. The PDAE further encourages mutual accountability in both the 
disbursement and utilisation of foreign aid resources. This commits donors to accede  to the 
development priorities of the recipient economies and ensure an effective use of the existing 
country systems in disbursing foreign aid. Furthermore, it commits the recipient economies to 
ensure the existence of strengthened monitoring and evaluation systems, clearly linking their 
development strategies and budget frameworks and processes. Partly, this enhances 
accountability as foreign aid disbursements from all donors are supposedly linked to a single 
funding framework and indicators that are derived from the recipient economy’s development 
strategy. Through these and other goals of the PDAE, mutual accountability in the 
disbursements and utilisation of foreign aid resources are among the key issues highlighted for 
its effectiveness. However, it should be noted that this is a non-binding declaration. As such, it 
binds neither donors nor recipient economies to thoroughly monitor how foreign aid is 
disbursed, under what conditions, and whether it is utilised efficiently for the intended 
objectives. Hence, vast empirical evidence skews towards political and strategic interests rather 
than developmental objectives in giving foreign aid. Evidence also suggests that foreign aid is 
fungible, a key factor that undermines its efficiency. 
2.1.4 Measuring Foreign Aid 
In determining the impact of ODA on economic growth, it is imperative to accurately decide 
whether to use commitments or disbursements as the two flows imply different things. While 
disbursements reflect the actual transfer of resources to the intended beneficiary economy, 
commitments represent a firm written obligation by the donor on the indicated amount to the 
respective intended beneficiary’s economy (OECD, 2005). As such, their relative influence on 
the direction of the results and growth impact is different since not all commitments are 
translated into disbursements (Roodman, 2004a). While disbursement volumes were somewhat 
higher than commitments for a few countries in some years, overall, the committed ODA 
volumes to COMESA have been significantly higher than the actual values received by the 
member states (Figure 1.4). Consequently, this study will be restricted to foreign aid 
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disbursement6 in analysing its impact on various aspects of economic growth to avoid 
magnifying foreign aid volumes in the beneficiary economies. 
Figure 2. 2: ODA Commitments and Disbursements to COMESA (2002-2014; US 
millions) 
Source: OECD Database accessed on 10th December, 2016 
In sum, it is unanimously agreed that the working definition of foreign aid greatly influences 
the outcome of the foreign aid-growth analyses as different types of foreign aid affect the 
economy differently (Easterly, 2003). Therefore, this study focuses on ODA as defined by the 
OECD above but only covering net disbursements to fully understand the actual impact of the 
foreign resources utilised. However, where the impact of the concessional loans is analysed, 
gross ODA is chosen as net ODA excludes repayments on the concessional loans. In analysing 
foreign aid utilisation in the region, the study uses total ODA and thus, combining both bilateral 
and multilateral foreign aid flows. 
2.2 The Political Economy of Foreign Aid  
Aid is potentially a powerful tool for exerting donor influence on other sovereign states. The 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PDAE) in 2005 highlighted five principles of aid. The 
 
6 Due to data paucity and data requirements (N and T sizes) of the various estimators adopted, some countries 
were dropped, and the study period was adjusted to the data set requirements in the respective analytical chapters.  
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recipient country’s ownership of the domestic policies, and donor alignment with national 
systems of the recipient were some of the principles. The principles of the PDAE were set up 
to insulate developing countries from excessive donor meddling in their national development 
agendas (Overton et al., 2012). This section reviews literature on aid allocation to establish 
whether there is a systematic relationship between foreign aid delivery and its impact on growth 
outcomes in the recipient countries.  It builds on the literature on foreign aid to explain why 
countries give or receive aid.  
2.2.1 What Determines How Donors Allocate Aid  
2.2.1.1 Humanitarian and Development Assistance 
Is there a distinction between humanitarian and developmental assistance? Is all aid 
developmental in nature? DAC’s definition of foreign aid given in the above section, highlights 
critical features of ODA, which is developmental such that its loan component is concessional 
and discounted below the market value. Humanitarian aid is perhaps the closest one get to 
neutral, impartial and independent aid, but the debate about these terms is raging (Dany, 2015). 
Humanitarian aid is a response to natural disasters and other human-induced emergencies 
including conflicts and wars. In this context, hotspots for these issues become the concentration 
of efforts by both state and non-state actors including NGOs actively contributing to delivering 
the emergency response.   
According to the OECD Creditor Reporting System Database, the top 5 recipients of 
humanitarian aid in COMESA (top 7 for Africa) between 2015 and 2017 were South Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kenya, with 
Central African Republic, Uganda and (Sierra Leone completing the top 10 African recipients 
of this type of aid (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2. 3: Humanitarian aid receipts, per cent of total humanitarian aid to Africa, 
average 2015-2017 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD Creditor Reporting System Database 
Humanitarian aid typically obtains more in-donor7 public approval than other forms of aid. The 
problem with humanitarian aid however is its short-term outlook, being based on relief and 
rehabilitation interventions in an emergency. Humanitarian foreign aid rarely takes on a long-
term perspective like climate change adaptation, or human rights promotion to prevent future 
conflicts (Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson, 2012). Although humanitarian aid is low compared 
to other types of aid, it represents a significant proportion of aid flows to least developing 
countries (LDCs). However, vulnerability and fragility of countries are usually linked to 
structural, long-term constraints as is the case among developing countries especially the LDCs 
facing chronic structural economic problems, poverty and underdevelopment. Hence the failure 
of humanitarian aid to catalyse long-term development may explain why foreign aid has not 
been effective in the most vulnerable countries.  
The interaction between humanitarian foreign aid and development cooperation is very 
important for the aid recipients. The triggers for humanitarian crises, for example, are often 
linked to the development challenges that led to conflicts and wars, hence the long-term solution 
usually requires more than the transient illusion of eased suffering of the affected populations. 
There is, therefore, a need for smarter allocation of aid to contribute to economic infrastructure 
development, strengthening national institutions and systems, capacity and coordination 
responsibilities of the recipients. In turn, these require donors to flexibly support on-budget aid 
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modalities that can contribute to nationally led development (OECD, 2015). This view was also 
outlined in the DAC guidelines on the role of development cooperation in emergencies, 
particularly on the need to support the effectiveness of the state in the short and the long-term 
(Bigdon and Korf, 2004), although structural stability is coined in terms of “democratic norms 
and values” which are hard to attain immediately following a conflict.  
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) found that aid for social infrastructure, economic 
infrastructure, and the productive sector had a positive impact on human development of 
recipient countries but the effect of humanitarian assistance was negative. Although the authors 
suggest the lack of substitution among humanitarian aid components is the culprit, evidence by 
itself points to the lack of synergy between humanitarian aid receipts and the development goals 
of human development. Also, the slow pace at which donors respond to new emergencies 
suggest that humanitarian aid is not allocated as neutrally and independently as thought, but 
rather that a significant portion of humanitarian aid is also subject to discretion of the donors 
which may fall in the category of economic and other strategic interests (Fielding, 2014).  
In his study about the politics behind humanitarian support, Büthe et al. (2012) argues that non-
state sources of aid allocated by NGOs does not suffer the same dilemmas as state aid and that 
no systematic prioritization of aid (self-interest) is observed. This confirms that humanitarian 
consideration for foreign aid divorced from state influence is a less controversial motive for 
providing aid to poor countries. However, the fact that the larger multinational NGOs also raise 
resources from private individuals and other influential personalities brings self-interest and 
strategic choice problems into their aid operations even where they are humanitarian in nature. 
In the end, there is a thin line between values on which the pure aid framework is founded, and 
material considerations which determine aid allocation. In the pure aid framework, norms and 
identities are supposed to drive aid allocation and priorities, based on the needs of the recipient 
countries (Büthe et al., 2012) 
2.2.1.2 Reasons for aid: Political and strategic or development  
The quality of institutions may influence the level of aid receipts, although some countries with 
poor governance structures have also received higher levels of aid. Fragmentation of aid, the 
proliferation of projects with diverse donor driven agendas, and the impact of donor aid 
diversion from government budget processes are factors that contribute to weakening state 
institutions and shrinking of the policy space. That aid creates vested interest may be contested 
but Bräutigam and Knack (2004) observed that aid can block improvements in governance by 
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weakening institutions in recipient countries. Aid flows create an incentive for rent-seeking 
public officials to expand budgetary outlays at the expense of economically productive 
activities and the efficient allocation of resources by the market (Remmer, 2004). Donors also 
question whether those who govern recipient countries have development as their central 
objective, especially in countries with rampant corruption and unwillingness to reform the 
public sector to match donors’ institutional settings (Booth, 2012). By contrast, a developmental 
state that plans and coordinates aid receipts according to its own development agenda stands a 
better chance at using aid to improve the quality of its policy and institutional capacities 
(Bräutigam and Knack, 2004).  
Thus, having good policies and keeping corruption in check does not always lead to higher aid 
inflows. Strategic considerations of donors play a significant role in determining the level of 
bilateral aid flows. For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) observed that OECD countries 
favoured former colonies whereas aid from Nordic countries was statistically linked to poverty 
levels of recipient countries (Qian, 2015). Faye and Niehaus (2012) linked the strategic choice 
of donors to political alignment of the recipient’s regime, with more aid channelled to countries 
which are politically aligned. Of interest is their observation that political and strategic interests 
may affect only the allocation of aid thus dis-aligning the overall impact of the received foreign 
aid on economic growth from the intent in giving it. Similarly, Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
observed that donors’ political and strategic interests were key in determining bilateral foreign 
aid flows whose impact on economic growth was contingent on good policies in the recipient 
economy. However, the influence of donor agendas may also extend to the use of aid (Newman 
et al., 2016), especially where the sectoral allocation of aid is misaligned with national 
development strategies (UNCTAD, 2019). Newman et al. (2016) and UNCTAD (2019) warn 
of the danger that recipients may become spectators rather than lead actors in influencing their 
development agendas, with key productive sectors including infrastructure receiving low aid 
resources compared to humanitarian and social sectors.  
The principal of country ownership is rooted in this neostructural theory of development which 
considers intervention in development as the primary responsibility of the state. Accordingly, 
building state capacity and aligning foreign aid to state functions are the desired response of the 
donors (Overton et al., 2012). The implication of this statement is two-fold. First, the project-
type interventions, which constitute more than two-thirds of aid disbursements to least 
developed countries (UNCTAD, 2019), are not appropriate for state capacity building. These 
projects tend to retain donor influence on recipients. Second, foreign aid should predominantly 
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be disbursed as flows from state to state as intended in the definition of ODA by OECD DAC, 
rather than through the growing practice of using non-state actors and intermediaries. The 
challenge to recipients of aid to maintain sovereignty over their national development plans 
therefore, depends on whether aid supports political and institutional machinery for delivering 
development.  
Focusing on business cycles, Norris et.al (2010) observed that strategic and political interests 
are not always key in influencing the direction of foreign aid. They concluded that adverse 
economic shocks largely affect gross bilateral foreign aid flows in both the donor and recipient 
economies. Analysing bilateral data for 22 donors and more than 100 recipient economies, they 
noted that foreign aid inflows were higher during times of adverse economic shocks in the 
recipient economies and/or economic boom in the donor economies and vice-versa. However, 
their findings did not support the existence of a linear relationship between foreign aid flows 
and business cycles in both the donor and recipient economies. Significantly, they observed a 
more than proportionate fall in foreign aid inflows to recipient economies following a recession 
in the donor economies. Thus, they underscored the fact that while political and strategic 
interests may be key in determining the flow of foreign aid in most cases, social and economic 
motives underlie the direction of foreign aid for some donors. This view was underscored by 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Berthèlemy (2005), who observed that motives for giving foreign 
aid g varies among donors with some focusing on the economic interests and yet others on 
political and strategic interests. They observed that foreign aid from most Nordic countries is 
largely influenced by the poverty levels and viability of institutions in the recipient economies. 
This was contrary to the United States and France where colonial ties and strategic interests 
were observed to be key determining factors of foreign aid disbursements. Similarly, in their 
Tobit analysis, Canavire et.al (2005) found that both political and economic issues are key in 
determining the direction of foreign aid with donor export related self-interests governing most 
of the bilateral foreign aid flows.  
Employing a three-dimensional dataset to account for heterogeneity in donors behaviour, 
Berthèlemy (2005) also concluded that both donors’ self-interests and economic motives play 
a significant role in the allocation of foreign aid. Noris et.al (2010) also observed that these 
motives vary with donors, with Switzerland, Ireland and most Nordic countries being highly 
driven by the economic stance of the recipient economy and on the other hand, France, Japan, 
US and the United Kingdom being largely influenced by political and self-interests. Overall, 
Noris et.al concluded that while decisions on foreign aid allocation are motivated by political 
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and strategic interests, most donors implement their selectivity rules in the allocation of foreign 
aid based on economic needs and merits of the recipient countries (also see Ridell 2007:97). 
Focusing on foreign aid determinants, Sorens (2009) concluded that the motives for giving 
foreign aid have a significant bearing on how it is utilised and hence its efficiency in stimulating 
growth. Specifically, he pointed out that political motives for foreign aid allocation have 
continued to encourage poor fiscal management in most underdeveloped economies as 
evidenced by continued high foreign aid inflows to countries with a record of high corruption, 
poor governance and policies. Sorens added that this results in inefficient resources utilisation 
including foreign aid hence no traceable positive impact of the latter on economic growth. 
Similarly, Radelet et. Al., (2004) and Radelet (2006) argued that instead of enhancing 
sustainable economic growth, foreign aid has pushed more economies into deeper debts, 
perpetrated inefficiencies in the public systems, corruption and bad governance resulting in 
foreign aid ineffectiveness in stimulating economic growth. However, other authors have put 
forward different views of foreign aid’s interactions with some of these variables. For example, 
Menard and Weill (2016) does not support the view that foreign aid fosters corruption. 
Similarly, Akramov (2006) did not find any relationship between foreign aid and governance.  
Studies emphasize the relative importance of donors’ political, commercial and strategic 
interests, historical ties as well as economic needs in the recipient economies as some of the 
key factors determining the direction of foreign. However, studies further highlight that these 
factors have very little (if any) direct impact on the effectiveness of these resources in 
influencing the macro-economic variables, particularly growth of the recipient economies (Faye 
and Niehaus, 2012). Foreign aid only becomes effective if donor motives for giving foreign aid 
tamper with the quality of institutions and policies in the recipient economy resulting in the 
reduction of corruption and other inefficiencies/ or promoting the overall efficiency in the 
economy (Sorens, 2009). Generally, it is contended that macroeconomic performance, policies 
and the quality of institutions in the recipient economies matters the most in rendering foreign 
aid effective (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Norris et.al, 2010). In other words, the impact of 
foreign aid cannot be solely explained by donor’s motives (Lumsdaine, 1993), it is also 
dependent on its efficient management (Riddell, 2007).  
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2.2.1.3 The doomed aid effectiveness agenda  
Despite the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005, effectiveness of development 
cooperation remains questionable. First, as already pointed out, aid affects incentives and 
institutions in recipient countries, hence, the aid delivery method matters. As a result of the 
mode of delivery, the preferences of donors are not defined by the likely outcomes of the 
intervention but by exigencies of aid modalities which are at the donor’s disposal. Second, the 
conflict between domestic policy imperatives and the donor objectives not only create 
unnecessary waste but also directly affect the efficiency of programmes financed by donor 
funds. Third, the misalignment between priorities of donors and beneficiaries may also be the 
result and the cause of the proliferation of free-standing donor project which only tangentially 
draw objectives from national plans (Booth, 2012).  
The proliferation of project type interventions contributes to fragmentation of aid while also 
diluting country priorities. Booth (2012) argues that the perception that low-income aid 
recipient country policies are inadequate or not geared to development leads to suboptimal 
donor arrangements that are specifically designed to bypass national systems and policies. This 
“cherry picking” behaviour by donors has the effect of undermining sector and national 
development plans, and entrenching donor agendas over national development priorities. The 
divergence between donor objectives and national priorities is just one side of the misalignment 
problem. Duplication of efforts is so rampant that donor coordination by recipients is not an 
optional transaction cost in the quest for alignment of donor aid with national priorities, and for 
achieving integrated aid delivery. However, harmonized aid may introduce clustering bias with 
too few sectors selected by donors; or due to a trade-off as some donors are poorly suited to 
work collaboratively as they compete for influence and visibility. The general lesson therefore 
is that there are issues that donors find particularly difficult to cede control to national systems, 
or systems established by other donors, rendering the entire process of donor harmonization 
difficult (Welle et al., 2008).  
It is not only state agencies that have led to the proliferation of projects. NGOs have also eked 
out some stake in development cooperation space once occupied only by state agencies. 
Whereas state actors allocate aid for various motives, private sector or NGOs in development 
cooperation may represent self-seeking entities that allocate aid as a fundraising strategy. In 
most extreme cases, it is not uncommon for NGOs to use images of suffering in their fundraising 
campaigns, although on closer assessment, some of the NGOs are high spenders on 
administrative and logistics. Further evidence of self-serving behaviour is the large 
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concentration of NGOs in countries or fields that attract more resources (Büthe et al., 2012), 
for example, health (HIV and other communicable diseases) and humanitarian emergencies 
such as refugee camps and migration.   
In their defence, NGOs are very effective in their operations. It is also argued by Büthe et al. 
(2012) that NGOs mostly allocate aid in accordance with humanitarian principles, that is, that 
aid allocated to recipient countries purely on needs established through the means of economic 
indicators such as per capita GDP, human development indicators or the share of the population 
living in poverty. However, Büthe et al.also concluded that NGOs operations have little impact 
on economic development as their aid allocations do not necessarily take a long-term view such 
as the development of institutional capacities of recipients or addressing root causes of the 
humanitarian crises. NGOs are also criticised for lack of accountability, not in the sense of fiscal 
accountability but performance, due to higher costs of service delivery. In addition, the very 
essence of aid effectiveness agenda has been destroyed further by the increased fragmentation 
of aid that comes with many actors including NGOs competing with other NGOs and with state 
agencies for a stake in development cooperation (UNCTAD, 2019).  
2.2.1.4 Instrument of economic sanctions  
Economic sanctions are defined as the withdrawal or threat of withdrawal of customary trade 
or financial relationships (Crawford and Kacarska, 2017). Conditionalities are discouraged in 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and in international agreements on financing 
development. The Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development uses the language of 
untying aid and the need to remove burdensome restrictions (UN, 2002), but the problem of 
tied aid persists. In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, donors again committed to “align activities 
with national priorities, including by reducing fragmentation, accelerating the untying of aid, 
particularly for least developed countries and countries most in need” (UN, 2015). Aid may be 
used as an instrument for bargaining by the donor to extract concessions from the recipient 
country or for leveraging power over international political and economic issues. For example, 
the European Union concerned with spill-over effects from insecurity in Libya has used aid to 
minimize these risks (Biondo, 2015). 
There are many facets of tied aid, and unlike the commonly held views, tied aid is more than 
just the procurement restricted aid that must use goods and services from the donor country. 
Untying aid is a complex process that requires an understanding of the various modalities 
through which aid is delivered. Requesting recipient countries to comply with donor policies 
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on procurement, gender, human rights and governance and other specific prescriptions are 
common in bilateral aid arrangements. In addition, the more restrictive the donor policy 
measures, the higher the tied components that recipient countries must deal with. On 
procurement, DAC promotes the use of the Recommendations of the Council for Development 
Cooperation Action on Managing the Risk of Corruption, which basically calls for putting in 
place a set of measures including a code of conduct among public officials and donor agency 
staff; ethics and anti-corruption assistance/advisory services; and training.  
The scope of untied aid is very low when one considers the transparency terms in the DAC 
guidelines. In general, DAC members should notify the recipient country ex-ante for offers of 
untied aid only when the activities are valued above SDR700,000 (SDR130000 in case of 
investments for technical cooperation) (OECD, 2019). Other non-DAC donors also place a 
significant premium on conditionalities, for instance, political thresholds are explicitly outlined 
in the US Millennium Challenge Account. Considering that donors prefer supporting individual 
projects whose funding scale is much less than the above cited amounts, the chances of 
achieving significant progress on untied aid is almost non-existent. Thus, sanctions and 
conditionalities effectively place donor interests above those of the recipients (Biondo, 2015).  
 
2.2.2 The perspectives of the recipients of aid 
2.2.2.1 National development priorities and national systems 
The attempts by developing countries to coordinate foreign aid and development assistance 
stems from the need to achieve coherence and integration with their development plans. Aid 
coordination is very important to recipients because it is through the exercise of this function 
that the developing countries can claim some ownership of the activities particularly if their 
objectives are loosely derived from national development plans (Biondo, 2015). Although aid 
coordination may not increase the use of recipient’s financial management systems and budget 
procedures, coherence of activities improves results while flexibly allowing donors to support 
areas in which they are competent.  
The drawback with flexible arrangements is that donors may cluster around their favourite 
sectors, typically the social sector, and neglect other national developmental priorities. Most 
developing countries have moved towards programmatic budgeting to improve integration 
among national development plans and sectoral plans and for rationalizing the budgeting 
process. Yet, the medium-term expenditure frameworks, which are touted by the World Bank 
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and the International Monetary Fund as the workhorse for achieving coherence between 
planning and resource budgeting, have not received the envisaged donor support. (OECD, 2015; 
Booth, 2012). After 2009, there are hardly any country cases where budget support is more than 
2 per cent of total aid receipts. In 2018, only Djibouti (43%) and Egypt (21%) received 
significant direct budget support, reflecting individual circumstances that are unique to them 
(Figure 2.4)8,9. 
There are other genuine reasons why budget support has not worked in some developing 
countries. For instance, corruption and fraud, human rights concerns and other governance 
issues are the main reasons that European Union members give for withdrawing budget support. 
However, donor perception of recipients also plays a critical role. Specifically, reverse 
alignment is common, whereby donors expect recipients to comply with the donors’ policies 
and not the other way around- the so called “aid conditionality” is a reverse alignment scenario 
which aims at imposing policy changes on the recipients’ in exchange for aid. The latter does 
not auger well with states that are pursuing focused national development plans that are well 
structured, regardless of resource constraints faced.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 In Egypt, the budget support reflects arrears from several years targeting socioeconomic sectors such as health, 
transport, water and energy in line with some conditionalities imposed on public finance management and also 
the EU-Egypt partnership priorities. According to the EU, the support will cease in under three years. For details, 
see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-002033_EN.html 
and http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-002033-ASW_EN.pdf 
9 In Djibouti, the budget support is through the World Bank assisting the country to carry out a systematic 
diagnostic assessment with the view to diversifying the economy (World Bank Group, 2018).  
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Figure 2. 4: Budget support received (% of total ODA from DAC Countries) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD Creditor Reporting System Database 
2.2.2.2 The aid landscape requires active state monitoring  
The aid landscape has evolved over the years, with an increased number of actors becoming 
involved in delivering development cooperation. In the past, aid predominantly consisted of 
grants and concessional loans from traditional donors (DAC members) and other developed 
countries (non-DAC donors). The DAC gives aid a distinct characteristic, through negotiated 
definitions of what official development assistance (ODA) should comprise, its modalities and 
channels of delivery, as well as its reporting and monitoring. However, as a result of the 
changing characteristic of ODA, developing countries have found themselves with higher debt 
obligations as the level of concessionality has declined over the years, while the element of 
grants has not increased to offset the changes. Therefore,  increases in ODA loans by the 
multilateral donors mainly to finance investments in economic infrastructure and productive 
sectors are the main reason for the steady increase in ODA gross disbursements to LDCs since 
2011. This resulted in a general external debt increase for LDC from $146 billion in 2007 to 
$313 billion in 2017, thereby raising the risk of reverting back to debt crisis (UNCTAD, 2019).  
2.2.2.3 The weak link between public finance and external development assistance 
Despite large flows of aid received by some countries, the impact on economic growth and 
poverty has largely been disappointing. Concessional loans have generally a higher impact on 
economic development than fungible grants particularly where self-funded or matching 
guarantees are requested by the donor. A large impact on government investment is gained from 
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concessional loans than from grant-dominated ODA expenditures which only leads to inflated 
consumption. Grants may also be damaging to economies of developing countries because of 
the large component that goes to consumption. For instance, emergency food aid and other 
social sector foreign aid may not have the same rates of return than investment on infrastructure 
and capital (Swaroop et al., 1996).  
Whether foreign aid receipts would catalyse economic growth is therefore dependent on many 
factors including how the receipts are utilized. The synergy between domestic resource 
mobilization and external development funds is underutilized because of the mistrust in the 
institutions of recipients and the inability by the recipients to plan their development 
programmes so that aid progressively becomes redundant. Guillaumont and Wagner (2012) 
argues that foreign aid can become redundant only if it catalyses economic growth including 
by addressing the structural vulnerabilities of the recipients. However, economic structural 
reform can only truly begin to take shape if the state has capacities to plan and implement 
development projects and when its own domestic resource mobilization framework is sound. 
Also, structural economic vulnerability is not always the only factor conditioning the impact of 
aid on economic growth as pointed out earlier. Hence, the key to achieving synergetic impact 
of aid on economic growth is first to boost the domestic resources with which to match aid, and 
second, to ensure aid is coherently spent within the framework of the national development 
priorities that are pro-growth.   
When foreign aid is disbursed according to the needs of recipients, they do not make any effort 
to improve their welfare, thereby perpetually remaining foreign aid dependent. This is the 
argument used by donors to delegate foreign aid delivery to international agencies and other 
non-state stakeholders to wrestle back some control over outcomes. If the delegated agencies 
have less aversion to poverty and other social ills, the foreign aid delivered by them will 
eventually improve welfare of the poor and reverse the social problems (Svensson, 2000). What 
this entails is that donors may have to invest resources to influence public expenditure policies 
of recipients of foreign aid, although such influence is pervasive and therefore not suitable. 
However, efforts to reduce corruption in the use of allocated foreign aid and ensuring that 
recipient governments undertake structural reforms to alleviate poverty should be encouraged 
and maintained.  
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda for the implementation of the SDGs was expected to refocus 
attention on resource mobilization for developing countries. The trend in developing countries 
shows that tax to GDP ratios have increased, indicating a higher domestic resource mobilization 
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effort. At the same time, public capital and current expenditures have also increased at a rapid 
pace, requiring vigilance on mitigating the negative consequences of expansionary fiscal 
policies. However, since tax revenue and ODA fall short of desired public expenditures in most 
developing countries, there is need to boost the tax potential of developing countries by 
focusing on solving long standing structural problems of the countries (UNCTAD, 2019). In 
other words, foreign aid should be purposely directed to productive sectors to boost growth, 
and endogenously reduce economic vulnerability and foreign aid dependence.  
Reform efforts in foreign aid recipient countries can be observed, although the attribution of 
the development outcomes to foreign aid may be less straightforward (Svensson, 2000). This is 
an area that fiscal response models exploit to account for the impact of foreign aid on 
development, considering the fiscal policy decisions of the recipient countries. However, 
generalizing foreign aid effects on government expenditure would be misleading because the 
effects are mostly country specific, with additionality and fungibility potentially overstated by 
many studies (Mosley, 2015; UNCTAD, 2019).  
The substitutability or lack of synergy between domestic and external resources can easily give 
rise to incompatibilities and inefficiency. The mere fact that foreign aid targets a few sectors is 
problematic because implementation of policies oriented towards growth or structural 
transformation should be integrated to national public budgets. For instance, public 
infrastructure investments in sectors such as ICT and transport are supposedly complementary 
with social sector expenditures such as health and primary education. However, if the 
composition of aid is biased towards some sectors, it dampens the impact of government 
expenditure of recipient countries (Chatterjee et al., 2012). The aid-growth relationship is 
therefore weaker because of the neglect of these and other salient factors that have worked in 
the past and have tended to be overlooked in recent years. 
In a classic article on foreign aid, Grundmann (1978), for example, argued that foreign aid can 
raise exports from the donors’ perspective if it is used to pay for goods and services from the 
donor to the recipient. The tied bilateral aid arrangements is responsible for 3 to 6 percent of 
in-donor export contracts, and the figure has steadily grown over the years. While aid is export-
generating from the donor’s perspective, the recipient faces a loss of market by its local 
entrepreneurs who cannot compete with transnational companies for the supply of the goods 
and services. Local entrepreneurs trying to break onto the international market may not access 
finance from international development banks that are financial backers of in-donor exporters. 
So, foreign aid-growth relationship works best only if they are rewarding to the neglected 
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aspects of development such as the development of productive capacities and local private 
sector.  
Originally foreign aid was meant to support BOP constrained countries to meet their 
international obligations as was the case in the Marshall Plan (Ranaweera, 2003). This was also 
the thrust of most structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and World Bank, although they 
focused on macroeconomic targets which the recipients were supposed to adhere to. 
Quantitative programming of foreign aid is criticised based on the gap model centred around 
two things: i) public investment and foreign aid are no longer co-determined as it should have 
been, and this is clear from the many cases in developing countries where public investment 
and ODA have sharply diverged. Instead, the focus on good policies and institutions 
overshadows the strides developing countries have made towards improving the economic 
environment and infrastructure needed for inclusive and sustainable economic growth; and (ii) 
what constitutes good policies and structural change has never been defined concretely, but 
foreign aid effectiveness is conditioned on the quality policies and institutions, which in some 
way brings country ownership back at the heart of development cooperation. Country 
ownership should at least force a rethink of the institutional frameworks through which foreign 
aid is channelled to developing countries and its prospects of sustaining economic growth (Tarp, 
2006).  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND EMPIRICS OF FOREIGN AID AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH  
The main objective of foreign aid remains poverty reduction through the promotion of 
economic growth and development. However, the extent to which this is fulfilled in developing 
economies is a contentious issue as underscored by the polarised views in the aid-growth 
literature. This chapter first reviews key economic theories of foreign aid focusing on the 
potentials foreign aid has in stimulating economic growth. Secondly, the chapter reviews the 
empirical literature on the determinants of foreign aid to provide a clear understanding of the 
extent to which it potentially compromises foreign aid effectiveness in the recipient countries.  
The chapter also provides a detailed review of empirical literature to determine the extent to 
which foreign aid has resulted in economic growth or lack of it in the developing economies 
and why. The chapter focuses on what renders aid effective or ineffective by highlighting 
contributing factors both from donors and recipient countries. The chapter also highlights 
salient factors in the methodologies adopted in the reviewed studies to ascertain its possible 
contribution to divergent views found in aid-growth literature. 
3.1 Economic Theories of Foreign Aid  
There are two conflicting groups of theories on the role of foreign aid on economic growth. 
Although theorists converge on the need to focus on inward-looking policies to enhance growth 
and break the financial dependency chain in foreign aid recipient economies, their views on the 
role of foreign aid diverge when it comes to their fundamental assumptions on the motives for 
giving foreign aid. To the dependency theorists, wrong motives for giving foreign aid (political 
and strategic interests of the donors) crowd out the potential growth-enhancing benefits of 
foreign aid by perpetuating corruption, among other things. The right motives are assumed by 
the conventional theorists, but they view inefficient utilisation in the recipient economies as a 
key factor affecting the potency of foreign aid. 
3.1.1 Dependency Theories of Foreign Aid  
The dependency theorists argue against foreign aid as they perceive it mainly as a political and 
economic control tool by the developed economies that traps the recipient countries in 
underdevelopment and poverty by weakening their attempts towards attaining self-sustaining 
growth (Moyo, 2009; Matunhu, 2011; Todaro and Smith, 2012:123). Specifically, they view 
foreign aid as one of the key destroyers of institutions, perpetrator of corruption and bad 
governance as it benefits the minority elite who serve the political and economic motives of the 
donors (Radlet et al., 2004). To them, underdevelopment is not just an issue of limited capital 
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but rather a consequence of social and economic imbalances that have seen the underdeveloped 
economies being net producers of raw materials for the benefit and further growth of the 
developed economies. As a result, developing countries remain stuck in the undeveloped state 
while heavily dependent on the developed world for resources and technology progress 
(Matunhu, 2011). In this regard, dependency theorists’ focus for enhanced growth is on the 
economic, political, and institutional reforms (inward-looking policies) in the underdeveloped 
economies to break the political and economic dependency chain rather than an infusion of 
foreign aid, which they believe barely stimulates economic growth. 
While foreign aid might negatively impact growth as portrayed by the dependency theorist 
views, they are silent on the viable alternate sources of foreign capital to close the financing 
gaps in developing countries with low savings rates and limited capacity to attract foreign 
capital through functional markets. In Africa, for example, it is well documented that its 
effectiveness in capital accumulation is greatly undermined by the region’s inability to raise the 
required finances. Focusing within the region to close the infrastructure financing gap, ECA 
(2015) noted that the region could only raise 48% of the required capital resources. Since the 
region is unable to mobilise the 52% through functional markets, foreign aid becomes their only 
option to augment resources in the short to medium term. As such, dependency theorists’ 
perceptions on foreign aid as an absolute evil to the growth process, poses further threats for 
these economies to remain underdeveloped unless viable alternative external financing 
modalities are found. Todaro and Smith (2012) criticises  the dependency theorist’s stance on 
foreign aid pointing out that it entails the existence of an unrealistic sustainable development 
path for closed economies that further limits their access to foreign capital and technology 
advancement. 
3.1.2 Conventional Theories of Foreign Aid  
Conventional theorists’ advocates for foreign aid only as temporal means to provide a thrust for 
launching the recipient economies onto a self-sustaining growth path (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; 
Todaro and Smith, 2012). They posit that foreign aid accelerates economic growth in the 
recipient economies by augmenting domestic savings to achieve the required levels of 
investment for the desired growth rates. Specifically, they view capital formation as a primary 
engine for growth yet limited in the developing economies on account of low savings and 
investment rates. Hence, the need for foreign aid as an additional source of capital to provide a 
temporal thrust for launching the recipient economies onto a self-sustaining growth path as 
discussed below:  
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3.1.2.1 Harrod-Domar Model 
The Harrod-Domar model provides pertinent foundation to the foreign aid advocacy theories. 
The model considers capital formation investment (I=ΔK) as the key pillar for economic growth 
such that economic growth rate (𝛥𝑌 𝑌⁄ = 𝑔), is a function of investment and the productivity 
of that investment which is given by the capital-output ratio (ΔK/ΔY=υ). The model further 
assumes that for any tangible investment to occur, the economy must save a significant 
proportion of its national income (sY) such that in equilibrium, the savings rate (S=sY) is the 
same as investment (I=ΔK). Thus, in equilibrium we have: 
𝑆 = 𝑠𝑌 = 𝐼 = 𝛥𝐾 = 𝜐𝛥𝑌                                                                                                        (3.1) 
And from (1) the growth rate will be given by    
𝛥𝑌
𝑌
= 𝑠
𝜐
                                                        (3.2)    
which entails that the more an economy saves and productively invest, the more it grows on the 
assumption of a stable υ over time as well as direct linear relationship between investment and 
growth. However, in practice, several factors such as changes in technology and policy 
environment alters υ over time with the corresponding effects on growth (Easterly 2003; Todaro 
and Smith, 2012). Furthermore, the implicit assumption of excess labour which can be hired as 
desired does not always hold entailing that focusing on just capital investments whilst ignoring 
the effects of other factors that are essential in determining growth, might compromise the 
effectiveness of model. Despite criticism over these assumptions, the model remains the 
backbone of foreign aid advocacy theories which assume that the main constraint for growth is 
the inability of poor countries to raise the required capital for the desired levels of growth 
through domestic savings. Hence, the need for foreign assistance to augment domestic savings. 
 
3.1.2.2 Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth: The Take-Off 
Through his stages of economic growth, Rostow highlighted constraints faced by 
underdeveloped economies as well as the kind of pushing they need in transiting into self-
sustaining growth levels. Similar to the H-D model, Rostow emphasized the need to raise both 
the volume and productivity of investment in various key sectors of the economy. He argued 
that investment properly supported by efficient institutions and proper technologies is essential 
in transiting through the take off stage to self-sustaining growth. Whilst reckoning that 
preconditions for take-off may vary between countries depending on their initial investment 
levels, he observed that three minimum conditions must be met if a country is to take-off:  an 
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increase in investment to at least 10 per cent of GDP; substantial growth and development of at 
least one of the core growth sectors such as manufacturing; and an existence of an institutional 
framework that will effectively  support growth linkages between the core growth sectors and 
other subsectors of the economy.  
Influenced by the H-D model, Rostow argued for the need to increase its investment levels to 
at least 10 per cent of its GDP in the developing economies to accelerate their respective growth 
levels (Lockwood, 1990; Bowen, 1998). Accordingly, he encouraged the rationalization of 
public investments to ensure effective support in production and ensuring enhanced market 
access. For the second and third conditions for taking off, Rostow underscored the fact that 
different sectors of the economy contribute differently to its growth. As such, equitable 
prioritisation of the core and growth enhancing supporting sectors while ensuring viable 
linkages within and among these sectors was deemed crucial in the pursuit of self-sustaining 
growth. To this end, the economy needs to undergo substantial structural transformation to 
ensure the existence of requisite human skills, viable institutions and relevant infrastructure to 
effectively support the core growth sectors. This also ensures that the sector’s growth benefits 
are effectively diffused throughout the economy (Parr, 2001).   
Despite its popularity, Rostow’s model has been criticised for assuming a linear development 
path for all countries based on the advanced western countries. To this, critics observe notable 
variations in the natural resource base, populations and geographical locations of different 
countries and hence, similar differences are observed in their paths to self-sustaining growth 
levels. This approach is also heavily criticised by the dependency theorists because most 
advanced economies thrived on the exploitative relationship that existed with their 
underdeveloped counterparts to which they argue that a repetition of that trend might not be 
feasible (Nurkse 1961:243; Ferraro 1996). Furthermore, Todaro and Smith (2012) observed that 
setting the advanced economies as a benchmark for the growth stages is also not plausible as 
Rostow ignored critical conditions that were crucial in the effective development success of 
most advanced economies. These include functioning commodity and money markets which 
are visibly missing in most undeveloped economies yet somewhat implicitly assumed present 
in Rostow’s model. They however underscored Rostow’s assumption of an irreversible 
development process by asserting that while difficult to launch an economy into the self-
sustaining growth path, it is much easier to sustain the desired growth levels once attained. In 
other words, it is largely not feasible to recess into underdevelopment once the desired self-
sustaining growth levels are reached. A good example in this regard is Singapore that has 
 
 
35 
 
remained among industrialized economies since taking off from underdevelopment in the mid 
1960s. 
 
3.1.2.3 The Big Push Theory 
Like Rostow’s preconditions for take-off stage, Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) also observed the 
need for a significant increase in the investment rate for the growth of underdeveloped 
economies. They argued for a big industrial investment thrust for developing countries to move 
to self-sustaining growth levels. Whilst discouraging piece-meal-approach (bit-by-bit) to 
industrial investments as a significant waste of development resources, they contended for huge 
simultaneous investments in complementary industries for self-sustaining high growth 
outcomes. They asserted that with positive spill over effects on job creation and income levels, 
investments effectively create the needed domestic demand to sustain manufacturing growth. 
Furthermore, through increased job creation, such investments expand the tax base and thus, 
effectively relieve the fiscal burden for the much-needed social overhead capital to further 
support the manufacturing sector’s growth (Murphy et.al., 1989; Wang, 2015). They argued for 
a balanced growth processes that requires viable linkages between and among different sectors 
of the economy for better growth outcomes. This view is in line with Nurkse (1953 and 1961) 
who equally argued for a balanced growth process where various complementary sectors would 
grow simultaneously and effectively balance out each other’s growth needs.  
Reckoning the limitation of domestic resources in providing the needed investment thrust for 
sustained growth in their model, Rosenstein-Rodan underscored the need for foreign aid in 
pushing underdeveloped economies to self-sustaining growth levels. In this regard, they 
emphasised that foreign aid is a temporal solution for raising capital investments necessary for 
transiting into self-sustaining growth (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961). Like Rostow, they also viewed 
domestic institutions and capacities as crucial in bringing about growth and development and 
as such, they deemed foreign aid as just a stimulus and not a permanent solution for accelerating 
economic growth. While emphasizing that economies might not need foreign aid inflows once 
the self-sustaining levels are attained, they argued for the need of continued capital imports and 
foreign private investments to continue augmenting domestic savings in sustaining the attained 
desired growth levels. 
The big push theory managed to identify market imperfection as one of the key constraints in 
the growth of developing economies with substantial coordinated industrial investment as the 
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most plausible solution. However, the theory heavily neglected the impact of the external 
markets in the maximisation of the economies of scale. Their focus was on the forward and 
backward linkages in the domestic industries in creating domestic demand spill overs between 
sectors, among other things. However, they overlooked the importance of rationalising 
domestic industries for exports in further increasing capital investments and enhancing 
industrialization.  
 
3.1.2.4 The Two-Gap Model 
Building on the H-D growth model, Chenery and Strout (1966) observed that two main resource 
gaps constrain investments for the desired growth of developing economies. These are the 
savings and the trade (foreign exchange) gaps. According to Chenery and Strout, the savings 
gap is mainly characterised by low savings rates in the developing countries in addition to 
limited human skills to support productive investments for the desired growth rates. The trade 
(foreign exchange) gap is characterised by insufficient forex earnings. They further postulated 
that these limitations do not only constrain an economy’s financial ability to productive 
investment, but further undermines its effective and efficient utilization of other relevant 
internal human and natural resources for enhanced productivity. Emphasizing the need for 
necessary structural changes for enhanced human skills, relevant and efficient institutions 
among other things, they claimed that an injection of foreign aid can effectively relieve an 
economy of these two gaps with the consequent potential of maximisation of other factors of 
production and hence, accelerate growth. They associated the existing gaps to both market 
imperfections and institutional structural anomalies such that domestic policies for structural 
transformation remain key in determining the effectiveness of both domestic and foreign 
resource as the economy transitions through different phases of growth (Jepma, 1992; Bowen 
1998). They also emphasized that foreign aid is just a temporal relief of the existing growth 
constraints10 aimed at providing each recipient economy with an incentive for maximum effort 
for self-sustained growth (Chenery and Strout, 1966). 
Specifically, their model assumes that an economy essentially goes through three phases to self-
sustaining growth in which at least one of the gaps is a significant growth binding constraint. 
Hence, their conclusion that the total amount of foreign aid required by an economy in this 
transition is basically determined by the cumulative magnitude of the gaps in each phase 
 
10 This view was also put forward by Rosenstein-Rodan in the Big Push Theory above 
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(Chenery and Strout, 1966). The first phase revolves around the H-D model where growth is a 
function of investment and the productivity of that investment. However, the low rates of 
savings and hence investments coupled with limited human capacity to enhance investment 
productivity are the main constraints facing the economy for the targeted growth rate. During 
this phase, they assumed that the trade gap is not binding, and so foreign aid will be required 
mainly to close the savings gap.  
During the second phase, they assert that while savings might still be lower than investments, 
the economy is largely constrained to acquire productive imports (intermediate and investment 
goods). Thus, both the savings and trade gaps are binding although foreign aid is mostly 
necessary to finance these imports (fill the trade gap) while structural transformation continues 
to enhance skills, among other things. Finally, in the third phase, the savings-investment gap 
will no longer be binding though structural changes are still under way and the trade gap is still 
evident and hence the continued need of foreign aid. By the end of this phase, the economy will 
no longer need foreign aid as both gaps will have been cleared and all the necessary structural 
changes would have been completed. It is assumed that beyond this phase, growth is on a self-
sustaining basis as the economy can adjust to existing market conditions (Bowen 1998). 
However, it should be noted that beyond this phase, they observed that the economy will still 
need other foreign inflows of capital such as foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and other forms 
of foreign private investments to help in sustaining the desired growth rates (Also see 
Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961). 
 
3.1.2.5 The Three-Gap model  
The three-gap model is essentially an extension of the two-gap model to include the fiscal gap, 
also popularly known as the inflation gap as it is deemed binding within specific inflation levels 
(Bacha, 1990). Augmenting the 2-gap model, it contends that while the savings and trade gaps 
are binding either jointly or independently in the development transition period, government’s 
fiscal limitations in financing the necessary public investments to support a given level of output 
is an equally growth binding constraint in this process. According to Bacha (1990), public 
investments in relevant economic infrastructure and industries are key in determining the kind 
of investments private investors will be willing to make. In other words, they assumed that 
through viable public investments, respective governments hold the key to profitable private 
investments that are necessary to enhance its growth (Bacha, 1990). However, increased fiscal 
deficits greatly affects the implementation as well as the quality of such growth stimulating 
 
 
38 
 
public investments. Depending on its mode of financing, fiscal deficits tend to crowd out private 
investments through increased inflation and/or interest rates (Iqbal, 1995).  
Overall, the gap models assume that with the necessary structural adjustments and capacity 
development, the total amount of foreign aid required to effectively propel an economy into a 
self-sustaining growth track will be given by the accumulation of the savings, trade and fiscal 
gap throughout the transition period. While presenting the most comprehensive theoretical 
framework for foreign aid advocacy, Easterly (2003) observed that the application of the gap 
analysis in most economies is largely flawed on theoretical grounds. Partly, this is from its 
simplistic assumption of a linear11 and stable relationship between investment and growth 
which does not hold when other models such as the Solow model are utilised. Similarly, he 
observed that the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) does not always reflect the quality of 
investment as assumed in the gap model as well as in the H-D model. To this, he asserted that 
there are a lot more factors that do influence the ICOR such as the quality of institutions and 
technology (also see Todaro and Smith, 2012). He further observed that the implicit assumption 
that foreign aid will only finance investment might also flaw the model’s applicability as this 
assumes the economy is only financially constrained but has vibrant institutions to boost 
investments (Also see Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000). However, he concluded that 
despite so many critics over these models, they have remained dominant models in the foreign 
aid effectiveness analysis as no new plausible model has emerged to replace them. 
Lastly, these theories assume that the volume of foreign aid in-flows to underdevelopment 
economies fully covers these gaps which raises the question of its effectiveness considering that 
most of the recipient economies have remained underdeveloped following decades of foreign 
aid. If foreign aid was sufficiently large or sustained at higher levels to effectively close the 
binding gaps, then most recipient economies would have reached the self-sustaining growth 
levels as portrayed by all the above foreign aid proponent theories. Noteworthy with 
conventional theories/models, is their emphasis on structural transformation as a requisite for 
effective utilization of both domestic and foreign resources for growth. These structural changes 
cover both policies, institutional and human capacities inter allia for productive investments 
and hence, their emphasis of foreign aid as a temporal solution to incentivise recipient 
economies in pushing themselves into self-sustaining growth levels. Therefore, the volume of 
 
11 Most empirical studies take care of this weakness by including a squared foreign aid  term (see Hadjimichael 
et.al (1995), Lensik and White (1999) and Durbarry et.al (1998) and Hansern and tarp (2001) among others 
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foreign aid received in relation to the existing growth and development financing gaps is as 
essential as is the proper utilization of that aid to effectively stimulate economic growth. 
3.2 Empirical Evidence on the Role of Foreign Aid  
Like the theory of foreign aid, empirical evidence is equally mixed on the role of foreign aid on 
economic growth, particularly at the macro level. Generally, those who find a positive impact 
of aid on growth argue that it is not just about the received volumes of foreign aid that are key 
for its effectiveness, but how efficiently it is utilised. The kind of policies the recipient 
government puts in place, the type of institutions and bureaucracies are all key for its 
effectiveness (Burnside and Dollar 200). On the other hand, the negative impact of foreign aid 
on growth is because it is highly fungible such that instead of funding productive investments, 
it is mostly diverted to unproductive public consumption (Arrellano et. Al., 2005). Furthermore, 
dependency theorists argue that foreign aid breeds corruption, bureaucratic failures and poor 
institutions (Alesina and Dollar, 1998; Rajan and Subramanian, 2007: Djankov et.al., 2008) and 
only benefits a few elites in the poor countries (Easterly, 2014). This perpetuates poverty for 
the majority of the population and overall national aid dependence (Boone, 1996; Easterly 2003 
and Moyo, 2009). So far, this chapter has reviewed studies that show factors that render foreign 
aid either effective or ineffective in achieving its core growth and development objective. In 
following sections, the chapter discusses salient factors behind the inconsistent macro foreign 
aid-growth outcomes 
 
3.2.1 Positive Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) provide one of the most influential pro-aid studies in the aid-growth 
literature. Focusing on aid utilisation, they concluded that its potency in enhancing growth lies 
with the policy environment in the recipient economy as it is key in determining the quality and 
quantity of investments as well as resource utilisation. As such, the higher the policy distortions 
in an economy, the less effective are both domestic and foreign aid in building the social 
overhead capital needed for productive private investments and hence overall growth. Similar 
observations are made for countries with poor quality of institutions and governance such that 
the higher the level of corruption inter alia, the higher the cost of development projects for 
example, and the less effective aid is in stimulating growth (Wane, 2004; Ojong et. el,. 2017). 
This generally hinges on aid as a highly fungible resource such that the probability of its 
misallocation becomes higher with the quality of institutions, governance and policies. 
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Burnside and Dollar (2000) found a positive and significant relationship between bilateral 
foreign aid flows and government consumption which partly entails that most of the aid to the 
developing economies do not end up in productive investments. Moreover, Dollar and Easterly 
(1999) also observed that unless countries have growth enhancing policies in place, expecting 
aid to move them into self-sustaining growth levels remains unrealistic. Accordingly, it is 
further contended that targeting aid to countries with bad policies and institutions remains 
fruitless in stimulating growth (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 
2003). However, Burnside and Dollar (2000) observed that the quality of policies and in 
particular, good policy environment was not among the factors determining the direction of aid. 
Poor targeting in aid allocation is one of the factors resulting in aid ineffectiveness. Poor growth 
in economies crippled with bad policies and institutions do not only signify lack of domestic 
capital for productive investments with the necessity of a big push as postulated by aid 
proponent theorists. It also entails poor prioritization of resources with little (if any) impact on 
growth.  
Despite the provision of key insights as to why foreign aid is ineffective in most cases, Burnside 
and Dollar’s (2000) study’s is flawed on several fronts in the methodology adopted with very 
few criticisms on conceptual issues. These include variable omission bias which according to 
Lensik and White (1999) resulted in the negative but insignificant initial GDP variables 
entailing among other things, that the data used was not supporting the underlying growth 
theory; no conditional growth convergence in their sample of countries. Similar conclusions 
were also reached by Hansen and Tarp (2001:554) who equally found that the initial income 
variable in the Burnside and Dollar (2000) study was never significant. Moreover, Karras 
(2006:19) concluded that a negative and significant initial income levels in these models 
signifies income converges among the countries in the sample. Precisely, it entails that the 
higher the income levels of a country in the initial period, the lower the speed of its growth rate 
vis-à-vis the growth rate of a country with very low income in the initial period. 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) further noted that the model missed out country specific effects which 
in their view could be correlated with the policy variables and/or initial income levels. They 
argued that the aid endogeneity regression was invalid because of variable omission bias 
rendering the estimates inconsistent. On the other hand, Easterly (2003) criticised the study on 
the definition of aid which only covered grants. Using the DAC’s definition of foreign aid which 
covers both grants and concessional loans, he found that the aid-policy interactive variable in 
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the Burnside and Dollar study was not significant. Hence, their conclusion that a good policy 
environment is not a key factor for aid effectiveness in stimulating economic growth. Similar 
results were also found by Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Gomanee et al. (2005), and Karras 
(2006). The study further utilised 4-year data aggregates12 which according to Easterly, mostly 
capture effects of business cycles and hence, not useful to informing long-term policy on aid 
effects. 
Utilising common cross-country growth specifications augmentations, Hansen and Tarp (2001) 
also concluded that foreign aid stimulates economic growth. However, unlike Burnside and 
Dollar, they observed that this was not dependent on good policy environment. Using similar 
data set as in Burnside and Dollar (2000) study, they reviewed specifications in the works of 
Hadjimichael et.al (1995), Lensik and White (1999) and Durbarry et.al (1998) and noted that 
all except Burnside and Dollar had a squared aid term as one of the regressors to capture either 
absorptive capacity issues, Dutch disease13 and capacity constraints or institutional destruction 
and influx of inappropriate technology. Nevertheless, they noted that all these different 
justifications of the squared aid term still entailed how policy affects aid effectiveness as in the 
Burnside and Dollar study. They observed that the aid squared term was essentially capturing 
issues related to macroeconomic governance in the first two studies while in the Durbarry et.al 
(1998) it was covering issues related to exchange rate management and/or fiscal policy. Using 
both specifications (aid squared term and aid-policy interactive term) in the Burnside and Dollar 
framework, they failed to support their assertion of aligning effective foreign aid to good policy 
environment but did support the existence of diminishing returns to foreign aid as concluded in 
the other three studies. However, from the different theoretical justifications of these different 
variables, they asserted that unless included initially in the model, the interactive and squared 
terms may enter the reduced form equation as proxies for each other. Hence, the observation 
that the aid-policy interactive variable in the Burnside and Dollar study, might have effectively 
masked several underlying variables including the existence of diminishing returns to aid. And 
they made similar observations for the foreign aid squared term in the other three studies. They 
justified this through their simple derivation of the two variables by assuming that the Burnside 
 
12 Due to trade data paucity, most studies aggregate the data as done by Burnside and Dollar. Other studies 
include Chauvet and Guillaumont (2003) who used 5-year aggregates and Durbarry et.al. (1998) who used 6-
year time aggregates. 
13 Growth of one sector dampening growth in another sector 
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and Dollar policy index is a stochastic variable which can be decomposed into two components 
as below: 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑑 + (
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦
𝑎𝑖𝑑
)                                                                                                                         (1) 
Where τ is the regression coefficient, aid is the component of the policy index that is perfectly 
correlated with aid and the residual (policy/aid) is the component of the index that is assumed 
not to be correlated with aid. From (1), they derived the aid –policy interactive term as in (2) 
below: 
𝑎𝑖𝑑 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑑2 + 𝑎𝑖𝑑 ∗ (
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦
𝑎𝑖𝑑
)                                                                                      (2)     
The above derivation implies that the aid policy interactive term might end up being significant 
even in circumstances where aid squared term is. Following the same derivation with aid as a 
function of policy, they also argued that aid squared term could end up being positive in 
situations where the interactive term really mattered. However, from their extensive literature 
reviews and their own estimates, they noted that the aid squared term was highly statistically 
superior to the aid-policy interactive term which was not robust.  
Focusing on the time dimension constraint as one of the main weaknesses in the Burnside and 
Dollar study as well as most cross-country studies, Karras (2006) ran a dynamic panel 
regression for 71 countries over 1960 to 1997 period to capture the true long-term relationship 
between aid and growth.  He concluded that foreign aid positively stimulates economic growth 
even in a bad policy environment. On the same note, results from several studies also suggest 
that ignoring the long-term dimension of aid impact on growth as done by most cross-country 
studies generally provides a misleading picture of the actual impact of aid. These include 
Moreira (2005) who used the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to take care 
of the endogeneity issues in the model and discovered that the magnitude of the short run and 
overall impact of foreign aid on growth was different. Using the ARDL methodology, Ojiambo 
(2009) supported the existence of a positive impact of foreign aid on growth in Kenya only in 
the long term.  Similar conclusions were also drawn by Tadesse (2011), Bitew (2014) and Ejigu 
(2015) using cointegration analysis on Ethiopian data. To this end, Moreira (2005) asserted that 
while taking care of country heterogeneity, non-linearity in aid growth relationship as well as 
endogeneity issues, it is imperative not to ignore the importance of the time dimension as all 
these are key in capturing different underlying dynamics for unveiling key features of the aid-
growth relationship (Also see Alvi et al., 2008). 
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Further expounding on the debate of good policies as a hinge for foreign aid effectiveness, 
Lensik and White (2000b) noted that Burnside and Dollar’s results were just an issue of 
interpretation in line with their own aid conceptualization and focus of the study. Specifically, 
they observed that the Burnside and Dollar equation: 
𝑔 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝐴 + 𝛽3𝑃 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽5𝑋 +                                                                                 (3)      
Where ɡ is the GDP growth rate, A is foreign aid, P is the policy index and X is a vector of 
structural factors that affect growth. They noted that (3) can be Re-written as: 
𝑔 = 𝛽1 + (𝛽2 + 𝛽4𝑃)𝐴 + 𝛽3𝑃 + 𝛽5𝑋 +                                                                                     (4) 
 Or as 
 𝑔 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐴 + (𝛽3 + 𝛽4𝐴)𝑃 + 𝛽5𝑋 +                                                                                (5) 
Where in Burnside and Dollar’s study 𝛽2 was not significant and 𝛽4 was positive and significant 
with the consequent conclusion that aid is effective in stimulating growth in a good policy 
environment. In this regard, when they expressed (3) as (5), they interpreted that policies are 
more effective when supported by foreign aid and concluded that Burnside and Dollar’s 
interpretation of (3) could have been misplaced. Chuvet and Guillaumont (2003) also found 
that foreign aid is positively significant in influencing policy and hence concluded that Burnside 
and Dollar’s findings were misleading as they did not consider the possible impact of aid on 
domestic policies. 
Overall, Lensik and White (2000b) observed that just as with most cross-country growth 
regressions, Burnside and Dollar’s results were not robust due to their sensitivity to data and 
model specification. Similar observations were also made by Hansen and Tarp (2000) as well 
as Lensik and White (1999). Furthermore, Easterly (2003) pointed out that Burnside and 
Dollar’s results were sensitive to the definition of foreign aid. Specifically, Lensik and White 
(2000b) noted that when low income countries dataset was utilised, none of the policy variables 
in the Burnside and Dollar’s results were significant although the aid-policy interactive term 
was significant, and the aid term was also significantly negative. This was contrary to their 
conclusions from the sample that included middle income countries. To this end, they further 
supported the interpretation of (3) as in (5) where aid is essential for effectiveness of policies 
in poor countries. 
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Cognisant of the fact that aid affects growth through various channels, Lensik and White 
(2000b) further contended that a system of equations should be utilised to thoroughly analyse 
its effects on growth and not just a single equation as is done in most cross-country growth 
studies thereby leaving out a lot of useful information in the analysis. This assertion is well 
underscored by Hansen and Tarp (2001). They argued that estimates of aid effectiveness are 
highly sensitive to the choice of both control variables  and the estimator as reflected in the 
negative impact of aid on growth when they controlled for investment and human capital in 
their model. Roodman (2007:275) also concluded that while potentially beneficial in enhancing 
growth, foreign aid might not be a critical determinant of economic growth. 
3.2.2 Negative Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth 
While recent debate on positive aid impact has been centred on how policy issues affects 
volume and productivity of investments, critics of foreign aid mostly explore various other 
channels through which aid impacts economic growth including exchange rate volatility, 
governance, inflation and investments. However, emphasis has been on government 
expenditure whose spill over effects are manifested in these other various channels that mostly 
render foreign aid inefficient in enhancing economic growth. Boone (1996) concluded that 
foreign aid is largely ineffective in enhancing economic growth and other variables deemed 
relevant in boosting economic growth. In his study, he observed that three quarters of the 
foreign aid was used to fund unproductive public consumption14 and consequently could not 
trace any positive relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. Similarly, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) did not find the existence of any systematic relationship between foreign 
aid and economic growth regardless of the quality of institutions and policies, inter alia.   
Similarly, Bass (2011) also failed to support the assertion that foreign aid enhances growth as 
it was ineffective in creating a conducive environment for its efficient and effective utilization. 
This points to possible adverse effects of foreign aid on macroeconomic variables such as 
exchange rates and inflation which consequently crowd out private investments. Therefore, 
Rajan and Subramanian (2011) noted how imperative it is for governments to rationally 
 
14 Despite different outcomes with the Burnside and Dollar (2000) study, the observation was the same but possibly 
different channels through which government consumption affects economic growth and other relevant variables 
were explored. However, even Burnside and Dollar hinted on the great potential unproductive public investments 
have in hurting the economies hence the conclusion that foreign aid will only be effective in a good policy 
environment.  
 
 
45 
 
prioritize foreign resource to ensure enhanced productivity across sectors in the economy with 
requisite improvements in public infrastructure.  
Analyzing these possible channels through which foreign aid possibly hurts developing 
economies, Rajan & Subramanian (2011) exploited cross-country and cross-industry variations 
in a panel of 32 aid recipient economies. They observed that foreign aid is mostly unproductive 
in most economies due to its dampening effect on exports through exchange rate appreciation 
and sometimes inflation as it drives up prices mostly in the non-traded goods sector. Similarly, 
Munemo et al. (2007) found that beyond certain thresholds, foreign aid receipts are 
counterproductive to export performance. This coils back to Boone (1996) and Burnside and 
Dollar’s (2000) findings about aid funding unproductive investments which could be 
inflationary. While Burnside and Dollar (2000) observed that poor targeting of aid to economies 
with bad policies was an issue, Rajan and Subramanian (2005; 2011), and Moreira (2005) added 
that issues of absorption capacities are hardly taken care of in determining the direction of aid. 
They contended that if aid inflows are much higher than the existing capacity to efficiently 
utilise; the probability of its adverse effects to manifest on other macroeconomic indicators such 
as exchange rates and inflation becomes equally higher. Consequently, Rajan and Subramanian 
(2011) proposed gradual increases of aid inflows to poor countries to give room for both human 
and institutional capacity development to effectively utilise higher volumes of aid. However, 
Clemens et al (2012) noted that the positive effects of foreign aid on growth were significantly 
diminishing with increased aid volumes which partly entails that beyond certain threshold, 
additional foreign aid to recipient economies becomes unnecessary. Hence the need for proper 
alignment of foreign aid disbursements with development financing gaps in the recipient 
economies, among other things.  
Like Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) study, Boone’s study (1996) was among the first prominent 
studies on the macroeconomic analysis of foreign aid inspired by modern economic theory that 
focused on finding out why it was seemingly not producing the expected results. However, his 
study’s methodology has also been criticised due to its linear treatment of the aid and growth 
relationship. Critics argue that this ignores the impact of diminishing returns to aid as well as 
absorptive capacities of the recipient economies (Hadjimichael et al., 1995). Furthermore, 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Bass (2011) argued that Boone’s results were not robust as they 
were sensitive to sample changes.  
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While Hansen and Tarp argued that Boone’s choice of endogenous variables might have 
compromised his estimates, Clemes et al (2011) argued that their instruments for aid could also 
have led to biased results. This argument was extended to the instruments used by Rajan and 
Subramanian (2011); Boone (2000); as well as Burnside and Dollar (2000). They argued that 
basing the strength of the instruments on population size as was done in the later three studies 
could have only been viable on variables with a proven direct impact on growth. They 
confirmed this by re-running the three regressions with 2-stage OLS, and all the concerned 
instruments were no longer potent on the second stage. In the case of Hansen and Tarp (2001), 
they caution the dependency on lagged aid variables as instruments for endogeneity due to its 
potential impact on the current growth values and hence leading to a biased aid coefficient. 
Similarly, Roodman (2007) also cautioned the use of lagged aid variables as they could lead to 
biased results due to reverse causation especially in countries where growth performance 
determines the volumes of aid inflows.  
Furthermore, Clemens et al. (2011) questioned the aggregation of aid in these studies without 
considering their possible growth impact time frame nor intended purpose in the recipient 
economy. This followed the observation that more aid proportions do fund unproductive 
investments (Boone, 1996; Rajan and Subramanian, 2011) because for most poor economies, 
not all aid inflows are meant to fill in the growth and development resource gaps. Large amounts 
of aid are intended for public consumption through disaster relief or food aid for instance and 
these would hardly enhance growth (Also see Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Radelet et al., 2004). 
While most of the studies discussed above focused on inherent factors in the recipient 
economies as key for effective utilisation of foreign aid, other studies suggest that foreign aid 
does not enhance growth due to the wrong motives of donors. For example, Sorens (2009) 
concluded that the motives for giving foreign aid have a significant bearing on how it is utilised 
and hence its efficiency in stimulating growth. He pointed out that political motives for aid 
allocation have continued to encourage poor fiscal management in most underdeveloped 
economies. This is seen in the continued high aid inflows to countries with a record of high 
corruption, poor governance and policies. Sorens argues that this results in inefficient resources 
utilisation including foreign aid hence no traceable positive impact of the latter on economic 
growth. 
Similarly, instead of being seen to enhance sustainable economic growth, foreign aid is 
condemned for pushing more economies into deeper debts, perpetrating inefficiencies in the 
public systems, enhancing corruption and bad governance (Radelet, 2006; Radelet et.al., 2004; 
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Djankov, et al., 2008; Moyo, 2009; Asongu, 2012). These writers view foreign aid as an evil in 
itself as it destroys the same factors such as quality of institutions that are meant to enhance its 
potency in stimulating growth. Nevertheless, these findings and conclusions are far from being 
unanimous. For example, Akramov (2006) and Menard and Weill (2016) do not to support the 
assertion that foreign aid is counterproductive to the quality of institutions and governance. 
3.2.3 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
Despite variations in the focus of the various studies, it is clear that enhanced potency of foreign 
aid is a joint effort by the donors and recipients. While donors are expected to align foreign aid 
disbursements with growth and development financing gaps in the recipient economies, 
respective recipient governments should ensure efficient and effective use of the aid. Diversions 
from one or both principles compromise the effectiveness of foreign aid in achieving its 
development objective. However, despite seemingly exhaustive research in this regard, very 
little has been done in assessing how the extent to which the received foreign aid closes the 
growth and development financing gaps influences its growth enhancing objectives. Therefore, 
this thesis contends for the possibility of aid beneficiary economies to remain financially 
constrained for growth enhancing investments amidst foreign aid inflows. The thesis assumes 
that foreign aid receipts below (above) what is required to effectively close growth and 
development financing gaps equally constrains its effective utilisation just as is the case with 
poor policies and bad governance for instance.  
Depending on the focus of the study, different methodologies have been adopted in the analysis 
of the foreign aid-growth relationship and different conclusions have been drawn as highlighted 
above. To a large extent, most of the differences in the conclusions drawn at the macro level 
are influenced by how foreign aid is defined in a study (Easterly, 2003). Furthermore, while 
most studies reviewed centre on the gap models in believing that foreign aid is meant to 
augment domestic resources for the required investments, their conclusions are largely 
influenced by their methodology and specifically, on their regression specifications (Tan, 2006; 
Lensik and White, 2000b; Hansen and Tarp, 2001). Pertinent differences are observed in the 
treatment of foreign aid endogeneity and hence, the choice of its instruments. Foreign aid is 
assumed to be endogenous in some studies such as by Gomanee et al (2005), Moreira (2005) 
and Clemens et al (2011). However, it is exogenously determined in some studies for example 
by Boone (1996), Faye & Niehaus (2012) and Quian (2014) that political and strategic interests 
of the donors are more important in determining the direction of foreign aid.   
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Due to this lack of consensus, caution should be taken about factors that influence the 
performance of foreign aid including policies, institutional and human resource capacities and 
governance in the recipient economies. The above discussion shows that there is no consensus 
on the relationship between foreign aid and specific factors such as policies and governance in 
different studies. For example, while Burnside and Dollar (2000) concluded that foreign aid 
will only be effective if complemented by good policies, Hansen and Tarp (2001; 2008), Lensik 
and White (2000b) and Chuvet and Guillaumont (2003) concluded otherwise. Similarly, the 
assertion by Alesina and Dollar (1998), Djankov et al. (2008), Busse and Gröning (2009) and 
Asongu (2012) that foreign aid breeds corruption, bureaucratic failures and poor institutions is 
not supported by Akramov (2006) as well as Menard and Weill (2016). 
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CHAPTER 4: EXTERNAL FINANCING AND GROWTH IN THE COMMON 
MARKET FOR EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA  
 
4.1 Introduction 
To achieve better outcomes from foreign capital15, the gap theory emphasizes the need for 
enhanced human skills, relevant and efficient institutions and supportive economic 
infrastructure to enhance viable synergies between and among sectors (Bacha, 1990). Theory 
emphasizes capital accumulation in setting the pace for growth and acknowledges that a 
balanced growth process which partly entails simultaneous growth of complementing sectors 
remains imperative for sustainable and inclusive growth as it allows for efficient exploitation 
of a country’s comparative advantage through effective rationalization of its factors of 
production (Rosestein-Rodan, 1961; Chenery and Strout, 1966; Bacha, 1990; Parr, 2001). In 
their initial development stages (mostly in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) countries gained independence), each country was 
expected to prioritize development of its core growth sectors without neglecting the important 
roles played by various sub-sectors in support of these key growth sectors and hence, overall 
growth of the economy. Equitable resource allocation to their respective core growth and 
supporting sectors was expected to unleash a balanced growth process to create an enabling 
solid base for a self-sustaining inclusive growth process. This would have effectively opened 
their markets and allowed for a gradual replacement of foreign aid with higher domestic savings 
and market-related inflows of foreign capital such as FDI (Rosentein-Rodan 1961; Chenery and 
Strout, 1966; and Cauas, 1973). However, foreign aid continues to be a principal source of 
development financing in the region as both FDI and savings have remained persistently low 
and hardly covering their current investment needs (Figure 4.1).  
Against this backdrop, this chapter evaluates the extent to which foreign aid consistently closed 
the region’s development financing gaps. This encompass an assessment of both sectoral aid 
allocations vis-à-vis growth as well as how foreign aid has been fairing against other sources 
of foreign capital over the last four decades. The chapter relies on trends analysis using Stata 
and excel which have been complemented by an Impulse Response Function (IRF) to explain 
the underlying patterns of the key variables. Consistent with theoretical predictions of foreign 
 
15 Foreign capital in this study will refer to Official Development Assistance (ODA), Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and Other Official Flows (OOF).   
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aid as the main source of foreign capital during the initial stages of transitioning from 
underdevelopment onto a self-sustaining growth path, the chapter focuses on economic 
development financing gaps and growth patterns vis-a-vis foreign aid inflows. The hypothesis 
is that effective foreign aid is signified by a decline in its relative weight in total foreign capital 
inflows over time, and its volumes are consistent with the existing development financing gaps.  
Figure 4. 1: Investment, Savings, FDI and ODA in COMESA, 1985-2015 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on WDI and OECD database assessed on April 23, 2018 
Note: This excludes Egypt, Libya, Mauritius and Seychelles whose savings rates have been at least 20% on average  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides theoretical foundations 
of foreign aid as it relates to the key aspects of focus; Section 3 provides the methodology and 
data sources; Section 4 highlights the relative weight of foreign aid in the region’s total foreign 
development financing inflows. Having established in Section 4 that foreign aid is currently the 
only key source of foreign capital in most COMESA countries, Section 5 evaluates the extent 
to which foreign aid fills the growth and development resource gaps in the region. Cognizant 
of the heterogeneity of sectors in influencing growth outcomes, Section 6 evaluates how 
prioritization of foreign aid supported the region’s growth. The emphasis is on whether the 
consistency of the volumes supported the growth of the key sectors and generated viable 
backward and forward linkages with other sub-sectors for a balanced growth process. 
Furthermore, the section also looks at which form of foreign aid (loans or grants) was more 
potent in this regard. Section 7 examines the impact of foreign aid on the overall economic 
growth of the countries focusing on whether its allocation was in tandem with the growth and 
development resource needs proxied by their growth rates. It also examines whether the current 
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growth outcomes are due to foreign aid the region has been receiving. Lastly, Section 8 
concludes the study and analyses policy implications of the findings from the study. 
4.2 Methodology  
In assessing external financing in COMESA, the article relies on the statistical analysis of the 
trends, means, and variance of foreign aid, GDP, FDI, other official flows and Savings of 
COMESA from 1985 to 2015 in Stata and excel. This is complemented by an Impulse Response 
Function (IRF) (Appendix 4.1) which provides insights on how growth in the region responds 
to changes in foreign aid in the specific sectors over time. Cognizant of the inconsistencies in 
the foreign aid-growth literature because of foreign aid’s endogeneity, the IRF is chosen as its 
estimation is done in a Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) framework that fully accounts for 
endogenous variables for consistent estimates.  By holding effects of all other variables in the 
model constant, an IRF gives a unique response path of growth to the changes of the individual 
sectoral foreign aid considered. Accordingly, the estimated PVAR in this study is specified as: 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                               (2.1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a four-variable vector: lngdp, lngbs, lnprodn, lnsocial. gbs is the foreign aid to the 
region through the General Budget Support (GBS), prodn is the total foreign aid to the 
production sectors and social represents total foreign aid to the social sectors. As consistency 
of the IRF requires stability of its estimated model, the eigenvalue stability test is provided in 
Appendix 4.4.2 
4.3 Data Description and Sources  
A panel for all COMESA member countries was constructed for the years 1985 to 2015. The 
variables of interest were Foreign aid (ODA), FDI, OOF, Savings and GDP as described in the 
table below. 
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Table 4. 1 : Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description Data Source 
Foreign Aid 
Foreign aid as defined by the 
OECD-DAC (Chapter 1) was 
disaggregated into sectors. The 
sectors of interest were the 
Social (education and health), 
production (agriculture and 
manufacturing), Economic 
Infrastructure, General Budget 
Support and humanitarian 
foreign aid 
OECD database: 
https://stats.oecd.org/qwids 
 
 
GDP Gross Domestic Product  World Development Indicators (WDI): 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
UNCTAD database and the AfDB Socio-Economic 
database 
FDI Covered net inflows of Foreign 
Direct Investments as a percentage 
of GDP 
World Development Indicators: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
and UNCTAD database: 
https://unctadstat.unctad.org 
OOF Other Official Flows as defined 
by OECD-DAC 
OECD database: 
https://stats.oecd.org/qwids 
Savings Gross domestic savings WDI and the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) socio-economic database 
(http://dataportal.opendataforafrica.org/). 
  
4.4 External financing in COMESA 
Although the sources of external financing for growth and development are broad including 
FDI and remittances, at the onset, most of these sources are very negligible relative to GDP of 
COMESA member countries. In this regard, this chapter focused on ODA, FDI and other 
official flows as defined by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and are jointly referred 
to as foreign capital (footnote 15). While their importance in augmenting domestic resources 
for growth is acknowledged by both practitioners and policy makers, the respective roles of 
these distinct foreign capital sources during the various stages of development varies greatly.  
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Figure 4. 2: ODA, FDI and OOF in COMESA (1985-2015) 
 
Source: OECD Database accessed on April 23, 2018 
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Generally, foreign aid should be used as a temporal gap filler in the quest for growth and 
development, while FDI and domestic savings should be sought both in the underdeveloped 
state and post foreign aid periods. This is based on the understanding that foreign aid receipts 
in the initial stages of development are prioritized to lay an effective foundation for self-
sustaining and inclusive growth. Thus, over time, other sources of foreign capital are expected 
to be more prominent in augmenting domestic savings in sustaining the desired growth levels 
attained or to achieve even higher levels. On the contrary, COMESA circumstances have defied 
these expectations as foreign aid has remained a predominant source of foreign financing, with 
other official flows being negligible (Figure 4.2).   
Except for Seychelles, COMESA countries have not been able to attract substantial volumes of 
FDI since 2004 (Figure 4.2). On average, FDI to most countries in the region has been less than 
2% of GDP and barely reaching 5% of GDP in others. Specifically, FDI to Burundi, Comoros, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Zimbabwe has 
been less than 2% of their GDPs on average over the last four-decades. On the other hand, FDI 
to Egypt, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Sudan, Swaziland and Zambia has been between 2.5% and 5% 
of their GDPs. Only Seychelles has had FDI averaging about 15% of GDP since 2001 with the 
highest at 54% of GDP in 2012, notably much higher than its total foreign aid inflows of about 
2.1% of GDP on average during the same period.  
Overall, the figure shows sustained and increasing volumes of foreign aid to these countries 
relative to sluggish FDI growth for over four decades. In this regard, understanding salient 
common factors that affect the two sources of foreign capital remains imperative for enhancing 
the potency of foreign aid in the region increasing FDI inflows. Apart from consistency of 
foreign aid volumes, its potency in achieving its development objectives largely depends on 
where and what it is used for (Boone 1996, Rajan and Subramanian 2011). Among other things, 
this calls for a good balance in aligning foreign aid flows with institutional and human 
capacities for its effective utilization. Rajan and Subramanian (2011) argued that injecting 
development foreign aid to LDCs over and above what they need to close their development 
financing gaps or can effectively utilize, is potentially damaging to the institutions and 
governance of the recipient economies. Reckoning that these are key in determining both 
foreign aid effectiveness (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) and the direction of FDI inflows (Alesina 
and Dollar, 1998; Alesina and Weder 2002; Faye and Niehaus, 2012), foreign aid, if not 
properly matched to the development financing gaps of the recipient economy, has the potential 
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to deter FDI inflows inter alia. Instead of enhancing economic growth in LDCs, foreign aid 
perpetuates foreign aid dependency and underdevelopment by effectively compromising their 
chances of relying on functional markets for foreign capital to enhance growth or to sustain the 
attained growth levels (see Boone, 1996; Easterly 2003 and Moyo, 2009). However, both ODA 
and FDI have been very low in some countries such as Egypt, Mauritius, Libya, Sudan and 
Swaziland. It will therefore be misleading to make this conclusion without further analysis on 
the impact of foreign aid on FDI in COMESA (see Karakaplan et.al 2005:21).  
4.5 ODA and development financing gaps in COMESA 
The importance of foreign capital to COMESA member states cannot be overemphasized as 
their savings rates are below what is required for their current levels of investments (figure 4.3) 
and let alone, to achieve higher GDP growth levels of at least 7% to achieve SDGs (SDG 8). 
While foreign aid is the main source of foreign capital in most COMESA countries, it is evident 
from the previous section (Figure 4.2) that it has been the most prominent source of 
development finance in only 5 of the COMESA countries (Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, 
Malawi and Rwanda) over the last four decades. The rest of the countries saved more than what 
they received in foreign aid albeit at low levels excluding Libya, Mauritius, Egypt and Zambia. 
Libya registered an average savings of about 57% of GDP between 2003 and 2010 before 
dropping to approximately 23% of GDP between 2011 and 2015 (Figure 4.3). Mauritius has 
maintained positive but diminishing savings trend throughout the period with the highest 
average of 25% of GDP over the period 2003-2010 and the lowest average of 9.8% over the 
period 2011-2015. Egypt and Sudan registered an average saving of 15% and 21.5% of GDP, 
respectively, since 2000. Similarly, Zambia has been saving about 29% of its GDP since 2004 
notably as ODA steadily declined while FDI was rising. Relatively low savings rates varying 
between 0.8% and 8.8% on average are noted for Zimbabwe, Djibouti, Malawi, Rwanda, 
Swaziland, Madagascar and Kenya. The average saving rates varied between 10% and 18% for 
Ethiopia, Seychelles, Sudan and Uganda. Some countries, notably Burundi and Comoros have 
been spending more than they could save as reflected by their average negative savings rates of 
-4% and -10.5% of GDP, respectively, since 1995. In other words, these countries are deficit 
spending as they are not able to generate any savings because their general consumption rate is 
basically higher than what they could generate and save. 
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Figure 4. 3: Investments, Savings and ODA in COMESA (1985-2015) 
 
Source: OECD Database and WDI accessed on 20th January 2018. 
 
Low savings vis-à-vis investments in most of the COMESA countries suggest huge financing 
gaps to support growth-enhancing investment. In addition to sustained foreign aid inflows to 
the region for over three decades, Figure 4.4 further shows that the volume of foreign aid 
received in the region over the last four decades has been substantial covering an annual average 
of about 63% of its development financing gaps since 1990, at current growth rates. Except for 
Libya, Seychelles, Mauritius and Egypt, Figure 4.4 shows that foreign aid has been covering at 
least 60% of the financing gaps in COMESA countries with episodes of foreign aid over and 
above what was required to fully close their financing gaps at current growth rates. There are a 
few episodes (years) where substantial foreign aid inflows are observed in some periods for 
countries including Eritrea and Zimbabwe although their investment financing needs were fully 
covered by their respective domestic savings (Figure, 4.4). These trends imply that other factors 
other than the actual volumes of received foreign aid vis-à-vis development financing gaps 
account for its inefficiency in stimulating growth, ceteris paribus. 
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Figure 4. 4: ODA Received as Percentage of Development Financing Gaps: 5-year 
Aggregates (1985-2015 Current growth rates) 
Source:    Authors calculations from OECD Data and WDI, 2018. 
Note:  i) The development financing gap was simply calculated as the difference between gross capital 
formation (investment) and savings.  
                ii) Take note of the different scales on the embedded charts 
               ii) The negative values in the charts reflects years in which the respective countries had no financing gap 
(their investments were fully covered by domestic savings) but they still received Foreign aid beyond their current 
investment levels by the reflected negative value in absolute terms. 
 
In line with the ODA growth and development objective, higher investment levels and possibly 
growth, would therefore be expected from most COMESA countries especially in years of more 
foreign aid than required to close their development financing gaps. On the contrary, Figure 4.3 
shows years of more foreign aid and lower investments in some of these countries including the 
DRC (2002-2005; 2010 and 2011), Burundi from 1993 to 2010, Rwanda 1994 to 1999 and 
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Malawi between 2012 and 2015. Except for Malawi, 20 - 40% of the foreign aid to these 
countries was earmarked for humanitarian relief (Appendix 4.3) in those years and was not 
expected to translate directly into growth (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Radelet et al., 2004 and 
Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2005). In the case of Malawi, development foreign aid exceeded its 
investment levels in some years either reflecting the low quality of its institutions in supporting 
the effective utilization of its resources or simply failure to absorb foreign aid support. 
According to Msowoya (2013) and Mwanamanga (2015), foreign aid misallocation as a key 
consequent of poor quality of institutions in Malawi greatly undermines utilization and potency 
of foreign aid in stimulating growth.  
On the one hand, Msowoya (2013) found foreign aid to be highly fungible in its core growth 
sector (agriculture) as the government substituted its agricultural financing with foreign aid 
with the fungible resources funding non-growth enhancing activities. On the other hand, 
Mwanamanga (2015) found that government consumption expenditure increases with foreign 
aid entailing that a good proportion of the development foreign aid that Malawi receives does 
not end up being productively invested as potentially reflected by the lower investment levels 
vis-à-vis foreign aid receipts in Figure 4.3. Overall, while higher foreign aid inflows vis-à-vis 
investment levels in Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda in the highlighted years clearly suggest that 
foreign aid inflows were not necessarily to support their growth, foreign aid to Malawi was 
potentially disbursed in line with its growth enhancing purpose but its efficiency was chocked 
by poor institutions and/or policies (Msowoya, 2013; Mwanamanga, 2015). 
Figure 4.3 further shows consistently higher savings rates vis-à-vis current investment levels 
and ODA inflows in Libya. Equal savings and investment levels are observed in Mauritius, 
Madagascar, Egypt and Kenya in some years. While this partly signifies the potential of some 
COMESA countries in building a sustainable base for inclusive and sustainable growth from 
own resources, it equally reflects that foreign aid inflows to these countries during these years 
did not effectively contribute to productive investments in the respective countries. In the 
Malawian case, foreign aid in the respective years potentially financed non-growth enhancing 
government consumption. Furthermore, growth enhancing effects of increased public 
consumption through humanitarian assistance as in the case of Rwanda and Burundi remains 
contested (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Radelet et al., 2004). While the case of foreign aid funding 
government consumption potentially reflects weak domestic institutions in the recipient 
countries, it is also possibly an effect of ODA inflows that were too low in relation to the 
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existing development financing gaps in the following countries (Libya less than 1% in all the 
periods and an average of 1.2% in Mauritius, 4,5% in Egypt, 6.9 for 5 period except the 1990-
1994 in Kenya) for tangible benefits/investments. Lastly, with equal ODA and investment 
levels, Figure 4.3 highlights potential foreign aid fungibility in countries such as Comoros, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda and Swaziland. Specifically, following the theoretical disposition of aid 
augmenting domestic resources for growth, zero government investment financing contribution 
in the respective periods entails that foreign aid was useful in freeing up domestic financing for 
other relevant public (government) consumption. Depending on the relevance of such 
expenditure lines to their growth objectives, the fungible resources could be significant or 
redundant in enhancing their overall growth. 
In sum, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show that despite visible development financing gaps in most 
countries in COMESA, there is some level of unwarranted foreign aid dependency in some 
countries in the region as either their current growth levels are essentially without foreign aid 
or their net investments did not increase with the full amount of foreign aid received. This also 
shows that without chocking foreign aid with weak domestic institutions and policies for 
example, higher levels of investments and growth, could have been attained with the current 
levels of savings and foreign aid. For instance, holding all other factors such as corruption and 
absorption capacity constant, more foreign aid to countries like Egypt, Libya, Mauritius and 
Kenya could have potentially increased their investments and growth levels. Furthermore, with 
foreign aid over and above the development financing gap, Figure 4.4 indicates poor 
development financing needs assessment by the donors and/or that foreign aid to some countries 
in the region is largely driven by political and strategic interests of the donors. Concurrently, 
assessing it with Appendix 4.3, it shows that not all foreign aid in the region is intended to 
enhance growth as most of it to countries such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia 
and DRC was disbursed for humanitarian relief.  
4.6 Sectoral Allocations and Economic Growth 
Ideally, economic growth is driven by productivity of the production and service sectors which 
are broadly categorized into (i) primary sectors which are essentially concerned with the 
extraction of raw materials and production of food and these broadly encompass agriculture 
and mining; (ii) secondary sectors which are mostly the manufacturing whose key role is to 
transform the raw materials from the primary sectors into high value added products; and (iii) 
tertiary (service) sectors whose main role is to provide tangible services including banking and 
tourism. Accordingly, the nature of growth and development of the primary sectors has a direct 
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bearing on the subsequent growth and development of the secondary and service sectors as they 
all depend on the primary sectors for food and most importantly raw materials and labour 
(Lewis, 1952). However, this only remains effective with viable markets, reliable energy and 
transportation services as well as with higher productivity of labour which is largely a function 
of functional education and health sectors. In other words, vibrant support sectors (social and 
economic) are required for higher productivity of the primary and secondary sectors such that 
overall, sustainable and inclusive growth and development depends on the effectiveness of the 
distinct roles played by both the key and sub-sectors in the economy (Odusanya et.al., 2011). 
In this regard, theory postulates good balance in resource allocation while ensuring viable 
synergies among various sectors for an inclusive and self-sustaining growth process (Rostow, 
1959, Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961). This should be guided by both the role played by the sector in 
the growth process and its development financing gaps. Potentially guided by these factors, 
foreign aid in COMESA is largely skewed towards the social sectors accounting for an annual 
average of 37.4% and followed by humanitarian and economic infrastructure at 16.4% and 12% 
on average respectively. Production sectors and general Budget Support (GBS)16 have each 
been getting an average of about 7% since 2002 (Appendix 4.1). Notwithstanding the sector’s 
relative role in growth and financing gaps, empirical evidence postulates utilization of foreign 
aid by the recipient economy as a key variable for its effectiveness (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; 
Boone 1996; Ojong et. al,. 2017). An annual average of about 28% of the foreign aid in the 
social sectors was being utilized for government and civil society consumption which however 
declined to an annual average of 17.1% from 2011 as population and reproductive health 
programmes gained prominence in the allocations with an average of 27.5%. This is currently 
being trailed by health and education foreign aid expenditure at an average of 24% and 23% 
respectively which focuses on consumptions and not productive investments (Appendix 4.2).  
Similar trends in most COMESA countries quantifies the above trends as the most plausible 
representation of the region’s aggregate sectoral allocations without outlier biases. In most 
countries including Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Swaziland, more 
than 50% of their foreign aid was allocated to the social sector (Figure 4.5) particularly 
education, health or general government budget support, humanitarian support, government and 
civil society sub-sectors. In the latter sub-sector, it is generally contended that resources are 
 
16 These are foreign aid resources that are not earmarked for any specific sector or projects and their allocations 
depend on the priorities of the recipient government.  
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largely used in funding government or civil society consumption (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 
2003). From the disbursement trends, this chapter observes that even in the education and health 
sectors, less than 10% of the foreign aid was invested in education and/or health facilities and 
training. For instance, in Comoros, the education sub-sector was getting more than 50% 
annually on average of the social sector foreign aid allocation between 2002 and 2010 and yet 
only about 5% was invested into education facilities and training. Similar trends are observed 
for Djibouti and Burundi where the resources to the leading social sub-sector generally funds 
recurrent transactions other than fixed investments.17 
Only Seychelles and Egypt prioritized economic infrastructure and production sectors, 
respectively. Until 2009, Seychelles foreign aid disbursements were evenly balanced between 
production and social sectors, respectively receiving approximately 34% and 36% of its foreign 
aid. Allocation to the economic infrastructure increased from 0.1% in 2010 to about 23% in 
2011 and remained on the rise. In contrast, there was a decline in the production sector from 
5% in 2010 to 0.36% in 2012 and continued volatility in the social sector foreign aid allocations 
(Figure 4.5). Consistent with foreign aid disbursements to the production sector, manufacturing 
value added steadily grew to 16.4% of GDP by 2003 but fell sharply to 7.7% in 2004 before 
slightly improving in 2005 to 8.7%. Manufacturing has since continued to grow sluggishly as 
foreign aid allocation to the sector also faltered18. While it is tempting to link the performance 
of the manufacturing sector to foreign aid inflows which was seemingly balanced across the 
key sectors, this did not eventually translate to the overall growth of the economy. The country’s 
GDP growth has been so erratic with some years of negative growth rates and some years as 
high as 10% which do not seem to be in tandem with foreign aid inflows. Seychelles was highly 
indebted during the period under review, hence its mixed fortunes. 
From 2007 until 2012, about 40% of the foreign aid to Egypt was used in the economic 
infrastructure sector. Allocation to the production sectors increased from 9% of total foreign 
aid receipts in 2011 to 22% in 2012. Subsequently, allocations to the economic infrastructure 
and social sectors fell sharply from about 49% and 17% in 2012 to 9% and 6% in 2013, 
respectively (Figure 4.5). During the same period, humanitarian aid increased sharply from 
USD 0.63 million in 2011 to USD 26.92 million in 2012 while allocations to cross cutting 
factors such as gender, picked from USD 78.5 million in 2012 to USD 552.7 million in 2013 
 
17 Authors Calculations based WDI 2018. 
18 Author’s calculations based on WDI 2018.  
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(OECD database, 2018). Despite the prioritization of foreign aid allocation to economic 
infrastructure and production sectors during the period 2007-2013, the growth of these sectors 
remained stable and did not significantly change compared with the years during which these 
sectors were not being prioritized. It is also evident that relative to economic size, foreign aid 
to Egypt is not significant even when measured against contribution to GDP of the priority 
sectors. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Emara et al. (2013) who found that low 
levels of foreign aid to Egypt (about 3.3% of GDP on average) had insignificant impact on the 
growth of its sectors and on overall GDP. 
Apart from being one of the countries in the region that has been receiving the lowest amount 
of foreign aid at an average of about 3.3% of its GDP since 1995, the concessional loan 
component to Egypt has been steadily increasing since 2007 from about 15% of its total foreign 
aid receipts to 74% in 201519. During this period, the allocation to the economic infrastructure 
sector also steadily increased from about 20% in 2007 to 51% in 2010 before dropping sharply 
to about 10% in 2015. Similar trends have been observed for Mauritius whose share of foreign 
aid to economic infrastructure started to increase while its general government budget support 
significantly shrunk (Figure 4.5). During this period, its concessionary loan component 
remarkably increased from 19% of its total foreign aid to 55.8% in 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19  Author’s calculations based on OECD database, 2018. 
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Figure 4. 5: ODA disbursement to COMESA by country and sector (2002-2014) 
 
Source: OECD Database for ODA accessed on 10 December 2017 
Note: Humanitarian aid and / or General Budget Support cover more than 65% of the other 
In line with foreign aid fungibility concept, the trend in Egypt indicates that the bigger the loan 
component in foreign aid, the higher the motivation for viable investment in the core growth 
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sectors. However, Seychelles presents contrary trends, with approximately 91% of its foreign 
aid resources being grants, most of it has been funding projects in the economic infrastructure 
and production sectors since 2010. This is also in contrast to the grant usage trends in other 
COMESA countries. Accounting for more than 80% of their respective total foreign aid 
receipts, grants are mostly spent on general government budget support or humanitarian 
support. As such, while loans might motivate efficient foreign aid utilization as they are 
programme specific, foreign aid fungibility (not using foreign aid for its intended usage by 
donors) incidences are likely to be higher with grants, particularly if received through general 
government budget support. Nevertheless, loans might also be prone to abuse if the country’s 
checks and balances (governance and policies) are weak as highlighted by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000). 
Table 4. 2: Volatility of foreign aid received by country (1985-2015) 
Country Variance of Foreign aid  
Burundi 61.22 
Comoros 13.38 
DRC 70.77 
Djibouti 30.79 
Egypt 2.24 
Ethiopia 6.72 
Kenya 2.34 
Libya 0.29 
Madagascar 8.90 
Malawi 9.01 
Mauritius 0.39 
Rwanda 100.46 
Seychelles 3.63 
Sudan 2.92 
Swaziland 0.41 
Uganda 4.57 
Zambia   15.53 
Zimbabwe 4.60 
Regional total 45.71 
Source: Authors Calculation based on OECD Database 
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Through the five pillars20 of the Paris Declaration on foreign aid effectiveness, both developing 
and developed countries resolved to ensure that there is efficiency in the allocation and 
utilization of foreign aid. Donors are committed to align their support to the development 
strategies and goals of the recipient countries. This could partly be achieved through direct 
support of the projects in the various sectors from the development strategies or through 
increased general government budget support allocation where the recipient country is expected 
to reallocate in accordance with its development needs. The latter leaves foreign aid highly 
fungible and prone to abuse by most recipient governments which might also be exacerbated 
by absorption capacity issues if not considered in the allocation (Moreira 2005; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2011). However, through the managing for results pillar of the Paris Declaration, 
the use of foreign aid resources in unproductive investments is supposed to be reduced as among 
other things, it calls for results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks for the foreign 
aid resource usage. While weak systems may have greatly affected implementation of such key 
initiatives and hence, effectiveness of foreign aid in the region, fragmentation and volatility of 
foreign aid (Table 1) could have potentially harmed its effective utilization. Effective planning 
on highly volatile resources is an impossible feat. 
Overall, foreign aid allocation to the whole region is volatile and significantly skewed towards 
either the social sector or general government budget support/humanitarian support that falls 
into consumption and not investment category. Humanitarian foreign aid does not directly 
translate into sectoral growth but as established by literature, if the right components are funded, 
social sector allocations may also contribute significantly to the country’s overall growth 
through improved technology and human skills. However, foreign aid to the social sectors in 
the region mostly funded consumption (remuneration in the education and health sectors) and 
very little was devoted to investments in infrastructure and developing human capacities (Figure 
4.5). Consequently, in COMESA, funding particular components in the social sector could still 
be critical for improving human capital to effectively enhance the performance of the lead 
productive sub-sectors and hence, overall growth of the economy. However, this assumes that 
human capacities are major development constraints in the region, which clearly is not the case 
as overall, social sector prioritization does not seem to support the region’s growth. The Impulse 
Response Function (IRF) in Appendix 4.4 shows that a unit increase of ODA in the sector has 
a marginal and unsustainable positive increase in growth lasting only one period before causing 
 
20 Pillars of the Paris Declaration: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for results, Mutual 
accountability. 
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a negative decreasing trend for the next three periods. A similar trend is observed for GBS while 
allocations to the production sectors have a sustainable positive impact on the region’s growth 
(Appendix 4.4).   
4.7 Foreign aid and economic growth Trends 
Over the last three decades, most of the economies in COMESA have remained relatively small 
with erratic growth rates averaging 3.8% (Appendix 1.1A). While episodes of negative growth 
rates were evident in some countries in the 1990s and early 2000s, all countries in COMESA 
(with the exception Zimbabwe) have been consistently registering positive albeit sluggish 
growth rates since 2005. It should be noted however that countries with similar growth rate 
patterns in the region have attracted foreign aid at different rates and volumes. For example, 
with GDP growing at an average of 3.8%, ODA to Burundi was approximately 30% of its GDP 
and for similar growth rate, Malawi and Rwanda received foreign aid approximately equal to 
22% of their GDP while Kenya received an equivalent of 6% of its GDP for the same growth 
rates. This partly suggests that Kenya faced a lower development financing gap or that it is 
more efficient in its development resource utilization compared to the other countries. This also 
potentially shows the enormous potential that COMESA countries have in raising their own 
domestic resources for growth. 
While recognizing heterogeneity in their resource base and hence resource gaps, COMESA as 
an economic community has provided member countries with an opportunity to effectively 
exploit their comparative advantage and grow without overdependence on foreign aid. In effect, 
it is not just about how much they receive in foreign aid, but their respective efforts in raising 
domestic savings and ensuring that together, these resources are efficiently deployed. Countries 
that have been receiving more foreign aid typically had low savings and no motivation to 
augment them with external capital inflows from competitive markets (Figure 4.3). Coupled 
with volatile foreign aid inflows, most of these countries have remained in their underdeveloped 
state. Only a few countries in the region including Seychelles, Mauritius, Egypt and Libya 
succeeded in investing significantly in economic infrastructure and realized better growth rates 
with limited volumes of foreign aid. 
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Figure 4. 6: GDP growth and ODA in COMESA (1985-2015) 
 
Source: OECD Database for ODA accessed on 10th December, 2017 and WDI accessed on 28th Dec, 2016 
Note: Take note of the different scales for the respective embedded charts 
 
From a development perspective, foreign aid is expected to be allocated to countries that really 
need it (Riddell, 2007). Consistency in foreign aid flows in tandem with development financing 
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gaps is expected to effectively meet the growth and development needs of the recipient 
countries. The evidence, based on GDP growth and foreign aid trends in COMESA shows that 
a completely different criterion is used to allocate foreign aid, with volatile volumes and notably 
more foreign aid directed to countries that are already relatively better off in terms of their 
saving rates and economic growth. Further, higher foreign aid volumes were disbursed to 
countries in an economic boom and significantly decreased during economic slumps. This is 
particularly the case for Burundi, Madagascar and Sudan. In exceptional cases, more foreign 
aid flowed during recessions in Seychelles and for some years to Zimbabwe. Also, notable 
contrasts are the very low foreign aid volumes to some countries with equally very low growth 
rates such as Madagascar (2.5% on average) while other countries such as Rwanda and Djibouti 
received higher volumes of foreign aid as they grew rapidly. Regardless of the criteria donors 
are using to determine the direction of foreign aid, there is likely to be little or no correlation 
between foreign aid and economic growth in a cross-country empirical study based on 
COMESA data as depicted in Figure 4.6. and appendix 1.1B.  
The total volume of foreign aid to most countries in the region has continued to grow over the 
years. This is contrary to the theory that views foreign aid as a temporary solution meant to 
jumpstart underdeveloped countries onto a self-sustaining growth path (Rosenstein-Rodan, 
1961). Except for DRC and Djibouti where foreign aid volumes have been steadily decreasing 
with economic growth, foreign aid has continued to grow in most countries regardless of the 
growth trends. In contrast, for Uganda and Zambia, foreign aid volumes have steadily declined 
since 2006 and 2004 respectively, although economic growth has also been slowing down. This 
implies that the decline in foreign aid volumes to DRC and Djibouti may not have been due to 
improvements in economic performance, but rather some other dynamics. Therefore, as equally 
established in Section 5, it can be concluded that economic financing gaps were not the only 
criterion in foreign disbursement to the region by foreign donors. 
Furthermore, the direct relationship between foreign aid and economic growth is relatively 
weak in most countries as trends analysis showed that an increase in foreign aid was not 
reciprocated by an increase in growth. A large component of humanitarian foreign aid in some 
countries (Appendix 4.3) crowds out the potential positive effect of foreign aid on growth as 
these are jointly assessed or it could be that foreign aid has been effective in stimulating growth 
but with a time lag (Moreira, 2005 and Bitew, 2014). Foreign aid could have been effective but 
with diminishing returns because of not being supported by relevant human skills and viable 
sectoral prioritization. While these relationships can be established econometrically, this 
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chapter offers insights into what could be obtained by a rigorous study. However, for some 
countries, growth remained erratic despite consistently increasing foreign aid. For example, 
Rajan and Subramanian (2011) found that foreign aid did not have any impact on economic 
growth. In the case of COMESA, except for Egypt, Libya, Mauritius and Seychelles, countries 
have been dependent on foreign aid for over four decades without substantial improvements in 
their growth and development outcomes. 
4.8 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter assessed economic performance of COMESA members in relation to external 
financing receipts. It established that ODA remains a key source of foreign capital to the region 
except for a few countries, notably Seychelles and Swaziland, that have enjoyed relatively 
better FDI inflows. Furthermore, for countries such as Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Malawi 
and Rwanda, foreign aid is an indispensable source of financing for development as evidenced 
by their low savings rates relative to ODA. The paper indicated that on average, foreign aid has 
been covering at least 60% of the financing gaps in most COMESA countries with episodes of 
foreign aid over and above what was required to fully close their financing gaps at current 
growth rates. There are few years where substantial foreign aid inflows are observed for 
countries such as Eritrea and Zimbabwe although their investment financing needs were fully 
covered by their respective domestic savings. These trends typically imply that foreign aid 
ineffectiveness in the region is not a function of how much is received vis-à-vis development 
financing gaps but rather a function of factors that mostly compromise its utilisation. 
Although foreign aid has failed to unlock the full potential of core growth sectors through viable 
investments in the sector and/or development of economic infrastructure and human capital, it 
continues to anchor the social sector particularly education, health, and humanitarian assistance 
directly or indirectly through general government budget support. Nevertheless, foreign aid in 
the social sector largely funds recurrent consumption, as less than 10% is invested in education 
and/or health facilities and training in most COMESA countries. Up to 17% of the total social 
sector allocation is streamlined for government and civil society consumption at the regional 
level. Therefore, foreign aid allocations to the sector are not effective in enhancing the region’s 
growth (Appendix 4.4).  
Failure by countries to productively invest foreign aid as reflected by either years of more 
foreign aid than investments or equal domestic savings and investment rates partly suggests that 
systemic domestic policy and institutional constraints have a bigger role to play than 
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development finance in influencing economic growth. It also indicates that the direction of 
foreign aid in the region is not a product of systematic assessment of the financing gaps as well 
as institutional and human capacities to effectively utilize the received foreign aid. In the current 
format of support to the region, foreign aid could be more effective if both COMESA 
governments and their respective development partners (donors) take full responsibility in 
addressing these relevant issues. This should include equitable prioritization of foreign aid 
within and across sectors vis-à-vis their distinctive roles and financing gaps in enhancing 
sustainable and inclusive growth by the respective governments. Donors can also address 
foreign aid volatility which cripples effective development planning. 
While this process would entail gradual increases of subsequent foreign aid to some countries 
according to their financing gaps as well as institutional and human capacities to effectively 
utilize foreign aid receipts, gradual decreases of foreign aid to some countries in the region will 
inevitably ensue. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that no amount of foreign aid can propel 
these countries into a higher-income group if a self-sustaining base for inclusive development 
is not established. As such, COMESA countries should deliberately put in place strategies and 
policies that encourage productivity-enhancing structural transformation through the 
strengthening of public institutions and capacity building in support of equitable resource 
allocation (both foreign aid and domestic resources) for inclusive and sustainable growth. Focus 
should remain on the countries’ comparative advantages in ensuring rationalization of the 
existing and development of new industries, building human capital and upgrading the 
economic infrastructure including viable value chains. As emphasized by economic theory of 
foreign aid, these measures would further enhance effectiveness of subsequent foreign aid 
receipts and eventually break the countries’ overreliance on foreign aid.  
Lastly, the concept of foreign aid (ODA) as defined by the DAC, needs to be rethought to 
exclude humanitarian assistance in its development financing definition. This would be useful 
in improving the efficacy of foreign aid in the aid-growth empirical analysis especially for the 
countries where the proportion of humanitarian assistance in total ODA is high. 
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CHAPTER 5: FOREIGN AID AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN COMESA  
 
5.1 Introduction  
The role of foreign aid in stimulating economic growth has been extensively analysed with 
polarised conclusions at the macro level. Pertinent issues discussed in empirical literature 
include: (i) Structural and institutional arrangements in the recipient economies whose focus 
for its effectiveness is on its utilisation. This strand postulates that optimal utilisation of the 
received foreign aid is the responsibility of the recipient economies. In this regard, domestic 
institutions and policies remain key in determining foreign aid effects on growth (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dehn, 2001; Alvi et. Al., 2008; Dreher et al., 2017).  (ii) Determinants 
of foreign aid whose focus is largely on how they indirectly compromise the potency of Foreign 
aid in stimulating economic growth of the recipient countries. On the one hand, foreign aid is 
assumed to be a primary function of growth and development financing gaps in the recipient 
countries such that unless foreign aid is given and utilised in this regard, it remains trivia in 
stimulating growth (Gomanee et al., 2005; Moreira 2005 and Clemens et al., 2012). On the 
other hand, foreign aid is perceived as a primary function of the political and strategic interests 
of the donors (Boone, 1996; Qian, 2014). Although there is little evidence to support the 
assertion of a direct negative impact of such foreign aid on growth, vast literature points to its 
indirect negative effects on growth through increased unproductive public consumption, among 
other things (Moreira, 2005; Rajan and Subramanian, 2011). 
Overall, regardless of the key focus of the study, the above two strands directly or indirectly 
converge on utilisation as the primary factor for enhanced (or lack of it) potency of the received 
foreign aid. This chapter contributes to the first strand, which directly emphasizes on optimal 
utilisation of the received foreign aid for enhanced growth outcomes. The chapter focuses on 
the aggregate impact of foreign aid to COMESA by controlling factors that potentially 
compromises the effective utilisation of such aid. Notably, the bloc has remained one of the key 
beneficiaries of foreign aid in Africa for over three decades. In most countries in the region, 
foreign aid has been at least 10% percent of their GDPs on average annually since 1985 (Figure 
4.6). Burundi, Malawi, and Rwanda received foreign aid, which was more than 20% of their 
GDP in some years. Only a few countries, Mauritius and Egypt, received an annual average of 
less than 2% of their GDPs (Figure 4.6). In view of the theoretical disposition of foreign aid as 
a key temporal enabler of economic growth in developing countries, most countries in the 
region would have been on the path to graduate from the Least Developed Country (LDC) status 
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following decades of foreign aid. However, most economies have remained relatively small, 
barely attaining the stipulated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) minimum annual growth 
rate of 7% (Figure 4.6).  Despite the fact that the vast literature on the role of foreign aid on 
economic growth, very little has been done to establish why foreign aid is not stimulating the 
desired growth outcomes in the region. 
Khomba and Trew (2016) found that foreign aid does not stimulate sustained growth despite its 
positive impact on incomes in Malawi. Focusing on Ethiopia, Tadesse (2011), Bitew (2014), 
and Ejigu (2015) found that foreign aid has a positive effect on growth only in the long term. 
These results are similar to Odiambo’s (2009), who also found that foreign aid has a positive 
effect on growth only in the long term in Kenya. Highlighting the relative effects of loans and 
grants, Morrisey et al. (2008) found that the relative positive effects of foreign aid on growth in 
Kenya were being weakened by the poor performance of the country’s loans. While these and 
other studies for the region are essential for country-specific foreign aid policy inferencing, they 
lack the rigor to effectively inform relevant policies in pursuit of the collective regional 
objectives. 
This chapter closes this gap by providing the first assessment of the aggregate impact of foreign 
aid on growth at the COMESA bloc level. To effectively contribute to the collective regional 
growth outcomes in this regard, the study contends for comparable growth outcomes from 
foreign aid in the respective member countries. Accordingly, the study adopts the hardly utilised 
Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator in the foreign aid-growth literature. The study diverts 
from the common trend of assessing total foreign aid impact by focusing on the relative effects 
of loans and grants on the region’s growth. It also examines how the quality of institutions in 
the respective COMESA countries have been affecting utilisation of their total foreign aid. The 
chapter argues that while the quality of institutions and/or policies are empirically validated to 
determine the potency of total foreign aid, they potentially have differential effects on the 
respective foreign aid components (loans and grants) as the administration of the two 
components varies significantly within and across countries in the region. Notably, while some 
conditions for loans and grants qualifications are common, factors such as repayment 
obligations that only hold for loans are bound to influence their utilization in various ways. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section provides the methodology, and 
Section 5.3 describes the data and provides data sources. Section 5.4 gives a thorough 
discussion of the results, and a chapter summary is given in Section 5. 
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5.2 Methodology 
One of the most contentious issues in the foreign aid-growth dynamic panels is the treatment 
of foreign aid as an endogenous variable. This is complicated by the addition of the lagged 
dependent variable as a regressor as it is correlated to the error term (Hansern and Tarp, 
2001:556). Relevant instrumental variable (IV) techniques such as the Allerano and Bond (AB) 
(1991) or Blundell-Bond (BB) (1998) and Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators 
have been adopted to address endogeneity in dynamic panels. The GMM estimator uses lagged 
values of foreign aid as instruments for handling its endogeneity. However, Clemens et al. 
(2012) and Roodman (2007) caution against over-reliance on such instruments due to the 
possibility of a correlation between such values with both past and current values of foreign 
aid. This results in a biased overall foreign aid coefficient. Furthermore, GMM estimators 
produce biased estimates in panels with long time periods or of similar magnitude with N as 
they constrain both short run and long coefficients to be homogenous (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
Easterly (2003) contends that most foreign aid-growth studies (including Burnside and Dollar, 
2000) fail to establish the long-term effect of foreign aid on growth as their short-time 
dimension captures cyclical economic impacts.  
Due to the homogenous assumption of both short-run (SR) and long-run (LR) parameters in 
these estimators, it is not possible to fully understand country-specific foreign aid-growth 
dynamics in the panel model. Therefore, it is impossible to draw country-specific policy 
inferences in the panel sample. If the focus of the analysis is to establish both short run and 
long-run effects of foreign aid on growth, it is imperative to explore other estimators such as 
the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) by Pesaran et al. (1999) that fully takes care of individual 
country heterogeneity by allowing variation in their short-run parameters and error variances 
while restricting their long-run coefficients to be homogenous. Though hardly exploited in the 
foreign aid-growth empirical literature, these estimators provide better estimates for dynamic 
panels with large T and thus a possibility of reliable long-term inferences in dynamic panels, 
unlike most estimators. 
Nevertheless, only the IVs/GMMs are unanimously agreed to perform better than any other 
estimators in the presence of endogenous variables (Sisay, 2015) only for panels with short T 
and long N. As such, most estimators in the aid-growth dynamic panels might produce biased 
estimates if foreign aid is really endogenous. Despite different outcomes of the different macro 
foreign aid -growth studies with equally divergent views on the role of policies, institutions, 
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and governance, there is consensus on the choice of estimators for short and long T panel data 
sets. To establish both the short-run and long-run impact of foreign aid on growth in the region, 
the chapter opts for the rarely used Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator. Easterly (2003) and 
Clemens et. al. (2012) argue that this estimator takes care of the time dimension, which most 
cross-country studies such as the one by Burnside and Dollar (2000) failed to address. 
 
5.2.1 Model Specification 
The H-D growth model essentially presumes the economic growth rate as a function of the 
national savings rate and the capital-output ratio. In its basic form, it is written as: 
𝑔 =
𝑠
𝑐
                                                                                                                                           (5.1) 
Where 𝑔 the real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, s is the national savings rate given 
as s = 
𝑆
𝐺𝐷𝑃
  where S are the national savings and GDP is the real GDP as a proxy for national 
output; c is the capital-output ratio given as 𝑐 =
𝛥𝐾
𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃
=
𝐾
𝐺𝐷𝑃
   where ΔK is the change in capital 
stock, and ΔGDP is the change in GDP.  
But the change in capital over time (ΔK) is given by the actual investment I such that in 
equilibrium it is equal to the savings rate 
ΔK = I = cΔGDP = S =sGDP                                                                                                  (5.2)                        
Thus, the more an economy can save and invest out of a given GDP, the more that economy 
grows at the rate determined by the productivity of the investment (c) (Todaro and Smith, 2012). 
As such, we can rewrite equation (5.1) as: 
𝑔 =
𝐼
𝐺𝐷𝑃
∗
1
𝑐
                                                                                                                                (5.3)  
However, it should be noted that for most developing countries such as those in COMESA, 
equation (5.2) does not really hold as the domestic savings (S) are not enough to finance 
required investment and importation of the required capital goods and technology to enhance 
investment productivity for the desired economic growth rates. Hence the need for foreign 
capital to augment domestic savings (Easterly, 2003; Gomane et al., 2005). Thus, the 
investment component in equation (5.2) becomes: 
𝐼
𝐺𝐷𝑃
=
𝑆
𝐺𝐷𝑃
+  
𝐹𝐶
𝐺𝐷𝑃
                                                                                                                    (5.4) 
Where FC is the total foreign resources, including foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign aid 
(ODA), and other foreign inflows. Following Chenery and Strout (1966), Cauas (1973) and 
Bacha (1990) gap models, the study includes the other two constraints (the trade and 
fiscal/inflation gaps). These constraints limit economies from attaining the desired investment 
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levels for self-sustained growth such that substituting (5.4) into (5.3) and relaxing the abundant 
labour force assumption to account for the requisite growth-enhancing human skills, the long-
run growth relationship in (1) becomes: 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝜋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃3𝑖𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖  𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡+ 𝜃5𝑖𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+ 𝜃6𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃7𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 (5.5)   
i= 1, 2, …, N; t=1, 2, ..., T                                                                                                           
Where the number of countries i= 1, 2,…, N; the number of time periods t= 1,2, …, T;  𝑔 is the 
natural log (ln) of the real GDP in United States Dollars (USD), π is the inflation rate, G is the 
ln of government consumption, ODA represents the ln of net foreign, S is the ln of the domestic 
savings, X is the ln of exports, εit is the idiosyncratic error term.  
Unlike most studies such as Moreira (2005), who used total population growth to capture the 
growth of labor force, LG in this study is the log of the population within the 15 to 64 year age 
bracket to capture only the productive population. The addition of labour in the equation (5.5) 
relaxes the assumption of the abundant labour force in the Harrod-Domar model, where the 
availability and productivity of capital are the only constraints for economic growth. Following 
the gap models where exports are expected to grow faster than imports especially during the 
second phase of an economy’s transition into self-sustaining growth, X will only capture 
exports and not terms of trade as is done in most studies that have used a similar model (see 
Hansen and Tarp, 2000). Among other things, this variable is expected to capture a country’s 
ability to finance its development imports. It is also expected to capture how much it is taking 
advantage of its preferential trade including the Free Trade Area (FTA) within the block and 
other preferences beyond COMESA as it strives to reduce its trade gap (exports growth catching 
up with the growth of imports) through market interactions (Chenery and Strout, 1966:690). 
Government expenditure in (5.5) includes all public expenditures made in a fiscal year. To 
assess institutional effects on foreign aid utilization, equation (5.5) will be re-run after adding 
a foreign aid*corruption interactive variable. Furthermore, equation (5.5) will be re-run after 
using disaggregated foreign aid data based on type (loans and grants) to assess their respective 
impact on growth in the region.  
Due to the inconsistencies in the foreign aid-growth relationship, it is not possible to determine 
the sign of 𝜃4 a priori. This is essentially in line with the H-D model, which states that unless 
the resources in an economy are productively invested, they can hardly stimulate growth. In the 
same regard, determining the sign of 𝜃6 a priori would be misleading unless the social-political 
environment, such as policies in an economy, are conducive for highly productive investments 
from savings. Literature shows that economies need to properly balance up their investments in 
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the various sectors and prioritise on their core growth sectors whilst ensuring good synergies 
across the sectors for any investment to have a meaningful impact on growth (Rosenstein-
Rodan, 1961; Wang, 2015). Lastly, as postulated by the gap theory that inflation and 
government consumption are effective growth constraints only at higher levels where they 
potentially crowd-out private investments, the sign for 𝜃2 and  𝜃3 cannot be determined a priori.  
However, a positive sign is expected for  𝜃7 which, according to the gap theory, is a source of 
forex earnings for development imports. 
5.2.2 The Pooled Mean Group (PMG) Estimation Technique 
The PMG estimator remains among the best estimators in heterogeneous dynamic panels with 
a long-time dimension. With its weak homogeneity assumptions that allow for free variation in 
the SR parameters and error variances, it is possible to draw reliable country-specific policy 
inferences from the dynamic panel model without losing its focus on the long-term relationship 
of the variables of interest.  
Assuming that all variables in equation (5.5) are I (1) and cointegrated such that the error term 
is an I (0) for all i, then the following Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) 
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) holds for equation (5.5): 
ɡ𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆ɡ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽20𝑖𝜋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑖𝜋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽30𝑖𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽31𝑖𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽40𝑖𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽41𝑖𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽50𝑖𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽51𝑖𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽60𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽61𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽70𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽71𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                          (5.6) 
Which can be parameterized into an Error Correction Model (ECM) as below 
𝛥𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷𝑖[𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜃0𝑖 − 𝜃1𝑖𝐿𝐺𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃2𝑖𝜋𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃3𝑖𝐺𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃4𝑖𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃5𝑖𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃6𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑡 −
𝜃7𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡] − 𝛽11𝑖𝛥𝐿𝐺𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽21𝑖𝛥𝜋𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽31𝑖𝛥𝐺𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽41𝑖𝛥𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽51𝑖𝛥𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽61𝑖𝛥𝑆𝑖𝑡 −
𝛽71𝑖𝛥𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                              (5.7) 
where: 𝜃0𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
1−𝜆
  ; 𝜃1𝑖 =
𝛽10𝑖+𝛽11𝑖
1−𝜆
 ;  𝜃2𝑖= 
𝛽20𝑖+𝛽21𝑖
1−𝜆
 ; 𝜃3𝑖 =
𝛽30𝑖+𝛽31𝑖
1−𝜆
 ; 𝜃4𝑖 =
𝛽40𝑖+𝛽41𝑖
1−𝜆
 
𝜃5𝑖 =
𝛽50𝑖+𝛽51𝑖
1−𝜆
 ; 𝜃6𝑖 =
𝛽60𝑖+𝛽61𝑖
1−𝜆
 ; 𝜃7𝑖 =
𝛽70𝑖+𝛽71𝑖
1−𝜆
 ; 𝜃8𝑖 =
𝛽80𝑖+𝛽81𝑖
1−𝜆
; 𝛷𝑖 = −(1 − 𝜆) 
𝛷𝑖 is the error correction term, which is expected to be negative if (5.7) is to hold as it entails 
the existence of a long-run equilibrium. The 𝜃𝑠 are the long-run parameters which are 
constrained to be homogenous across countries in the PMG methodology and the 𝛽𝑠are the 
short-run parameters, which, together with the error correction term, are left to freely vary 
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across countries. This specification allows for a special ARDL case in which the estimates have 
been proved to “remain consistent and asymptotically normal for both stationary and non-
stationary I(1) regressors” (Asteriou, 2009). However, the appropriate lag length of the 
respective estimated equations will be determined using the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). 
 
5.3 Data and Challenges 
The main variables in this chapter are i) GDP growth as a proxy of the level of development of 
the respective COMESA countries, ii) Corruption defined as the extent to which public power 
is perceived to be utilised for private gains is proxied by the corruption index (corr) from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank (WB). The index values vary 
between -2.5 and 2.5, with the higher values reflecting perceived lower incidences of corruption 
(WGI, 2018). iii) ODA defined as the flow of official grants and concessional loans to 
developing countries with the main objective of enhancing the economic and social 
development of the recipient economies (OECD, 2018). This mainly comprises grants which 
have been covering an annual average of about 80% of the total foreign aid since 2002 at the 
regional level (Appendix 5.1). At the country level, grants are the predominant sources of 
foreign capital in 11 of the 19 COMESA countries, including Burundi, Comoros, DRC, 
Djibouti, Malawi, and Rwanda. The summary statistics for these variables are presented in 
Appendix 5.2. 
The study uses secondary data mainly from the World Bank Development Indicators, UN 
database, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database, the 
COMESA database, the AFDB African Infrastructure Database, and the UNCTAD database21 
covering the 1985-2015 period. These sources were specifically chosen to ensure that the study 
utilises only highly credible data. Eritrea was dropped from the sample because of data paucity 
between 1985 and 1995, as this was the period it was still under Ethiopia. This period also 
included part of its transitioning to political independence. The dataset had less than 3 percent 
 
21 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx  
  http://data.un.org 
  https://stats.oecd.org/qwids 
 http://comstat.comesa.int/ 
 http://infrastructureafrica.opendataforafrica.org 
 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN) 
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gaps. These were filled through the extrapolation command in Stata, as it was not possible to 
perform some of the necessary tests on unbalanced panels.    
 
5.4 Results and Discussions 
5.4.1 Preliminary data diagnostic 
5.4.1.1 Cross Section Dependence 
The use of panel datasets with long time dimensions complicates its analysis for most estimators 
due to its emphasis on the need for independence of the panels (Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 2003). 
To ensure that the estimates in this study are not biased due to this concern, the Pesaran cross-
section dependence (CSD) test is used for possible correlations of the residuals across countries. 
With a p-value of 0.3082, the study does not reject the null hypothesis of the independent panels 
in its sample. 
5.4.1.2 Heterogeneous Panel Unit Root Tests 
Based on the Dickey-Fuller procedure, Im-Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (2003) developed a unit root 
test that allows for panel heterogeneity specifically by relaxing the assumption of a common 
autoregressive parameter as assumed by most unit root tests such as the Levin-Lin-chu (LLC) 
and the Breitung Tests. This is because several country-specific factors weaken the potency of 
such an assumption. As such, they fit the specified Dickey-Fuller equation separately into each 
panel and then average the t-statistics from the various regressions. The test works for both 
balanced and unbalanced panels provided there are no gaps within the panel under the null 
hypothesis and that all panels contain a unit root against the alternative and that panels in the 
sample have stationary series. While the test allows for heterogeneous panel specifications both 
with serially correlated and uncorrelated standard errors, its demeaned version further allows 
for robust statistics where the various standard errors contain common time-specific 
components (Hassan et al., 2014). This approach is further simplified by the Fisher-Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test that runs different tests on each panel and then combines 
their respective p-values to determine whether the panel is stationary. It is worth noting that 
both tests assume the individual unit root process of the respective panels as they maintain 
heterogeneity of the panels in their analysis.  
Except for the exports, government expenditure, and population in the IPS test, the null 
hypothesis of the presence of unit root in all panels was rejected for all the other variables in 
first differences, as indicated in Table 1. The Fisher-ADF test strongly rejected the unit root 
hypothesis at 1% for all the variables excluding exports and government expenditure. Under 
 
 
79 
 
IPS, the conclusion of the presence of at least one panel with stationary series was made only 
for the population on its demeaned first differences. However, the demeaned first differences 
(with a drift) of exports and government expenditure are stationary under the Fisher-ADF. 
Augmenting the unit root test results in Table 5.1 by the AIC for the maximum lag selection, 
the study concludes that the sample has both stationary and non-stationary variables that are 
integrated of order 1.  
Table 5. 1: IPS Unit and Fisher-ADF Root Tests Result 
 IPS Fisher-ADF 
Variable levels 1st difference Levels 1st Difference 
Δ lnGDP -10.9875***  419.9551***  
lnODA  -2.0364**  63.4961***  
lnExports 3.7560 -0.6294 33.8230 107.150*** 
lnFDI -8.3892 ***  295.3136 ***  
lnSavings -4.0419 ***  179.4485***  
lngovt 
Expenditure 
2.1844 -1.1824 38.8768 127.9430*** 
Inflation -7.4682***  183.2750***  
ln Population 2.6570 -2.3792*** 276.6500***  
     
Note i) ***, **, and * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
iii) Since the study is covering all COMESA member states, it assumed a finite N for the Fisher-ADF and therefore, 
only reported on the χ2 ρ. However, it should be noted that all the four tests under the fisher-ADF failed to accept 
the null hypothesis of a unit root in all the panels at 1%. 
 
5.4.1.3 Panel Cointegration Tests 
Having established the independence of the panels in the sample as well as the order of 
integration of the variables, the study adopted the Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration test to 
ascertain the existence of long-run cointegrating relationships amongst the panels in the sample. 
Based on an ECM in which all variables are I(1), the test allows for complete heterogeneity of 
the panels and assesses the existence of long-run relationships among the variables using four 
tests (Ga, Gt, Pa, Pt). (i) The Ga and Gt assess the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
relationship in all the panels against the alternative hypothesis of the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship in at least one panel. (ii) The Pa and Pt assess the same null hypothesis as the Ga 
and Gt but against the alternative hypothesis of the existence of cointegration relationships in 
all the panels.  
Since the main variables of interest are GDP growth and foreign aid (ODA), the study first 
established the existence of a long-run relationship between these variables. As shown in Table 
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5.2, all tests failed to accept the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1%. Similar tests were 
conducted between GDP growth and all the variables in the sample with similar conclusions 
(results not reported in this study). On the other hand, considering the simple P-values of the 
cointegration test between GDP growth and the rest of the variables, only the Ga test confirmed 
the null of no cointegration in all the panels. However, with the robust P-values, the study 
concludes that a long-run relationship exists between all its variables. 
Table 5. 2: Westerlund panel cointegration tests between Δ lnGDP and lnODA 
 
Note: For all the tests between GDP growth and all the variables in the sample, The AIC optimal lag length of 1 
was utilised. No difference in the significance and magnitude of the values was observed whether the leads lag of 
1 was utilised or not and similarly if the Bartlett kernel window option of 2 was considered.   
 
Table 5. 3: Westerlund panel cointegration tests between Δ ln GDP, lnODA, lnExports 
lnFDI, Inflation and lnSavings 
 
Note: The Robust P-values were obtained by bootstrapping using 500 replications. Apart from slight changes in 
the magnitude of the statistics, signs, and significance of the tests were not affected by altering the covariates in 
the tests. Thus, similar results were obtained using different combinations of the regressors since not all of them 
could be included in one regression as the test was only accepting a maximum of 5 variables. 
5.4.2 Empirical Results and Discussion  
The PMG results in Table 5.4 shows that the null hypothesis of the absence of a long-run 
equilibrium cannot be rejected both at the economic bloc level and for individual COMESA 
member states as reflected by the negative and significant signs of the respective error 
correction terms. At the regional level, the results in Table 5.4 shows that ODA positively 
stimulates growth only in the short run (SR) reflecting the possibility of diminishing returns to 
foreign aid at the regional level. Thus, the more foreign aid the region has been receiving over 
                                                
     Pa       -19.349     -26.849      0.000    
     Pt       -13.092      -9.361      0.000    
     Ga       -17.660     -12.926      0.000    
     Gt        -3.139      -8.821      0.000    
                                                
 Statistic     Value      Z-value     P-value   
                                                
                                                                 
     Pa       -11.384      -1.789      0.037          0.002       
     Pt       -13.707      -4.684      0.000          0.000       
     Ga        -9.654       1.144      0.874          0.012       
     Gt        -2.812      -2.560      0.005          0.002       
                                                                 
 Statistic     Value      Z-value     P-value    Robust P-value  
                                                                 
 
 
81 
 
the years, the less has been its marginal effect on its overall growth. As evident in empirical 
literature, this could be due to low human and institutional capacities of the recipient economies 
to effectively absorb high volumes of foreign aid (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Lensik and White, 
2000a). This could also be an effect of poor targeting of foreign aid resources by the donors 
where the recipient economies in the region were receiving more than what they needed to 
effectively close their growth and development financing gaps (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 
2001). Foreign aid in the region is potentially being redirected to other non-growth enhancing 
programmes. Furthermore, overreliance on foreign aid as a key source of development 
financing without effectively augmenting it with requisite human capacities as well as relevant 
production and market infrastructure over time effectively leads to a decline in the per unit 
returns of foreign aid over time.  
At the country level, the results show that the relative impact of ODA is similar among the 
countries in the region. Table 5.4 shows that a one-unit change in the change of ODA has about 
1% change in the change of the growth rate in most countries. A few exceptions are shown for 
Mauritius, Djibouti and Comoros where the impact is relatively higher. Table 5.4 further shows 
that at the regional level, savings have a significant and positive impact on growth with its unit 
change being associated with about 0.004% change in the change of the region’s growth rate. 
The short run effects are however different across the countries in the region with coefficients 
ranging between -0.02 and 0.09. Notably, the positive impact of domestic savings is higher in 
countries with better savings rates such as Egypt, Mauritius and Libya (see figure 4.3). 
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Table 5. 4: Effect of Total Foreign aid on Economic Growth 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
   
 
Consistent in all the three models at the regional level is the unexpected negative but significant 
(in some models insignificant) coefficient of exports in the long run. This result is well 
supported by the theory of the ‘paradox of plenty’ which contends for a concentration of a 
country’s exports on few commodities in line with its comparative advantage without any value 
addition such that the net effect of exports on growth is negative (Kartikasari, 2017). 
Accordingly, with the high concentration of the region’s exports on a limited number of 
products, including tobacco, diamonds, uranium, copper, and cotton with very little (if any 
value addition), its regional trade balance has remained negative and has been worsening since 
2011 (Appendix 5.3). The region’s exports are falling below its imports such that low export 
earnings, as postulated by the gap theories continue to hold as a binding constraint for enhanced 
growth and development at the regional level.  
ect lnODA lnExports lnFDI lngov ln ppln Inflation lnSavings
LR -1.67719
*** -0.00306 0.00002 -0.00598 0.02011
*
0.00002
***
0.0044
**
SR
COMESA -0.85762
***
1.44989
***
0.06423
*** 0.00255 0.09090
*** -0.38011 -0.00034 0.00963
Burundi -0.72379
***
1.21606
** 0.02104 0.00072 0.0179 0.77679 -0.00143
** 0.00003
Comoros -1.20592
***
2.00927
*** 0.05181 -0.00032 0.03389 1.0163 -0.00250
**
0.00065
**
Djibouti -1.48991
**
2.54812
** 0.06138 0.01233 0.05515 -0.53916
* -0.00013 -0.00024
DRC -0.46859
***
0.81859
** 0.01103 0.00029 0.01174 -6.39807
**
0.00004
** -0.00031
Egypt -0.56814
**
0.95381
**
0.04347
***
0.00042
***
0.08643
*** -0.2785 -0.00073
**
0.05463
**
Eswatini -0.93306
***
1.56531
***
0.09212
** 0.00023 0.02974 2.68964
*** 0.00026 -0.00039
Ethiopia -0.81595
***
1.40326
*** 0.09602 -0.00006 0.18227
*** -3.74706 -0.00108
** -0.00103
Kenya -0.48035
***
0.81040
*** 0.02382 -0.00252 0.04596 -0.02234
** -0.001 0.00524
Libya -1.16849
***
1.93635
*** 0.0692 0.00008 0.57721
*** -1.73977 0.00051
** 0.09125
Madagascar -0.72679
***
1.24181
***
0.19081
*** -0.00034 -0.01527 -3.18259 -0.00076
**
0.00132
***
Malawi -1.25184
***
2.13113
***
0.11061
** -0.00007 -0.07807
** -0.29757 0.00019 -0.00049
Mauritius -1.38361
** 2.32591 0.02799 -0.00028 0.04146 1.21476 0.00165
**
0.05446
***
Rwanda -0.91196
***
1.54275
*** 0.06999 0.03472
**
0.20986
***
0.83977
* -0.00002 0.00167
**
Seychelles -0.62580
***
1.05687
*** 0.04423 -0.00088 0.17775
*** -0.24994 -0.00075 -0.00413
***
Sudan -0.94799
***
1.60398
***
0.06012
***
0.0003
*
0.10677
*** 0.90146 -0.00051
***
-0.02095
***
Uganda -0.76018
***
1.26308
***
0.05364
*** -0.00007 0.07301
*** 1.32093 -0.00013 0.0001
Zambia -0.63522
***
1.09624
*** 0.02662 0.01549
* -0.0204 -0.31639 0.00052
*** -0.00628
Zimbabwe -0.33965
***
0.57515
*** 0.10216 -0.01387 0.10083
*** 1.16981 0.00040 -0.00225
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While the coefficient for the active population has the expected positive impact on the region-
s aggregate growth, its impact across the countries in the region is not consistent. The active 
population group contributes positively to the GDP growth in countries such as Eswatini, 
Rwanda, Comoros, Mauritius, and Uganda. However, the unexpected negative impact holds for 
countries such as Burundi, Madagascar, and Ethiopia. These results imply a low productivity 
of labour in most countries in the region to effectively contribute to its GDP growth rates. 
The gap theories contend that inflation and government consumption significantly constrain 
growth only at high levels. Consistent with this line of thought, an inverse relationship between 
inflation (or government consumption) and GDP is expected mainly if they are beyond the 
expected thresholds. Further, Gokal and Hanif showed that this causality from inflation to 
growth is generally weak as the trends from most countries support a strong unidirectional 
causality from growth to inflation. Thus, notwithstanding the possible constraint on growth 
beyond certain thresholds, their study shows that the higher the GDP (economic size) of a 
country, the higher the consumer prices (inflation). In this regard, the consistently positive 
impact of inflation on growth in all three models shows that regional inflation levels are within 
the thresholds, not constrain growth. Further, consistent with Gokal and Hanif (2004), the 
results on inflation highlights the fact that COMESA is largely comprised of small economies. 
However, consistent with the gap models, consistently negative albeit insignificant only in the 
core model shows that high government consumption rates in most countries are a constraint to 
the region’s growth.  
Notwithstanding slight changes in the magnitude of the coefficients and levels of significance 
for some variables, the results of model 2 presented in Table 5.5 shows a significant variation 
on the effect of ODA on growth across countries when controlled for corruption. While no 
significant relationship could be established between the ODA-corruption interacted variable 
for most countries in the short run, the variable is significantly positive only for 6 of the 19 
countries in the region.  The 6 countries with better short-run outcomes of corruption effect on 
foreign aid utilisation are Rwanda, Swaziland, Mauritius, Kenya, Djibouti, and Zambia. 
Notably, Figure 7.3 shows that these are among the few countries in the region that have been 
successfully reducing corruption levels in recent years. However, with corruption levels still 
high in most countries in the bloc, the net effect of corruption on the region’s growth remains 
negative as foreign aid increases. Specifically, the results indicate that in the long run, the 
marginal effect of a unit change in corruption has a decreasing effect on the change in growth 
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as foreign aid increases. However, the magnitude of the ODA-corruption coefficient (0.0026) 
reveals the potential for better growth outcomes from foreign aid if corruption is effectively 
addressed in all countries in the region.  
Worth noting are the varying impacts of loans and grants both at the bloc and country levels. 
At the bloc level, an annual average of 81% of the total foreign aid is received through grants 
to the respective countries of which at least 30% on average, is largely for consumption through 
humanitarian assistance and/or associated with increased fiduciary risks22 through General 
Budget Support (GBS) (Appendix 4.4). On the one hand, humanitarian foreign aid has been 
empirically proven not to have any growth-enhancing effect (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2003). 
On the other hand, GBS has mixed outcomes function on programmes/activities that it finances 
(Leiderer, 2012). Depending on what the remaining 70% of the grants finances in the region, a 
positive or negative significant effect on growth could ensue. The results in Table 5.6 shows 
that grants have an overall positive effect on growth in the long run. As highlighted above, 
mixed short-run outcomes are observed at the country level. The table shows that grants have 
negative and significant short-run effects on growth in Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya, and Zimbabwe 
(Table 5.6). These could be accounted for by several factors such as corruption (Appendix 5.5) 
and the intent (humanitarian assistance) for which most of the foreign aid was disbursed in 
some periods in countries such as Burundi and DRC. The table further indicates that for most 
countries, grants have positive and albeit insignificant short-run effects on their growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22  The risk that the received foreign aid  will end up financing unintended programmes with the worst scenario 
being benefiting the elite through corruption for example or the risk that the received foreign aid  will free up 
government resources for the benefit of the elite inter alia. 
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Table 5. 5: Effect of Total Foreign aid on Economic Growth: Controlled for Corruption 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Although a significant long-run inverse relationship between loans and growth can be traced at 
the regional level, positive short-run impacts of loans are observed in countries such as 
Comoros, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, and Uganda. While potentially 
attracting better utilisation than grants as they are programme specific and have a repayment 
obligation, researchers contend that loans are also equally prone to abuse if the country’s checks 
and balances (governance and policies) are weak (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). In that case, 
loans could be diverted to other non-growth enhancing projects and/or inflated cost of the 
growth-enhancing projects. This is seen in COMESA (Appendix 5.5), wherein the long term, 
both the loan and grant components of ODA are subject to abuse in the region through 
corruption. However, the relative impact of corruption on the utilization of foreign aid is much 
higher on loans than it is on grants. Thus notwithstanding the potential impact of corruption on 
the utilization of grants in some countries, the grant component depicts relatively better 
utilization in the presence of corruption than loans. This is well underscored by the overall net 
positive impact of grants on growth when controlled for corruption, while the coefficient of the 
loan component remains negative and significant.  Accordingly, the overall positive long-term 
effect of grants on growth leaves the negative effect of loans as the key foreign aid component 
responsible for its overall negative effect on growth in the region.  
EC lnODA ODA*corr lnExports lnFDI lngov ln ppln Inflation lnSavings
LR -0.04658
**
-0.00259
* -0.00737 0.00019 -0.01364
**
0.02422
*
0.00276
***
0.00043
**
SR
COMESA -0.88984
****
0.05537
***
0.00322
***
0.05920
*** 0.00258 0.09630
*** -0.67497 -0.00039
* 0.00907
Burundi -0.72542
***
0.04054
* 0.00201 0.02217 0.00073 0.01405 0.7178 -0.00147
** 0.00004
Comoros -1.21687
** 0.04918 0.00318 0.05472
* -0.00032 0.0413 1.00219 -0.00247
** 0.00064
Djibouti -0.38467
**
0.05018
***
0.00664
*** 0.01197 0.00048
** 0.015 -6.53635
**
-0.00042
* -0.00035
DRC -1.46651
***
0.12815
*** 0.00272 0.06993 0.013 0.06787
* -0.48867 -0.00007 -0.00023
Egypt -0.59945
***
0.02989
** -0.00188 0.02211 0.00041
***
0.10833
*** 0.3464 -0.00105
***
0.05011
***
Eswatini -0.97557
***
0.04432
* 0.00003 0.07628
* 0.00016 0.03952 3.05531
*** 0.00041 -0.0004
Ethiopia -0.79127
***
0.07834
*** 0.00201 0.09225 -0.00014 0.19582
*** -4.10411 -0.00111
* -0.00052
Kenya -0.36599
***
0.02464
***
0.00631
*** -0.00787 -0.00349
** 0.05083 1.86021
*
-0.00125
*** 0.00458
Libya -1.15946
*** 0.03233 0.0059 0.06915 0.00006 0.58934
* -2.8466 0.00062 0.09010
**
Madagascar -0.74083
***
0.06468
*** 0.00022 0.19132
** -0.00056 -0.00093 -2.35826 -0.00057
*
0.00141
**
Malawi -1.43872
***
0.12601
*** 0.00948 0.11136
** -0.0005 -0.07246
** 0.22285 -0.0003 -0.00063
*
Mauritius -1.38006
***
0.07037
**
0.00374
* 0.02058 -0.00034 0.03306 0.29685 0.00148
*
0.04970
**
Rwanda -0.94861
*** 0.03043 0.00451
* 0.07285 0.03385
***
0.20777
** 0.73328 -0.00031 0.00176
Seychelles -0.68541
* 0.03437 -0.00398 0.03558 -0.0001 0.19855
*** -0.12 -0.00074 -0.00394
***
Sudan -0.97477
***
0.06556
*** 0.0024 0.06352
**
-0.00003
*
0.10783
*** -0.13989 -0.00053
*
-0.02141
***
Uganda -0.88179
***
0.04594
* 0.00204 0.04937
*** -0.00045 0.06065
*** 0.17979 0.00002 0.00022
Zambia -1.05603
***
0.06819
**
0.01115
*** 0.0155 0.01797
** -0.02878 -4.21361
** 0.00028 -0.00516
Zimbabwe -0.22561
** 0.01361 0.00143 0.09491 -0.01432 0.10561
*** 0.24332 0.00005 -0.00272
 
 
86 
 
Table 5. 6: Effect of Loans and Grants on Economic Growth 
  
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
In sum, the results from the three models consistently confirm an inverse long-run relationship 
between foreign aid and economic growth in the region, suggesting that the marginal 
incremental effect of foreign aid on growth has been going down with increases in foreign aid 
over time. Notwithstanding the reduction in corruption levels in some countries, corruption 
levels in most countries in the region are still high (Figure 7.3). As such, the results indicate 
that the overall potency of foreign aid is still compromised by corruption in the long term. 
Appendix 5.5 shows that the potency of both loans and grants is compromised by corruption, 
although the impact is much higher on loans. Moreover, the short-run effects of corruption on 
the utilisation of both loans and grants are evident both at the regional and country-level though 
insignificant in some countries. Overall, loans have a significant inverse relationship with 
growth in the long term, while grants are more productive in enhancing the region’s economic 
growth.  
Furthermore, results in the three tables consistently indicate that savings in the region have a 
positive LR effect on growth. This indicates the great potential that the region has in effectively 
turning its growth and development trajectory using domestic resources. Lastly, the results 
EC lnGrants lnLoans lnExports lnFDI lngov ln ppln Inflation lnSavings
LR 0.00690
***
-5.23857
***
-0.00308
*** 0.00011 -0.00982
* 0.01317 0.00001 0.00055
**
SR
COMESA -0.86093
*** -0.00526 4.51737
***
0.06160
*** 0.00315 0.08644
*** 0.34463 -0.00044
** 0.0096
Burundi -0.77062
*** 0.01016 4.04669
* 0.01792 0.00074 0.00411 0.77250
*
-0.00145
**
0.00008
*
Comoros -1.15432
***
0.01967
**
6.04266
**
0.06634
*** -0.00072 0.07946
*
4.57932
**
-0.00261
** 0.00055
Djibouti -1.36353
***
0.03932
**
2.16224
*** 0.02163 0.00793 0.04837 -0.63676
** -0.00089 -0.00044
DRC -0.25393
*** 0.012 1.32774
**
0.03888
** -0.00019 0.03553
* 0.13421 -0.00009 -0.00039
***
Egypt -0.62012
***
-0.00253
*** 3.23918 0.05007
***
0.00047
***
0.06897
***
-1.62829
***
-0.00066
** 0.04576
Eswatini -1.02074
*** 0.01453 5.36829
***
0.08128
* 0.00034 0.05688 2.9221 0.00041 -0.00042
Ethiopia -0.86080
***
-0.03891
*
4.54243
***
0.11222
** 0.00035 0.15953
** -5.0447 -0.00073 0.00021
**
Kenya -0.49238
*** 0.02014 2.58103
*** 0.00928 -0.00246 0.02313 -0.20256 -0.00109
***
0.00352
***
Libya -1.18989
***
-0.01899
** 6.25507 0.06874 0.00023 0.51725
*** 0.58286 -0.00108 0.10251
Madagascar -0.71234
*** 0.0049 3.74711 0.18487
*** -0.00045 -0.00511 -0.4918 -0.00070
*
0.00134
***
Malawi -1.14341
*** -0.01353 5.97978
*** 0.10553 0.00014 -0.07985
** -0.41714 0.00026 -0.00041
Mauritius -1.38414
*** 0.00523 7.25483 0.0177 -0.00034 0.04587 1.03891
***
0.00163
*
0.05515
***
Rwanda -0.96658
*** -0.0246 5.09657
*** 0.05476 0.03434
***
0.17074
*** 0.87526 -0.00063
**
0.00159
**
Seychelles -0.68472
*** -0.00064 3.59378
*** 0.04072 -0.00067 0.16672
*** -0.28073 -0.00035 -0.00406
Sudan -0.95441
*** -0.00111 5.00741
**
0.05759
*** -0.00003 0.11524
***
-0.22170
***
-0.00054
** -0.02222
Uganda -0.78610
*** 0.00186 4.10094
***
0.04751
*** -0.00026 0.07210
*** 0.75312 -0.00011
** -0.00001
Zambia -0.60917
*** -0.00914 3.198363
***
0.05947
*
0.01609
* -0.01199 0.96711 0.0006 -0.00884
Zimbabwe -0.52947
***
-0.11303
**
2.76852
*** 0.0743 0.00124 0.08904
*** 2.5017 0.00002 -0.00113
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consistently show an inverse LR relationship between its exports and growth, which is largely 
explained by its limited export base with little (if any) value addition in line with the ‘paradox 
of plenty.’ The trade balance in Appendix 5.3 indicates that the region’s exports have been 
lagging behind its imports resulting in a sharp slump in its trade balance since 2011. Among 
other things, this trend implies that the region is not reaping enough from its exports to 
effectively support its growth needs, hence the negative long term impact of exports on its 
aggregate growth. 
5.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
Focusing on the role of institutions and corruption in the utilization of foreign aid, the chapter 
assessed the impact of total ODA on economic growth in COMESA. The chapter postulates 
comparable effects of foreign aid across the countries in the region if it is to effectively 
contribute to its inclusive and sustained growth collective goals. Accordingly, the chapter 
adopted the PMG estimator, which, among other things, allows for heterogeneity of countries 
and produces short-run country-specific estimates. The results show consistent positive short-
run effects of foreign aid across the countries in the region, albeit insignificant in a few 
countries. This implies that foreign aid has the potential to effectively contribute to the regional 
collective growth goals, ceteris paribus. In line with the positive short-run impact of foreign 
aid on growth across COMESA countries, its aggregate regional impact is equally positive. 
However, the results further indicate that the short-run positive impact is not sustainable, as 
shown by the negative and significant sign of its long-term coefficient. This result reflects 
diminishing returns to foreign aid as its positive impact gets eroded with increases in foreign 
aid receipts over time. Overall, the results show that foreign aid in the region does not have an 
optimal impact on growth as its potency is compromised by corruption.  
Specifically, a negative and significant LR coefficient of the aid*corruption variable indicates 
that the marginal impact of corruption on the change growth as foreign aid increased is negative. 
This was supported by the general decline in corruption levels in the region since 2007. 
However, the chapter found that the decline in corruption was not consistent across the 
countries in the region, and as such, its negative impacts on the utilisation of both loans and 
grants are still visible in some countries, albeit insignificant in some of the countries. 
Nevertheless, the chapter established that the potency of both loans and grants is compromised 
by corruption in the long term. The chapter results show that there can be better growth 
outcomes from foreign aid if corruption is effectively addressed in all countries in the region. 
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Notwithstanding comparable effects of total ODA in the region, loans and grants have 
significant varying impacts both at the country and the regional level. While grants have a 
positive impact on growth, albeit insignificant in the short run at the regional level, loans have 
a net negative impact on economic growth in the long run. At the country level, the chapter 
found that the utilization of loans and grants varies across countries in the region with equally 
varying impacts on their respective growth outcomes. Worth noting are the varying positive 
(negative) impacts of loans and grants in countries such as Rwanda, Swaziland, and Djibouti 
(Appendix 5.5), which effectively entails that there are potentially different factors that affect 
the potency of these two components of foreign aid. At the regional level, corruption is clearly 
a factor that compromises the potency of both loans and grants in the long run. However, at the 
country level, results indicate that while loans might not be compromised by corruption in one 
country, grants are. In the case of Rwanda, Appendix 5.5 shows that while the impact of 
corruption on the utilisation of its grants is negative and significant, corruption does not 
compromise the potency of loans in the short run. However, this is different in countries like 
Djibouti, where it is the loan component that is prone to abuse in the short run. As such, it 
remains imperative for COMESA to effectively address corruption to ensure that both loans 
and grants have comparable positive impacts across its countries if the region is to achieve 
better growth outcomes from foreign aid.    
Lastly, while exports have a negative effect on growth in the LR, savings are growth-enhancing 
in the long term. These results entail the great potential that the region has in effectively turning 
its growth and development trajectory with increased domestic resources and rationalisation of 
its exports. In this regard, encouraging strategies that focus on increasing domestic revenue, 
development of its production and market structure to effectively rationalise its exports remains 
best policy options both in augmenting future aid inflows for enhanced potency and launch 
themselves on to a self-sustaining growth path with a diminishing need for foreign aid over 
time. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT AID IN AGRICULTURE: A PANEL VECTOR 
AUTOREGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Agriculture remains a hinge for sustainable and inclusive growth for most developing countries, 
mainly due to its economic importance in facilitating industrial growth and economic structural 
transformation, food security, sustaining livelihoods, and hence, poverty reduction in most of 
the poor population. FAO (2018) highlights that at least 75% of the world’s extreme poor 
depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. Overall, research shows agriculture as the largest 
employing sector accounting for up to 81% of total employment in most developing countries 
and as much as 50% of their respective export earnings (Kaya et al., 2008). The Common 
Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) is not exempt from these trends as the sector 
is indispensable in its growth and development agenda. Agriculture remains key in sustaining 
livelihoods in most COMESA countries covering between 70% and 92% of the total 
employment in Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe and less than 20% only in Libya and Mauritius (Figure 6.1). 
Furthermore, the sector is vital for COMESA’s industrial development and export revenue, 
covering at least 50% of the raw materials in its industrial sector and accounting for about 65% 
of its foreign exchange earnings (Karugia et al., 2012).   
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Figure 6. 1: Employment by Sector in COMESA Countries (2002-2017) 
Source: Author’s Calculations from WDI accessed on March 19, 2019 
 
Despite this central role in the region’s trade, industrial development, and sustainability of 
livelihoods, agriculture’s productivity has been persistently low (WDI, 2019). Its contribution 
to GDP has been steadily declining over the years in all COMESA countries whose economies 
largely depend on agriculture. Between 19991 and 2001, agriculture accounted for 52% of GDP 
on average in Ethiopia, about 45% in the DRC and Burundi, and about 40% in Rwanda, Sudan, 
and Uganda. When compared with the 2002 and 2017 period, this has gone down by about 53% 
in DRC, 40% in Uganda, about 23% in Ethiopia and Rwanda and by 26% in Sudan. The share 
of the service sector in GDP has continued to increase steadily (Figure 6.2). Similar trends are 
observed in the other countries, including Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, whose share in GDP ranges between 16% and 33% on average (Figure 6.2).   
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Figure 6. 2: Share of Agriculture in GDP in COMESA Countries (1991-2017) 
Source: Author’s Calculations from WDI and COMSAT data accessed on March 19, 2019 
Although diminishing agricultural share in GDP is not necessarily a bad outcome as it 
potentially entails desired structural transformation23 for enhanced growth, it is worth noting 
that its diminishing influence in GDP is largely being reciprocated by the development and 
hence, increasing share of services in GDP in most countries.  However, contrary to theoretical 
disposition of a successful structural transformation which entails an invariable decreasing 
share of agriculture in both GDP and employment as economies develop and industrialize 
 
23 Simply defined as a change in the sectoral composition of output and labour in GDP largely identified by a 
declining share of agriculture in GDP and employment as the industrial and service sectors gain prominence in 
this regard.  
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(Mellor, 1961; Soubbotian, 2004; Tran and Doan, 2010), agriculture has remained the dominant 
employer in the region covering between 50%-90% of the active labour force in 13 of the 19 
COMESA countries (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). As such, persistent low agricultural productivity in 
the region entails continued low incomes and high poverty levels on the one hand; dwindling 
export earnings and overreliance on food imports and food aid on the other hand, as their ability 
to compete on the world market continues to falter (FAO, 2002). Furthermore, it also indicates 
a slow pace of industrialisation (sluggish growth of the industrial sector (Figure 6.2) due to 
expensive imported raw materials as the agricultural sector continues to fall short in meeting 
the industrial sector’s demand for raw materials (Karugia et al., 2012). Therefore, boosting the 
sector’s productivity remains imperative for a balanced, sustainable, and inclusive growth 
process of most COMESA countries. Considering the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
this remains key in enhancing (or undermining) the region’s ability to achieve SDG124 (see 
Kaya et al., 2008; Christiaensen et al., 2010); as well as SDGs 225 and 826 (see AfDB, 2016:8). 
Figure 6. 3: Agriculture Foreign Aid and Government Expenditure in COMESA (2002-
2017) 
Source: Author’s Calculations from ReSAKSS, 2019, and OECD Stats accessed on 13th March 2019. 
 
24 SDG 1 commits to end poverty in all its forms everywhere. Specifically, it commits to eliminate extreme 
poverty through SDG1.1 and to “reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages 
living in poverty in all its dimension according to national definitions.” 
25 SGD 2 commits to “end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable 
agriculture.”  
26 SGD 8 focuses on “promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment and decent work for all.” 
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While climate variability and climate change shocks are notably having a significant toll on 
agricultural productivity in most developing countries, recent research highlights the decline in 
agricultural investment as key in depressing its productivity and growth (Islam 2011; Alibi, 
2014; Ssozi et al., 2017). Recognising this setback vis-à-vis the central role of the sector in its 
development, African governments, through the 2003 and 2014 Maputo and Malabo 
Declarations respectively, committed to allocating at least 10% of their budgets to agriculture. 
However, most countries in COMESA have not been able to live up to their commitment as 
their allocations to the sector continue to be below this threshold. Out of the 19 COMESA 
countries included in this study, only Malawi and Ethiopia have consistently met this target at 
an annual average of 10.2% and 15.4% respectively between 2003 and 2008; and then at an 
annual average of about 18.9% and 11.9% respectively between 2008 and 2014. For the rest of 
the countries, it ranged from the lowest of 0.85% in Djibouti to the highest of 8.9% in Zambia 
between 2003 and 2014, with most of them falling below the annual average of 4% (ReSAKSS, 
2019). Consequently, COMESA, as a region, has not met this target since its initial declaration 
in 2003. Overall, its commitments barely reached 5% between 2000 and 2005; and they have 
continued to decline to less than 4% on average since 2006 (Figure 6.3). 
Similarly, foreign aid to the sector has been persistently low at around 5% of the total foreign 
aid on average at the regional level since 2002. Only Eswatini, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
and Rwanda allocated more than 6% of their total foreign aid annually to agriculture since 2002 
(OECD Stats, 2019). Nevertheless, contrary to the decreasing trend in government expenditure 
at the regional level, Figure 6.3 highlights that foreign aid to the sector has been increasing, 
albeit volatile since 2006. This raises several issues for the region, such as (i) the effect of 
foreign aid in the region’s agricultural growth and development and (ii) the effect of the 
prioritisation of foreign aid in the agricultural subsectors in enhancing productivity and growth 
in the sector. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter provides the first assessment of the impact of foreign aid on 
agriculture in COMESA in a Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) framework, which avoids 
endogeneity instrumentation bias that crowds most foreign aid-growth literature. Covering the 
period 2008-2017, the focus is on the response path of agricultural productivity and growth to 
changes in foreign aid; and on the relative role of foreign aid in its sub-sectors. Accordingly, 
the study intends to unveil pertinent issues behind the current performance of agricultural 
foreign aid in the region and highlight key future foreign aid investment components for the 
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effective transformation of the sector in the region in its pursuit of sustainable and inclusive 
growth.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section provides a brief literature review 
on the role of agriculture in the growth and development of least developed countries and how 
foreign aid has contributed and/or is expected to contribute to this process. Section 6.3 describes 
the methodology, and the description of the data used in this chapter is provided in Section 6.4. 
The results of the econometric analysis are discussed in Section 6.5, and the final section 
summarises the chapter. 
 
6.2 Literature review 
6.2.1 Agriculture and Economic Growth 
Agriculture remains central in economic growth and development due to its rich resource base 
and viable linkages with other core growth sectors of the economy. This perspective dates to 
the mid-1950s with the dualist theorists who postulated industrialization of Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) as an impossible fit without the support of the agricultural sector mainly 
through the provision of labour and raw materials to the industrial and service sectors (Lewis 
1954; Fei and Ranis, 1961). Firstly, they perceived the migration of labour from the agriculture 
sector to support the productivity and growth of the industrial sector with higher incomes/wages 
in the industrial sector as the main migration drive. Secondly, they visualised increased 
agricultural productivity and growth as key in meeting the industrial sector’s growing demand 
for raw materials as well as for the food demand27 of the sector’s growing population (Fei and 
Ranis, 1961).  
Notably, in the dualist model, the growth of the agricultural sector was not a consequence of 
re-investments from industrial profits but rather a function of labour migration to the industrial 
sector, which among other things, enhanced agricultural labour productivity over time. 
However, critics noted that their failure to reckon the importance of reinvesting in agriculture 
potentially compromises the industrialization of the economy as it effectively limits its ability 
to support industrial growth and development. As such, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Nurkse 
(1961) argued for a balanced growth process that encompasses the simultaneous growth of such 
 
27 Meeting food demand of the growing population was deemed essential in curbing food price inflation with its 
dampening effect on the wages, industrial profits and thus, counterproductive to the overall economic growth and 
development process. 
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complementing sectors. Going beyond industrial growth benefits as emphasized by the dualist 
theorists, they highlighted that the spill-over effects of a balanced growth process on job 
creation and incomes would be more effective both in expanding the tax base to relieve the 
fiscal constraint for relevant socio-economic overhead capital; and most importantly, in creating 
domestic demand for the growing sectors as the incomes/wages in both sectors simultaneously 
rise. However, despite several criticisms against dualist theorists, such as high unemployment 
levels in the urban sectors following labour migration (Hossein, 2012), dualist theorists 
provided a pertinent foundation to the subsequent understanding of agricultural growth and 
development as essential components of inclusive and sustainable economic growth.    
Subsequently, several studies have been done in the last 2 decades that advocate for 
agricultural-led economic growth in most LDCs to ensure that the resultant growth process is 
inclusive and self-sustaining. These include Kaya et al. (2008), who noted that unless economic 
growth is largely driven by agricultural growth, inclusive growth remains an illusion, especially 
in countries whose population is largely poor and primarily engaged in agriculture for their 
livelihoods. Furthermore, Mellor (2001); Rosegrant and Hazell (2001); Christiaensen et al. 
(2010) contended that agriculture is significantly more effective in ensuring that the poor 
participate, contribute and benefit from economic growth and development. On the flipside, 
Ogundipe et al. (2017) found that growth in other sectors (industry and services) does not have 
a significant influence on the livelihoods of most of the rural poor, notwithstanding their 
important roles in the overall growth of GDP. Their findings were in line with those of the 
World Bank (2008), which concluded that the non-agricultural sector-led growth potentially 
perpetuates the rural-urban income gap as it leaves out most of the poor rural dwellers. In most 
of these studies, the emphasis has been on the subsistence nature of agriculture in LDCs such 
that the sector’s growth and development have lasting effects on the incomes and livelihoods 
inter alia of the rural farm population. Furthermore, focusing on its linkages with other sectors 
of the economy, empirical literature further highlights its role in the self-sustaining growth 
process of LDCs by enhancing their export earnings and overall national incomes (Johnston 
and Mellor, 1961; UNDP and Odusola, 2017).  
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable development further underscores the importance of 
enhancing agricultural growth in LDCs for an inclusive, equitable, and sustainable growth 
process. With at least 10% of the global population currently in extreme poverty and highly 
dependent on agriculture for livelihoods and food (Castañeda et al., 2018; FAO, 2018), it 
reckons agricultural growth as key in ensuring that the poorest of the poor participate in 
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generating sustainable economic growth and fully share its benefits (SDG 2.3). Accordingly, 
among other things, commits to double agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale 
subsistence farmers. In meeting this development stride, recent research highlights the need for 
increased investments in the various components of the sector, including land and water 
resource management to unlock irrigation potential, agricultural research and extension services 
to enhance adoption of modern technologies and improved inputs; as well as plant/post-harvest 
loss control (Alibi, 2014; Mellor, 2017).  
 
6.2.2 Role of foreign Aid in Agricultural Productivity and Growth  
As highlighted in Section 1, most developing countries remain financially constrained to meet 
the financing needs of their agricultural sectors, notwithstanding the sector’s indispensable role 
for the developing countries’ inclusive and sustainable growth process. This is further 
quantified through failure by most African LDCs to meet the 2003 Maputo and 2014 Malabo 
agricultural development investment targets (Alibi, 2014). Therefore, the gap theory advocates 
foreign aid as the most viable temporal means of augmenting domestic resources in the 
respective LDCs for the desired growth outcomes in these LDCs (Chenery and Strout, 1966). 
Despite several positive outcomes confirming this significant role of foreign aid in the 
agricultural sector growth (Kaya et al., 2008; Akpokodge and Omojimite (2008); Alibi, 2014; 
Verter, 2017; Ssozi et, al., 2018), a few studies such as that by Ighadaro and Nwaogwugwu, 
(2013) have concluded otherwise. Among other things, these contradictions highlight the 
potential of misleading results on the developmental role of foreign aid, mainly owing to the 
choice of estimators. Largely, this follows inconsistencies on the causal relationship between 
foreign aid and growth in the empirical models. Backed by theoretical propositions that 
economic growth and development objectives determine the direction of foreign aid flows, 
foreign aid has been endogenously treated in several foreign aid-growth studies (Gomanee et 
al. (2005); Moreira (2005) and Clemens et al. (2011). However, foreign aid is among the 
exogenous variables in another strand of research which believes that the expected 
developmental role of foreign aid is of minimal importance in determining its allocations which 
are largely a function of the donors’ political and strategic interests (Boone,1996; Faye & 
Niehaus, 2012; and Quian, 2014). In other words, different assumptions on foreign aid 
endogeneity lead to the adoption of different estimators, which potentially leads to different 
conclusions, especially if wrong assumptions are made ceteris paribus. 
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For instance, Akpokodge and Omojimite (2008) adopted the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
estimator, which provides consistent estimates in the presence of endogeneity. They found a 
positive influence of foreign aid on agricultural growth in Nigeria, although they failed to 
ascertain the theoretical propositions that the level of savings (development financing gaps) 
determines the direction of foreign aid. On the one hand, Ighadaro and Nwaogwugwu (2013) 
equally assumed endogeneity in their model but opted for the Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) and Error Correction Model (ECM) which produces reliable long-run estimates 
regardless of the inclusion of endogenous variables in the model (Inder, 1993; Morrissey et al., 
2006:316; Nkoro and Uko, 2016;78). However, their study failed to support the findings that 
foreign aid has a positive influence on agriculture in Nigeria. On the contrary, Verter (2017) 
confirmed the positive effect of foreign aid on agricultural growth in Nigeria despite failing to 
support the assertion of foreign aid endogeneity in his model. These and other studies with 
conflicting results on the same countries potentially misinform foreign aid policy. As such, the 
choice of estimators must be carefully done with robustness checks conducted where necessary 
for effective policy inferencing. 
 
6.3 Methodology 
Guided by the neoclassical growth model, the agricultural sector’s production function can be 
broadly specified as 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑁) where Y is an agricultural value-added, A is total factor 
productivity (technology), K is capital, L is labour, and N is land. By efficiently financing any 
of these factors of production, foreign aid can be instrumental in enhancing agricultural 
productivity and growth. As highlighted above, getting reliable estimates on the impact of 
foreign aid in the sector through the development of these factors of production depends on the 
choice of an estimator. This study reckons the potential of foreign aid endogeneity on the 
assumption that development resource gaps, as reflected by low savings and growth rates in the 
recipient economies, determine the direction of foreign aid. Thus, the study employs the Panel 
Vector Autoregression (PVAR)28 method, which reckons all its variables as endogenous and 
 
28 The study adopts Stata pvar estimator which estimates the PVAR model by fitting independent regressions for 
each dependent variable and uses their respective lags and those of the rest of the variables as instruments for 
endogeneity. The estimator runs on Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) and we have opted for forward-
mean differencing which eliminates fixed effects without generating biased estimates from unbalanced panels as 
is potentially done by the first-differencing method utilised by most estimators (Love and Zicchino, 2006; 
Hayakawa, 2009). 
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uses their lagged values as instruments for endogeneity. While noting the importance of 
accounting for dynamic interdependencies in a panel setting, PVAR also allows for individual 
heterogeneity in its sample. This technique is specifically preferred because it takes care of 
foreign aid endogeneity in the model and allows for the impulse response Functions (IRF)29 and 
forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD)30 analyses. These provide a chance to study the 
response of agricultural productivity and growth to a change in foreign aid, which is not possible 
with most estimators.  
Assuming a first-order VAR, this study estimates the following PVAR model:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                               (6.1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a four-variable vector: ΔlnAgriVA or lnagriVA/W, lnODAagri, lnODArural, and 
lngov.  ΔlnAgriVA is the change in the natural log (ln) of agricultural value-added as a proxy 
of agricultural growth, AgriVA/W31 is the agricultural value-added per worker as a proxy of 
agricultural productivity, ODAagri is the total ODA to the agricultural sector, ODArural is the 
total ODA for rural development, and govagri is the total public expenditure in the agricultural 
sector. 𝛼𝑖 is fixed effects variable capturing individual heterogeneity in the model. 𝑖𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error term. 
Although the above specification will give the response paths of each of the variables to the 
shock in the other variables, this analysis is on the responses of agricultural growth and 
productivity to the impulses in agricultural foreign aid. As highlighted above, the study assumes 
that the level of development in the sector determines its foreign aid allocations, which in turn 
are meant to enhance its productivity and growth. Similar assumptions of reverse causality are 
also made for agricultural productivity/growth with government expenditure/rural development 
foreign aid. It postulates that with high levels of agricultural productivity and growth, the 
amount of investment needed from these three financing sources to sustain the attained levels 
will not be as high as what is needed to trigger its development process.  
 
29 IRFs show the response path of one variable to a one-time shock in another variable if all other shocks in the 
PVAR system are held at zero. 
30 FEVD measures the magnitude of variation in one variable explained by the shocks imposed in another variable 
within a specific forecast horizon. 
31 We reckon the limitation of this proxy which is not fully encompassing all inputs in the model as it is mainly 
capturing labour productivity. As highlighted by Karugia et. al (2011), the Total Factor Productivity (TPF) 
measure which considers all inputs would be ideal but empirically very limited due to data paucity.  
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Worth noting is the relative impact of the agricultural sub-sectors to its productivity and growth 
(Alibi, 2014; Ssozi et al., 2018). Agricultural foreign aid in COMESA is largely skewed towards 
agricultural development, which accounts for an annual average of 32% of the total foreign aid 
in the sector. This is followed by investments for land and water resource management, which 
accounts for an annual average of 17% of the total foreign aid to the sector. Agricultural policy 
and administrative management come third with 15%, and an annual average of 14% of its total 
allocation is spent on agricultural research, training, and extension services (Figure 6.4). While 
focusing on the overall responses of agricultural growth and development to changes in foreign 
aid is important in highlighting the relative impact of foreign aid in the sector, assessing how 
sub-sectoral prioritisation has been affecting productivity in the region is equally imperative in 
enhancing the potency of future allocations. Therefore, equation 2 below is estimated using the 
Allerano-Bond Generalised Methods of Moments (A-B GMM) estimator, which also relies on 
lagged regressors as instruments for endogeneity. 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 1𝑡           (6.2)  
where 𝑔 is the agricultural value-added growth rate or agricultural value-added per worker, X 
is a vector of ODA in the agricultural sub-sectors, and the rest of the variables are as defined 
above. Following inconsistencies in the foreign aid-growth literature, the signs of the foreign 
aid variables cannot be determined a priori. However, the study expects government 
expenditure to have a positive impact on agriculture productivity and growth, notwithstanding 
the fact that factors such as corruption that affects foreign aid potency in the sector, potentially 
have a similar impact on government resources. 
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Figure 6. 4: Aggregate Composition of Foreign aid in the agricultural Sector in COMESA 
(2002-2017 
 
 
With most of the resources to the sector disbursed either through the Sector Wide Approaches 
or Sector General Budget support (SGBS), understanding how institutional quality in the region 
has contributed to foreign aid potency in the sector is imperative. These resources mostly cover 
grants which account for a regional annual average of 67% since 2002. Coupled with their 
SGBS disbursement modality and no repayment obligation, grants are generally perceived 
prone to abuse by the respective recipient governments (see footnote 37). Therefore, this 
chapter also assesses the relative impact of these forms of foreign aid (loans and grants) in the 
sector whilst focusing on how institutional quality influences the direction of their impact on 
the sector’s productivity and growth. Proxied by the corruption index from the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI), the chapter estimates the equation below: 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐷𝐴 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼𝑖 + 1𝑡                                                                                                                                     (6.3)  
where corr is the corruption index interacted with total agricultural ODA. ODA in equation 3 
will be further disaggregated into loans and grants to assess how they are affected by corruption. 
The rest of the variables are as defined above. The chapter expects negative signs of the 
respective foreign aid components interacted with the corruption index with higher levels of 
corruption in the region.  
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6.4 Data Description and sources 
The chapter utilised secondary data for COMESA countries32 mainly from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) database, ReSAKSS database, COMESA database; and the African Development 
Bank (AfDB) socio-economic database33.  
The chapter covered the period from 2008 to 2017, and its key variables are: i) ODA as the flow 
of official grants and concessional loans to developing countries with the main objective of 
promoting the economic and social development of the recipient economies (OECD, 2018). 
The focus was on ODA flows to the agricultural sector in the respective COMESA countries. 
Apart from considering its aggregate flows in terms of the total foreign aid to the sector and its 
disaggregation according to type (loans and grants), the chapter also looked at its flows to the 
sub-components in the sector. Some sub-components with related/similar functions were 
aggregated into other components due to their low shares in the total foreign aid to the sector. 
There is also a large share of grants covering up to an annual average of 75% in most countries 
between 2002 and 2017. Specifically, seven34 of the COMESA countries registered zero values 
for loans throughout the period under study. Zero values were also observed for rural 
development foreign aid and in the agricultural subsectors. To secure all relevant data points, 
all the zero values were replaced by an arbitrarily small value of 0.001, and a log transformation 
of all the foreign aid values was utilised in the study. 
ii) Agriculture value added as a proxy for growth in the agriculture sector and Agriculture value 
added per worker as a measure of productivity in the sector (ReSAKSS, 2019). iii) Country 
score on control of corruption as the extent to which public power is utilised for private gains. 
The index values vary between -2.5 and 2.5, with the higher values reflecting lower incidences 
of corruption (WGI, 2018). For the period under examination, this index was interacted with 
various components of foreign aid on the assumption that higher corruption levels in a recipient 
economy compromise foreign aid potency in infrastructure development.  
Overall, data paucity was not a significant issue in this study, as only about 1.2% missing values 
spread across a few countries on their government expenditure were noted in the sample. As 
 
32 With 100% agriculture value added and agriculture value added per worker missing values for Djibouti and 
Libya, the two countries were dropped from the sample.  
33 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx; https://stats.oecd.org/qwids; www.resakss.org, 
http://comstat.comesa.int/; http://dataportal.opendataforafrica.org 
34 Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Libya, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. 
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such, all the estimations were done considering these gaps. However, different values form 
different data sources for the same data points made dataset choice ambiguous as all data 
sources that the study utilised are highly credible.  
 
6.5 Results and Discussion  
This section presents and discusses the econometric findings of this chapter. For the first part 
of the section that analyses the impact of aid on both agricultural productivity and growth, two 
models were run, respectively. The second part of the section analyses the sub-sectoral impacts 
of foreign aid in the sector. Lastly, the third part assesses the role of institutions in aid utilisation 
focusing on corruption.  
6.5.1 Effect of Aggregate Foreign aid (Loans + Grants) and Government Expenditure 
on Agricultural Productivity and growth 
6.5.1.1 Model Selection  
The choice of an optimal lag order is a critical component of any VAR estimation to avert 
undermining the credibility of estimates due to factors such as loss of degrees of freedom with 
the inclusion of too many lags or functional misspecification bias if fewer lags than necessary 
are considered. To this end, the study adopted the commonly used moment and model selection 
criterion (MMSC) for GMM models by Andrews and Lu (2001). Their MMSC is consistent 
and is based on Hansen’s (1982) 𝐽 statistic of over-identifying restrictions and are analogous to 
the widely used Bayesian information criteria (BIC), the Akaike information criteria (AIC), the 
Hannan-Quinn information criteria (HQIC) model selection criteria, and they are referred to as 
the Modified BIC (MBIC), Modified AIC (MAIC) and Modified QIC (MQIC) respectively. 
 
Table 6. 1: Lag-order selection statistics for PVAR (Model 1) 
 
 
                                                                              
        3    .9999982    7.84554   .9533321  -63.23688  -24.15446   -39.8745  
        2    .9999942   24.10959   .8404218  -118.0552  -39.89041  -71.33049  
        1    .9999961   52.66837   .2982595  -160.5789  -43.33163  -90.49176  
                                                                              
      lag      CD          J      J pvalue     MBIC       MAIC       MQIC     
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Table 6. 2: Lag-order selection statistics for PVAR (Model 2) 
 
MBIC, MAIC, and MQIC result in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 support the choice of the first order 
PVAR for both models to be estimated (the first model is with agriculture value-added and the 
second with agriculture value added per worker and henceforth referred to as model 1 and model 
2 respectively). This choice is equally supported by the panel unit results in Appendix 6.1, 
which confirms stationarity of all these variables in levels for both Im-Pesaran and Shin (IPS) 
and Fisher-Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests.  
 
6.5.1.2 pvar Estimation 
Guided by the model selection criterion in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the first order PVARs ere run 
using the forward mean differencing method to remove the country-specific fixed effects (see 
footnote 28). Typically, pvar estimation drops all observations with missing data, which entails 
the loss of data points, and this notably grows with the number of lags included as instruments 
(Abrigo and Love, 2016). This meant potentially inconsistent estimates from the model that has 
missing values and used lags 1 to 4 as instruments. Thus, the estimation utilised the pvar-
gmmstyle option in Stata, which minimizes such loss of data points through the replacement of 
all missing observations with zeros instead of dropping them. 
The focus of this section is on the IFRs and FEVD that isolate the impacts of exogenous shocks 
in each variable on the other variables in the estimated PVAR system. To this end, the study 
opted for orthogonalized IRFs and their implied FEVDs, which requires that each IRF provides 
a response path of one variable while holding exogenous shocks in all the other variables in the 
system constant. It was assumed that agricultural growth and productivity have a direct effect 
on agricultural foreign aid, ODA for rural development and government expenditure in models 
1 and 2 respectively; and that these three variables affected growth and productivity in their 
respective models only with a lag. In other words, the specification in this study assumes that 
                                                                              
        3    .9999983   6.475497   .9820975  -64.60692   -25.5245  -41.24455  
        2    .9999958   21.71527   .9147953  -120.4496  -42.28473  -73.72482  
        1    .9999973   48.87191   .4378344  -164.3754  -47.12809  -94.28822  
                                                                              
      lag      CD          J      J pvalue     MBIC       MAIC       MQIC     
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the level of growth and development determines the direction of both foreign aid and domestic 
financing in the sector.  
The meaningful IRFs and FEVD are conditioned on the stability of the estimated pvars. 
Specifically, it is postulated that unless the estimated PVAR is stable in that it is invertible with 
a finite-order vector moving-average (VMA) representation, no meaningful causal relationships 
can be deduced from its associated IRF (Love and Zicchino, 2005). In this regard, the stata 
pvarstable command was utilised to assess the stability of both models prior to the IRF and 
FEVD computations in each model using pvarirf and pvarfevd commands, respectively. 
Since the focus of the study is on how agricultural productivity and growth responds to the 
foreign aid-related investments, the explanation of results will be limited to how agricultural 
productivity and growth responds to the foreign aid-related investments in its core sector and 
other closely related subsectors, especially rural development. Only relevant highlights for 
other relationships in the PVAR models will be mentioned. However, the results of all 
relationships will be provided. First to be presented and explained are results for model 1, which 
will encompass the pvar estimates and all its necessary post estimation results (including 
stability, IRFs, and FEVD). This is followed by a presentation and discussion of results from 
model 2 before drawing unified conclusions from the 2 models. 
 
6.5.1.3 Model 1  
Table 6.3 indicates that agricultural growth has a large positive effect on the volumes of both 
agricultural and rural development foreign aid in COMESA, although such an effect on 
government expenditure appears to be temporal as reflected by the insignificance of the 
agricultural value-added coefficient on government expenditure. On the other hand, the table 
shows a marginal and unstable positive influence of agricultural ODA on the sectors’ growth 
while government expenditure has a stable positive influence. On the contrary, ODA for rural 
development has a diminishing effect on agricultural growth in the region. Overall, the causality 
relationships deduced from Table 6.3 are simplified in Annex 6.2a, which highlights 
bidirectional causality among all the variables in this model except for a unidirectional causality 
from agricultural growth to agricultural ODA/ government agricultural expenditure.  
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Table 6. 3: pvar estimates 
Response of Response to 
 ln agva ln ODA ln rural ln govt 
ln agva 0.9013493*** 0.0005505 -0.0044996*** 0.0714011*** 
ln ODA   1.149937*** 0.2361272*** -0.0325818*** 0.6499424*** 
ln rural     2.197866** -.6218708*** 0.3948086*** -1.693382*** 
ln govt 0.4247529 -0.0866411*** 0.0336059*** 0.4557958*** 
Note:    i) ***, ** and * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5% and           
          10% respectively 
 
With all the eigenvalues below 1, the stability test result table and graph below highlights that 
the estimated PVAR above is stable and that its estimates can be informatively used in 
computing both IRF and FEVD.   
 
Table 6. 4: Stability Test for Model 1 
  
 
Figure 6.5 shows a marginal and unsustainable response of agricultural growth to exogenous 
positive shocks in agricultural ODA. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in 
agricultural foreign aid results in a marginal positive change in agricultural growth for only 
about a year and turns into a negative trend with the minimum reached around year 5. This is 
quantified by the FEVD in Table 6.6, which shows that a shock in agricultural foreign aid 
accounts for less than 1% of the variation in agricultural growth. On the contrary, growth 
initially decreases marginally following a positive shock in rural development foreign aid in the 
   pVAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
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first year but steadily increases and remains positive from year two until full absorption of the 
shock around year 5. However, a positive reaction of growth to a change in government 
expenditure is more persistent and decreases smoothly from around year 4. Nevertheless, the 
impact of a shock in rural development foreign aid on growth in the sector is equally very low 
at about 1% from year 5. 
Figure 6.5 also shows that exogenous changes in growth have large and sustained positive 
impacts on both agricultural and rural development foreign aid such that a drop in agricultural 
value added is matched by an increase in foreign aid which, however, steadily declines for 
agricultural foreign aid and remains relatively stable for rural development foreign aid after 
about two years. On the other hand, government expenditure shows a steady marginal decline 
until around year 4, although it is positive throughout the 10-year period under consideration.   
Figure 6. 5: IRF for Model 1 
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Notably, the substitution effect of agricultural foreign aid on government expenditure, which 
reflects foreign aid fungibility, is persistent in the region. With an increased injection of foreign 
aid, the government's agricultural budget shrinks substantially, with its minimum reached 
around year 2. 
Table 6. 5: FEVD 
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         8     .0618727    .0700021    .1923918    .6757334
         7     .0580985    .0703377    .1933062    .6782576
         6     .0537816    .0706811    .1942519    .6812854
         5       .04885    .0709431    .1952879    .6849191
         4     .0432289    .0696059     .196631    .6905342
         3     .0368838    .0602614    .1957088     .707146
         2     .0299594    .0338332    .1783493    .7578582
         1     .0228773    .0059728    .1179054    .8532444
         0            0           0           0           0
lngovt      
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Despite the turn-around in the third year, government financing response to an increase in 
foreign aid remains negative. Contrary to the theoretical dispositions of foreign aid 
complementing domestic resources for growth and development, such a trend potentially 
maintains/widens the existing financing gaps as effectively, net allocations to the sector do not 
increase by the full amount of foreign aid. This undermines the potency of agricultural foreign 
aid in achieving its development objectives in the region. Overall, Table 6.5 highlights that up 
to about 7% of the variation in government spending in agriculture is explained by a single 
shock in ODA, which in turn accounts for up to 14% of the variation in agricultural growth.  
Similarly, Figure 6.5 shows that agricultural foreign aid equally substitutes for foreign aid for 
rural development and explains up to 12% variation in foreign aid for rural development within 
2 years. Although the response of foreign aid to both these resources is significantly 
complementary, it is rendered redundant because, with such positive response, the volume of 
rural development aid and government financing drops, leaving agricultural foreign aid as the 
key development resource in the sector. As highlighted above, this compromises the potency 
of agricultural foreign aid despite the significant potential it has in stimulating growth in the 
sector (see Table 6.3 and Figure 6.5) 
 
6.5.1.4  Model 2 
Although government expenditure, agricultural and rural development foreign aid do not seem 
to have a meaningful influence on agricultural productivity, Table 6.6 shows that their direction 
is largely influenced by agricultural productivity. Specifically, a shock in productivity explains 
up to 37% of the variations in agricultural foreign aid, 10% of the changes in foreign aid for 
rural development, and as high as 57% of the variation in government expenditure (Table 6.8). 
These causality relationships are further simplified in Appendix 6.2b, which shows that neither 
agricultural or rural development foreign aid nor government expenditure granger causes 
agricultural productivity, although the opposite holds in the region. Substantiating this trend, 
the IRF in Figure 6.6 shows a marginal negative decline in productivity lasting only one period 
following innovations in rural development foreign aid. Although it stabilises after one period, 
the response of productivity to a shock in rural development foreign aid remains negative. On 
the contrary, it marginally increases in the first year and maintains a marginal positive response 
in the other periods' sequel to an increase in foreign agricultural foreign aid. Furthermore, the 
IRF in Figure 6.6 shows that labour productivity in the sector relatively remains the same with 
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improvements in government expenditure. None of these investments meaningfully influence 
variations in agricultural productivity. While a meagre 0.05% of the variation in agricultural 
productivity is explained by changes in government financing, only up to 0.3% of its changes 
are independently accounted for by agricultural and rural development from year 7 (Table 6.8). 
Table 6. 6: pvar Estimates for Model 2 
Response of Response to 
 ln agvaw ln ODA ln rural ln govt 
ln agvapw 0.9551537*** 0.0042087 -0.0025198 -0.0011339 
ln ODA 1.886656*** 0.169764** -0.0391102*** 0.3077811* 
ln rural 6.000835*** -0.5385328*** 0.0617454 -1.102866*** 
ln govt 1.394757*** -0.0826128*** -0.0156767* 0.4602662*** 
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 
Table 6. 7: Stability Test for Model 2 
  
Table 6.7 confirms the reliability of the causality relationships in model 2. With all eigenvalues 
below one, the table quantifies by the stability estimated PVAR for model 2.  
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Figure 6. 6: IRF for Model 2 
 
 
Figure 6.6 further qualifies the presence of foreign aid fungibility in the region signified by the 
substitution effect of agricultural foreign aid on government expenditure in the sector. 
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in agricultural foreign aid is reciprocated by a 
sharp decline in government financing lasting about a year before marginally picking in year 
two and fully absorbing the shock by the end of year two. This trend is well quantified in Table 
6.8, where about 6% of the variation in government spending is explained by a shock in 
agricultural foreign aid, but such an impact starts faltering in year 2 covering about 5% in year 
2 and continues to drop to about 3% from year 5. Similarly, agricultural foreign aid has a 
significant diminishing effect on foreign aid for rural development. The IRF in Figure 6.6 
highlights a sharp decline in foreign aid for rural development following a unit positive shock 
in agricultural foreign aid. Unlike the response in government financing, rural development 
foreign aid significantly drops but bounces back to the original level within two periods 
following a positive shock in agricultural foreign aid (Figure 6.6) 
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Table 6. 8: FEVD for Model 2 
 
 
Overall, pvar estimates and their associated post estimates confirm theoretical propositions for 
giving foreign aid that is guided by the need to stimulate growth and development. However, 
instead of complementing domestic resources in this regard, both models confirm that foreign 
aid fungibility exists in the sector as foreign aid significantly substitutes government financing 
in the sector. In other words, government reduces or increases its financing in the sector 
following an increase or reduction in foreign aid. Among other things, this has significantly 
contributed to the marginal and unsustainable impact of agricultural foreign aid on agricultural 
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productivity and growth as net expenditure in the sector and does not effectively increase by 
the full amount of the disbursed foreign aid. At the centre of this trend are the foreign aid 
disbursement modalities followed by respective donors, particularly those that limit donor 
participation in their utilisation.  
Guided by the Paris Declaration on foreign aid effectiveness (PD)35, Sector Wide Approaches 
(SWAPs) or Sector General Budget Support (SGBS) are the most commonly adopted foreign 
aid disbursement modalities for the sector in the region. These are part of the commonly adopted 
Programme Based Approaches, which involve the pooling of resources from different donors 
in the sector into one basket for a shared goal through the recipient government’s treasury. 
Despite earmarking these resources for a specific sector (agriculture in this case), these 
resources are not project-specific, entailing the recipient government’s flexibility in their usage. 
In most cases, these resources have no conditions except in a few instances where donors 
require their disbursements to meet specific policy measures. Notwithstanding the benefits of 
these approaches over project foreign aid, for example36, (SGBS are highly criticised for 
increased fiduciary risks37 as the usage liberty given to the recipient government makes them 
highly fungible (Leiderer, 2012).  
On the other hand, there are Result Based, or Foreign aid on Delivery (AoD) approaches, which 
are also a form of budget support as they are not earmarked for specific projects but are 
conditioned on the delivery of donor-recipient country mutually agreed specific outcomes that 
are independently verified. AoD conditions incentivise recipient economies to restrict domestic 
and foreign aid expenditure on the prioritised investments by focusing on directly linking 
financing with outputs/ outcomes. As such, these approaches are advocated to avert fiduciary 
risk associated with SWAPs and SGBS. However, research highlights that AoD does not 
completely deal with foreign aid fungibility, especially in the presence of information 
asymmetry, particularly where government financing is private to the foreign aid recipient 
 
35 Founded on 5 key principles: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for results, Mutual 
accountability. 
36 Among the benefits of project support include increased funding predictability and hence, manageable 
development planning; and reduction in transaction costs for the recipient government through unified funding 
and reporting modalities 
37  The risk that the received foreign aid will end up financing unintended programmed with the worst scenario 
being benefiting the elite through corruption for example or the risk that the received foreign aid will free up 
government resources for the benefit of the elite inter alia. 
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governments. Lederer (2012) shows that recipient governments can opt to declare less resources 
than what they could comfortably contribute towards the agreed development objectives and 
redirect these domestic resources to other uses. In which case, foreign aid will continue to 
substitute for domestic financing, although the degree of such risk is greatly minimised with 
these approaches vis-à-vis SWAPs, SGBs, and project foreign aid.  
Lastly, the results show that foreign aid for rural development has a diminishing effect on 
agricultural growth in the region. Despite the declining trend and being persistently below 
agricultural foreign aid (Figure 6.3), this section shows that the impact of government financing 
in agriculture is much higher and significant vis-à-vis foreign. It accounts for up to 14% of the 
variations in agricultural growth, while foreign aid explains only 0.4% of its variations. 
6.5.2 Foreign aid allocation in the agricultural sub-sectors  
Having established the response path of agricultural growth and productivity to foreign aid in 
Section 6.5.1, this section has assessed the relative contribution of agricultural sub-sectoral 
foreign aid to the sector’s productivity and growth. For consistency and comparability of the 
estimates, the study has continued with the GMM estimation of a first-order PVAR.  From the 
onset of this section, it is worth noting that all the respective variables in both models have 
similar signs despite their relative differences in the magnitude of their impact and level of 
significance on growth and productivity.  
Table 6. 9: Effect of agricultural Sub-sectoral allocations on productivity and growth 
Variable Dependent variable and Coefficient 
 Growth (lnagva) Productivity (lnagvaw) 
ln agva L1 0.7850813 ***  
ln agvaw L1  0.624225*** 
ln ODA rural for rural development -0.0100372*** -0.0099768*** 
ln govt 0.0242848* 0.0194927* 
ln policy and administrative management 0.0023374** 0.0024595** 
ln agricultural development -0.0055903* -0.0058914* 
ln water and land resources management 0.0053435** 0.0064901** 
ln inputs 0.0002923 0.0008679 
ln food crop production 0.0005316 0.000735 
ln industrial crops/export crops production -0.0003048  -0.0017288 
ln extension, research and training 0.0045107** 0.0031608*   
lnother -.0019143 -0.0012196 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10%           
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Confirming Table 6.3 pvar estimates, the A-B GMM estimates in Table 6.9 also shows a 
significant diminishing effect of ODA for rural development on both agricultural productivity 
and growth. Similarly, it also highlights that increases in government agricultural financing 
significantly contribute to positive growth outcomes in the sector. With a marginal effect of 
foreign aid on the sector’s growth established in Section 6.1, Table 6.9 indicates a positive but 
insignificant contribution of foreign aid in 3 of the sub-sectors, including inputs, food crop 
production, while an insignificant negative impact is observed from industrial crop production. 
Despite being the main recipient of agricultural foreign aid, agricultural development sub-sector 
shows a significant but negative impact on the sector’s growth. Significant and positive impacts 
are observed from water and land resource management, policy and administrative 
management, extension, research, and training. These results suggest that the allocation of 
agricultural foreign aid in its subsectors is not beneficial in maximising its growth-enhancing 
benefits. 
Firstly, a diminishing effect of agricultural development on the region’s growth on the one 
hand, and incremental benefits on growth from land and water resource management; policy as 
well as extension services and research, on the other hand, suggest evidence of misalignment 
of the ODA with the relative importance of the various agricultural sub-sectors. Notably, 32% 
of the total foreign aid earmarked for agricultural development annually represents at least 
double the allocations in each of the other three sectors. In this regard, at least a positive impact 
on growth could have justified such an allocation otherwise equitably realigning foreign aid to 
enhance the sector’s productivity and growth through increased productive irrigation and 
enhanced extension systems, for instance, could have been more useful in relation to the sector’s 
sustainable growth.  
Secondly, the results highlight insignificant albeit marginal positive effects of foreign aid on 
growth in all the subsectors that have been receiving an annual average of not more than 6% of 
the total agricultural foreign aid (inputs (6%), food crops (6%) and export/industrial crop 
production (3%)). Realising that total agricultural foreign aid has been covering an annual 
average of only about 5.5% of the total foreign aid in the region from 2008, the above-average 
annual allocations to these sub-sectors are quantifiably very low for tangible benefits. However, 
the relative importance of these sub-sectors in the region’s inclusive growth process cannot be 
overemphasized. While foreign aid for inputs and food crop production is essential for the 
sector’s growth both through increased food security and incomes of the large population of 
subsistence farmers, foreign aid for industrial/export crop production is key for the region’s 
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industrial development and enhanced export earnings (karugia et al., 2012). In this regard, 
heavily skewing foreign aid allocation towards agricultural development, which has a 
diminishing effect on the sector’s growth at the expense of other potentially beneficial sectors, 
further suggest evidence of potential misalignment of resources in the sector.  
 
6.5.3 Effect of Corruption on Agricultural Foreign Aid  
Corruption has the expected negative sign and is significant in all the four equations run. 
However, different signs are obtained when interacted with the foreign aid variables in the 
models implying its impact on the two components of foreign aid is different. Specifically, the 
results in Table 6.10 shows that a marginal impact of the change in corruption is positive on 
both agricultural productivity and growth, and the volume of grants increases. On the other 
hand, its impact in the sector is negative, with an increase in loans, although such an effect 
cannot be statistically confirmed at conventional levels. This implies that corruption in the 
sector potentially compromises the potency of loans only and not grants. With at least 7 of the 
17 COMESA countries included in this study without the loan component and covering an 
annual average of only 33% at the regional level for the entire period under study, the net effect 
of corruption on foreign aid utilisation at the regional level is the same as that on grants. Thus, 
overall, the net effect of corruption in the sector is positive, although it is still potentially 
compromising the utilisation of loans. 
Table 6. 10: Effect of Corruption on Foreign Aid Effectiveness 
Variable Dependent variable and Coefficient 
 Growth (lnagva) Productivity (lnagvaw) 
ln agva L1 0.8143056*** 0.7939259***   
ln agvaw L1   0.7214283 *** 0.7055868*** 
ln ODA rural development -0.0025456 -0.0008762 -.0009575   0.0013584   
ln govt 0.0240179 0.0193645 0.0235367 0.0157984 
corruption -0.6645133***   -0.7392032*** -0.6620188*** -0.7849348*** 
ln oda*corr  0.0348795**  0.0365559*** 
ln grants*corr 0.0357256**  0.0356677***  
lnloans*corr -0.0061975  -0.008202  
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10% 
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6.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter sought to unveil the impact of agricultural foreign aid on agricultural productivity 
and growth in a PVAR framework. Using the IRFs and FEVD, the focus was on the response 
path of agricultural productivity and growth to the relative exogenous shocks in foreign aid. 
The study further assessed how prioritization of foreign aid in the sector affects its potency in 
enhancing productivity and growth. The study finds a unidirectional causality from agricultural 
productivity (growth) to foreign aid and thus confirming the theoretical dispositions of the 
developmental role of foreign aid. However, instead of complementing domestic resources in 
this regard, the results indicate that foreign aid substitutes the government’s agricultural 
financing in the region and thus effectively compromising the potency of foreign aid by the 
substituted amount. However, a positive and significant coefficient of the grants (total foreign 
aid) *corruption interactive variable shows that corruption is not compromising foreign aid 
utilisation in the sector, although such negative effects cannot be completely overruled on the 
utilisation of loans. As such, corruption in the few countries with the concessional loan 
component potentially increases the fiducial risk associated with the GBS or sectoral support 
approaches that are commonly used in the region. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that the allocation of agricultural foreign aid in its subsectors 
is not beneficial in maximising its growth-enhancing benefits. The chapter found that foreign 
aid in the sector is heavily skewed towards agricultural development, which has a diminishing 
effect on the sector’s growth at the expense of other growth-enhancing sub-sectors, including 
extension, research, and training as well as water and land resource management. Lastly, the 
results indicate that foreign aid for rural development has a diminishing effect on both 
agricultural productivity and growth in the region. Despite the declining trend and being 
persistently below agricultural foreign aid, the chapter found that the impact of government 
financing in agriculture is much higher and significant vis-à-vis foreign aid. It accounts for up 
to 14% of the variations in agricultural growth, while foreign aid explains only 0.4% of its 
variations. 
Overall, the chapter observed that the key developmental role of agriculture is achieved through 
its backward and forward linkages with other relevant sectors in the economy. This is 
accomplished through its increased productivity and growth to effectively meet the growing 
demand of raw materials, labour and income as the economy advances. Among other things, 
this process demands significant investments to transform the sector and enhance its growth. 
Despite the low levels of foreign aid allocated to the sector in this regard, marginal impacts of 
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foreign aid on the growth outcomes have been observed mainly owing to foreign aid fungibility 
and misalignment of foreign aid in its sub-sectors with its growth and development objectives. 
While misalignment is largely a function of domestic priorities, foreign aid fungibility is 
potentially seen to be an effect of foreign aid delivery modalities that do not enforce 
accountability with AoD approaches bearing a very minimal risk of fungibility occurrences vis-
à-vis SWAPs, SGBS or project foreign aid. Significantly, the risk of foreign aid fungibility 
potentially increases with high levels of corruption. 
Therefore, a comprehensive revision of aid on delivery modalities in the agricultural sector is 
necessary in the region. Focusing on eliminating fungible resources, COMESA and its 
development partners should enhance accountability and potency of foreign aid receipts first 
by adopting Aid on Delivery (AoD) approaches. As shown in Section 6.1, future allocations of 
foreign aid under AoD approaches are strictly a function of a recipient country’s achievement 
of mutually agreed outcomes (Stefan Leiderer, 2012:4). Among other things, this will 
effectively discourage recipient governments to reduce their counterpart funding as that would 
mean a mismatch of the planned resources vis-à-vis expected outputs and hence, compromise 
their ability to deliver on the agreed outcomes. Secondly, COMESA should focus on 
eliminating corruption in all its member countries to further minimise the risk of misdirecting 
both foreign aid and domestic resources to non-growth enhancing activities. These should be 
properly supported by the equitable alignment of the received resources with the sectoral goals. 
Moreover, a thorough understanding of the relative roles of the various agricultural sub-sectors 
by COMESA remains imperative in guiding its resource allocation for enhanced efficiency in 
attaining its sectoral development goals. Focus in the respective sub-sectors should be on 
components with relatively higher positive impacts on productivity and growth. There should 
be a shift of resource allocation bias from agricultural development to land and resource 
management to encourage the region’s exploitation of its untapped irrigation potential. Funding 
should be availed to industrial/export crops to encourage diversification of its export base and 
agro-based industrial growth. COMESA member states should also increase allocations for 
research, training, and extension services to ensure its adoption of high yielding inputs and 
advanced agricultural related technologies. The higher impact of domestic resources on 
agricultural productivity and growth further suggests the need to cut foreign aid dependency 
and focus on inward-looking policies for growth. Policies and strategies that focus on increasing 
domestic revenue would be beneficial in this regard for a self-sustaining growth process. 
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CHAPTER 7: FOREIGN AID AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The importance of physical capital accumulation in the neoclassical production function and 
hence, economic growth can never be overemphasized. Broadly covering a wide range of direct 
and indirect tangible means of production,, including factories, schools, and roads, economic 
infrastructure continues to be one of the core components of capital accumulation. Broadly 
perceived as the stock and quality of transport, energy, information, communication and 
technology (ICT), water and sanitation infrastructure; economic infrastructure remains key in 
enhancing productivity and competitiveness of a country through effective reduction of 
production and transaction costs. These reductions in costs are partly through capital deepening 
and eased access to trade information because of reductions in asymmetries and other market 
imperfections that are caused by compact and extensive ICT systems. Furthermore, there is 
easy connectivity and accessibility of markets, the enhanced attraction of viable FDI, and 
supply value chains both at the country and regional levels through a reliable and efficient 
transport network as well as energy supply. 
While it is widely agreed among practitioners and policymakers that good infrastructure sets 
the pace of economic growth and development, it is equally clear that its development pace 
must be accelerated particularly in the initial stages of a country’s development if it is to 
effectively meet infrastructure demands as the economy grows (Kim, 2006; Garsous, 2012). 
This is particularly from the understanding that infrastructure provides a solid foundation for 
efficient production and distribution. As such, the need to further increase the stock of 
infrastructure in advanced economies is not as urgent as in the developing countries as the value 
addition of such investments will be very minimal38. In contrast,  its contribution to the 
developing countries is significant vis-à-vis its contribution to the developing countries. 
Proponents of foreign aid advocate a good balance in the prioritization of foreign aid receipts 
across sectors to ensure that infrastructure needs are catered for throughout the development 
process. (see Rosentein-Rodan 1961; Chenery and Strout, 1966 and Cauas, 1973). In other 
words, for effective growth and development thrust from foreign aid, the focus should be on 
the core growth sectors without neglecting the indispensable role of key support sectors such 
as economic infrastructure. Specifically, Murphy et al. (1989) and Wang (2015) advocated 
 
38 However, this does not negate the need for continuous maintenance and improvement of existing infrastructure. 
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economic infrastructure development as key in bringing about the desired growth outcomes 
from the investments made in the core growth sectors. 
 However, infrastructure bottlenecks remain among the key culprits affecting its intra-regional 
trade, investments, and hence, overall growth both from the supply and demand sides in 
COMESA (Muuka et al. 1998; ECA 2004; Ancharaz et al., 2010; Mlambo and Mlambo, 2018). 
These mainly consist of poor and inadequate transport, power, and communication 
infrastructure that heavily compromises COMESA countries’ ability to timely produce and 
access markets. Ultimately, these infrastructure setbacks have significantly increased their 
overall production costs and dampened their growth and development levels. This situation 
prevails in spite of decades of foreign aid to the region receiving an annual average of about 
39% of the total aid to Africa since 2002 (Figure 1.2) 
Empirical research reveals that transport costs are generally higher by about 35% in landlocked 
countries than those on the coast, covering up to 70% of their export value (ECA 2004; ECA 
2010). This is mainly because of their remoteness from the main world markets, which, coupled 
with poor transport infrastructure and systems within their countries and neighbours particularly 
in developing countries, has a huge negative impact on their overall transportation costs. With 
50% of its membership being landlocked, this means that COMESA is loaded with an eminent 
task of ensuring that it has the most efficient and effective transportation system if it is to fairly 
compete on the international markets and efficiently enhance its intra-regional trade. However, 
due to budgetary constraints, COMESA has not been able to effectively address this challenge. 
A lot still needs to be done to develop a well-integrated multimodal transport system that 
effectively connects its different member states to its regional and international markets. 
Notwithstanding regional efforts to cover some of its infrastructure gaps in recent years, missing 
links are still persistent on key points within and among different modes in the region as well 
as in individual member states, including those that are open to the sea. Except for Egypt, Libya, 
Seychelles, and Mauritius, transport infrastructure gaps are evident in COMESA countries as 
partly reflected by the consistent low scores on the road transport infrastructure index over the 
last decade (figure 7.1). These gaps render inter-modal transfer of goods unfeasible in some 
instances and hence, very expensive to timely transfer of goods both within the region and to 
international markets.  
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Figure 7. 1: Infrastructure Composite Index (2000-2015 Average Scores) 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations from the African Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI)39, 2013; 2016 
 
39 Developed by the African Development Bank, the AIDI is a composite index covering four main components: 
transport (roads), water and sanitation, ICT and electricity. These are aggregates of 9 key indicators: total paved 
roads (km/10,000 inhabitants) and total road network in km (per km2 of exploitable land area) for roads; net 
generation (KWh/capita) for electricity; total Phone Subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants), number of Internet Users 
(per 100 inhabitants), fixed (wired) Broadband Internet Subscribers (per 100 inhabitants) and International 
Internet Bandwidth (Mbps). It takes values between 0-100 for ICT, transport and water and sanitation. 
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Whilst transport infrastructure is one major constraint, energy and ICT sectors are equally 
underdeveloped in the region (Figure 7.1). Coupled with intermittent supply, the low per capita 
energy generation of less than 200kwh, on average in 9 of the 18 COMESA countries, cannot 
effectively support their growth-enhancing structural transformation. Using per capita 
consumption as a proxy for both direct and indirect costs of energy, ECA (2006) noted that 
energy costs were generally higher in countries with lower energy per capita consumption. 
Thus, high energy costs and unreliable energy supply in the region further inhibit 
competitiveness as these significantly limit manufacturing and commodity processing 
capacities, among other things. Consequently, most countries have remained reliant on a few 
ranges of primary agricultural products for exports and growth (UNCTADstats). Similarly, 
underdeveloped ICT infrastructure in most countries further undermines competitiveness 
through increased transaction costs relative to other regions with well-developed ICT services. 
With good ICT infrastructure, transaction costs are further reduced through a reduction in the 
costs of obtaining relevant information that enables businesses to make timely decisions (ECA, 
2010). 
While infrastructure bottlenecks are a function of several factors, including inefficient 
institutions, it is evident that its underdevelopment and/or lack of it in COMESA remains a key 
hurdle for its growth and development. The empirical literature on infrastructure and growth 
has focused on how good quality and quantity of infrastructure matters in stimulating growth 
with very little on its financing modalities. This chapter addresses the later focusing on ODA 
as the main source of development financing in COMESA. The chapter emphasises the potency 
of different forms of foreign aid (loans and grants) in the development of key aspects of 
economic infrastructure in the region.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section examines empirical evidence 
justifying infrastructure investments to enhance growth. Section 7.3 reviews the theoretical 
foundations of ODA as it relates to infrastructure development financing. Section 7.4 presents 
the methodology and data. Finally, Section 7.5 discusses the results and highlights policy 
implications from the key findings of this study. 
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7.2 Literature Review 
7.2.1 Economic Infrastructure and Economic Growth 
Recent debates on Africa’s inclusive and sustainable growth focus on structural transformation 
as a key priority in transforming its development platform (Lopes et al., 2017). This requires 
deliberate efforts by African governments to develop and implement policies that cover their 
productivity gaps through the reallocation of labour and rationalisation of industries based on 
their comparative advantage. Underpinning such a transition includes the prioritisation of 
economic infrastructure development as a key enabler of productivity, inclusive, and 
sustainable economic growth (AIDI, 2013). Infrastructure is key in facilitating movements of 
factors of production, enhancing competitiveness and access to markets, stimulating FDI, and 
enhancing total factor productivity through its positive impact on the quality of labour, 
production and distribution costs as well as the advancement of technology. While this positive 
role in enhancing productivity and growth is undisputed by both practitioners and academicians, 
empirical findings on the magnitude and direction of this relationship is not unanimous. These 
emanate from the methodologies (estimators) used (see Esfahan and Ramirez, 2003:443) as 
well as from the quality and quantity of the infrastructure component considered in the analysis. 
Overall, research has shown that lack of relevant economic infrastructure is prohibitive to 
growth (see Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1990; Schwartz, 1994; ECA, 2010; sojood et al., 2012) 
and generally, various infrastructure components impact economic growth rates in different 
ways.  
In his seminal work, Aschauer (1989) argues that infrastructure greatly influences growth. 
Using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimation 
methods on the G7 countries data between 1966 and 1985, he found high output elasticity of 
public infrastructure (0.39). Similar results were reported by Holtz-Eakin (1988), Munnell 
(1990), Munnell (1992) as well as Easterly and Rebelo (1993) with coefficients ranging from 
0.34 to 0.66. Recent studies with similar conclusions include Nedozi et al. (2014), who 
contended that infrastructure development remains indispensable in Nigeria’s growth and 
development. Using simultaneous equations to analyse the effect of infrastructure on growth in 
Nigeria, they alluded to the fact that infrastructure serves as a key input in the production 
process without undermining its indirect impact on growth through its effects on the overall 
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costs, quality of labour and technology40. Therefore, various economic infrastructure 
components can be used as part of inputs in the production process or to facilitate linkages 
between different components in the production and market chain. For instance, a reliable 
energy supply is a key input in the manufacturing process and the advancement of value chains 
in the production process. While efficient transport infrastructure, on the other hand, is key in 
enhancing the development of value chains through eased connectivity and reduced 
transportation costs between relevant industries in the production chain and markets. Moreover, 
transport infrastructure is equally crucial in facilitating movements of labour to the relevant 
production centres. Thus, growth-enhancing structural transformation and hence inclusive 
growth will require balanced investments in the various components of the economic 
infrastructure as they each play a distinctive role in covering productivity gaps facing most 
developing countries. 
While high returns of infrastructure on growth are evident in most empirical studies, research 
also shows significant disparities in the magnitude of this impact on growth. Eakin and 
Schwartz (1994) and Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) confirm the positive impact of infrastructure 
on growth but note that the magnitude of their positive effects is significantly different. Eakin 
and Schwartz do not support the assertion of high growth outcomes from infrastructure 
investments. Nevertheless, they both found that the extent of this impact was largely contingent 
on the country’s institutional and policy context. This means that the poor the quality of 
institutions (e.g., rampant corruption) and infrastructure policy inter alia, the higher the 
financial and economic cost of infrastructure and the longer it takes to fully translate these costs 
into benefits with a possibility of negative returns from such investments (also see Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 2002). These observations are in line with Barro’s (1990) theoretical expositions, 
which suggest a negative impact of infrastructure investment on growth if the cost of that 
investment falls below its benefits. While failure to account for this as well as other channels 
through which infrastructure indirectly impacts growth holds for disparities in a number of 
studies (see Ramirez and Esfahani, 1999; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003), significant diversions 
in infrastructure-growth outcomes are also seen to emanate from the estimators adopted and the 
level of development of the infrastructure component(s) being considered in the analysis. 
 
40 Similar observations were made by Pesaran et. al., 2000; Calderón and Serven, 2004; Babatunde et. al., 2012; 
Birhanu, 2017. 
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The contentious issue surrounding the choice of estimators concerns the possible endogeneity 
of infrastructure in the model. Generally, bi-directional causality between infrastructure and 
growth is seen in most empirical studies (see Pesaran et al., 2000; Babatunde et al., 2012; 
Garsous, 2012; Badalyan et al., 2014). This strand of literature indicates that the quality and 
quantity of infrastructure remain key in determining the direction of economic growth. It also 
shows that the country’s level of growth and development determines the quality and quantity 
of infrastructure needed to either sustain the attained growth levels or to further enhance its 
growth. Utilising viable instruments to control for infrastructure endogeneity in their model, 
Fedderke and Bogetic (2006) confirmed that infrastructure was endogenous in most growth 
models being widely estimated, resulting in spurious and hence inconsistent results in most 
empirical studies. 
Lastly, the level of development of the infrastructure component being considered also 
influences the direction and magnitude of its impact on growth. For instance, Sojoodi et al. 
(2012) confirmed a positive impact of transport and telecommunications infrastructure but did 
not ascertain the existence of a positive impact of energy on per capita output in Iran. As 
indicated earlier, the notion of energy as one of the key components in industrial production is 
widely accepted, but the quality and quantity of its infrastructure remain essential in 
determining its efficiency and reliability in the production and distribution process and hence,  
growth. This underscored by AIDI, (2013) and (2016) observed that though very key to Africa’s 
growth and development, energy infrastructure’s slow development remains among the key 
setbacks for its growth. Similarly, AfDB et al. (2010) pointed out missed opportunities of up to 
40% in productivity gains by African firms and the consequent losses of at least 2% in annual 
growth due to inadequate and underdeveloped infrastructure. In other words, underdeveloped 
components of economic infrastructure can hardly have tangible effects on growth as they 
inhibit productive utilisation of both physical and human capital (see ECA, 2010). 
Overall, the role of infrastructure in stimulating growth is widely understood among 
practitioners and policymakers. While there is wide documentation of this aspect of 
infrastructure and growth as discussed above, very little has been done to analyse the relative 
contribution of the various sources of infrastructure financing to effectively guide its 
development policy. Hence, this study, which among other things, contributes to the reduction 
of this gap in the literature by focusing on how foreign aid can contribute to infrastructure 
development to enhance the sector’s potency in stimulating economic growth. 
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7.2.2 Role of Foreign Aid in Economic Infrastructure Development: Theory and 
Evidence 
Underpinning most infrastructure-growth analyses is the neoclassical growth model which 
takes the form 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐴𝐿)                      (7.1)  
Where Y is the national output, K is the stock of capital which is generally perceived as a stock 
and quality of both direct and indirect means of production including schools, hospitals, 
factories, transport, ICT and market infrastructure, L is the labour force, and A is the 
productivity of labour. Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale, we 
get 
𝑌 = 𝐾𝛼(𝐴𝐿)𝛼−1, 0 ˂ 𝛼 ˃ 1                   (7.2) 
such that we can rewrite (1) as ᵧ𝑌 = 𝑓(ᵧ𝐾, ᵧ𝐿). Expressing output in units of labour we get 𝑦 =
𝑓(𝑘) such that the more a country invests, the more it grows. Given that the change in the 
capital-labour ratio over time is 𝑘 =
𝐾
𝐴𝐿
  then,𝑦 = 𝑘𝛼, assuming the productivity of labour is 
constant. Therefore, the change of capital over time will be given by actual investment (proxied 
by savings less what is spent on replacing capital and invested in the labour force). 
𝛥𝑘 = 𝑠𝑓(𝑘) − 𝐺 − (𝛿 + 𝑛)𝑘                   (7.3)  
Where 𝑠𝑓(𝑘) is the national savings, δ is the depreciation rate, G is the government investment 
on labour and n is the growth rate of labour. This shows that a country needs to save more to 
efficiently finance its requisite investments for inclusive and sustainable growth (see Todaro 
and Smith, 2012). However, gap theories stipulate that 𝑠𝑓(𝑘) in developing countries is hardly 
enough to finance the requisite investments for the desired growth levels. Furthermore, the 
developing country’s ability to augment these savings through competitive markets is largely 
impaired by their underdeveloped production and market structures. To this end, foreign aid is 
advocated as the most viable temporal means for closing the infrastructure financing gap in 
developing countries without which, moving on to a self-sustaining growth path will be 
virtually impossible for most countries. This perspective equally anchors Rostow’s Stages of 
economic growth, where foreign aid provides the thrust that developing countries need to 
launch onto a self-sustaining growth path. Similarly, in the Big Push theory, Rosestein-Rodan 
(1961) shows how foreign aid could significantly increase investment rates for the growth of 
underdeveloped countries. Underlying all these theories is the belief that developing countries 
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are unable to raise the required savings for the much-needed infrastructure for sustainable 
growth and development. 
The above theoretical observations are well underscored by ECA (2015). While emphasizing 
on utilizing domestic resources in closing the infrastructure deficit, the study emphasises the 
role of foreign aid as a temporary measure in Africa’s structural transformation for sustainable 
and inclusive growth. With an annual infrastructure deficit of US$ 93 billion, the study found 
that the region could potentially mobilise only 48% (US$45 billion) annually. Qualifying the 
52% percent of the annual infrastructure deficit in foreign aid as the resources to give the region 
the push it needs in its development transitioning, the study contends that foreign aid will be 
instrumental in closing this infrastructure financing gap only in two decades. However, in line 
with the findings of Burnside and Dollar (2000), this temporal need of foreign aid was 
dependent on the region’s sound revenue reforms and policies. In this regard, receiving the 
requisite annual 52% to close the infrastructure financing gap in the next two decades could 
potentially lead to more problems for the region including increased debt burden and continued 
foreign aid dependency. These problems will particularly manifest if the region does not do its 
part in ensuring that the received aid is effectively utilised and other avenues for increasing its 
revenue for further development of its infrastructure are explored 
Barañano et al. (2014) found that the net effect on foreign aid on infrastructure development is 
largely a function of the structural characteristics and policies inherent in the recipient 
economies. These findings concur with Burniside and Dollar (2000), who contended that 
recipient policies and institutions are key in rendering foreign aid effective or ineffective as 
they determine its allocative efficiency and optimal utilisation of the received resources in the 
respective sectors. Similar conclusions were also drawn by JBC (2008) and Djajic´ (2009), who 
confirmed that the level of institutional and policy distortions in a recipient economy determine 
the net effect of foreign aid on infrastructure development. 
Overall, although very scanty, empirical evidence agrees with the theory that foreign aid has 
the potential to enhance infrastructure development in aid recipient economies provided their 
policies and institutions are in support of this development course. As such, it remains important 
to account for these factors in the analysis of the impact of foreign aid on infrastructure. In the 
case of dynamic modelling as in the present study, most foreign aid-growth studies show the 
importance of relevant methodologies as these equally undermine the results by providing 
spurious regressors. 
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7.3 Methodology 
Detailed analyses of dynamic panel data models are largely undermined by correlation concerns 
that ensue the addition of the lagged depended on variable as a regressor. This is exacerbated 
by the existence of endogenous variables in foreign aid panel analysis (Gomanee et al., 2005; 
Moreira, 2005; Clemens et al., 2011) as they are both potentially correlated with the unobserved 
individual effect. Therefore, an appropriate choice of estimators remains crucial in averting 
spurious estimates for policy inferencing. Consequently, this chapter adopts the Blundell-Bond 
(BB) (1998) system GMM estimator, which is among the few estimators with reliable estimates 
for a dynamic panel in the presence of endogenous variables (Statistik, 2015). Other competing 
estimators include the Difference in Difference (DID) estimator and the Instrumental Variable 
(IV) estimator. While finding viable instruments for the IV estimator is a formidable task, the 
DID estimator relies on strict exogeneity of the variables, which is not guaranteed in the 
presented study. 
The Blundell-Bond (BB) (1998) estimator works by first differencing the estimated equation to 
remove the effects of time-invariant omitted variables to ensure that the resulting first 
differenced instrument variables are not correlated with the model’s fixed effects. It then jointly 
estimates the original level and the first differenced equations as a system by combining lagged 
levels and lagged differences of both the dependent variable and regressors in the two equations 
as instruments for endogeneity. The estimator works by first differencing the estimated equation 
to remove the effects of time-invariant omitted variables to ensure that the resulting first 
differenced instrument variables are not correlated with the model’s fixed effects. It then jointly 
estimates the original level and the first differenced equations as a system by combining lagged 
levels and lagged differences of both the dependent variable and regressors in the two equations 
as instruments for endogeneity. 
Grounded on the neoclassical growth model in Section 2.2, the general model in this chapter is 
specified as  
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽0𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                                                                          (6.4) 
Where 𝑔 is the infrastructure development index, ODA is foreign aid to the economic 
infrastructure sector. X is a vector of k specific factors influencing the sector’s outcomes, and 
these are public and private expenditure in the sector which are expected to have a similar 
impact on the sector’s outcome as foreign aid, inflation that implicitly affects the cost of 
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infrastructure projects, corruption and institutional bureaucracies which potentially 
compromise the quality and delivery of infrastructure projects contracts. The latter will be 
proxied by the corruption index (corr) from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by 
the World Bank (WB). Gross domestic savings (Sav) will be used as a proxy for public and 
private expenditure on economic infrastructure as for most of the countries in the region, and 
such expenditure data is missing. The choice of this proxy is justified by the theory, which 
postulates that the higher the saving rates in an economy, the better its capacity to invest in 
infrastructure projects to enhance its overall productivity and growth (Todaro and Smith, 2012). 
ε captures country-specific attributes that do have an impact on infrastructure development, and 
μ is the white noise error term. Accordingly, the study will estimate equation 5 below: 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡            (7.5)                       
Where inf is the inflation rate, Sav is the gross domestic savings, GDP is the real gross domestic 
product, and the rest of the variables are as defined above. 
With the region receiving an annual average of about 55% of its economic infrastructure from 
foreign aid in the form of loans during the period being examined (Figure 7.2), ODA is further 
disaggregated into loans and grants to find out which form of foreign aid is more productive in 
developing economic infrastructure in the region. This is expected to reveal whether the current 
composition of foreign aid in the sector is beneficial in enhancing its growth and development 
objectives. If loans motivate prudent utilisation as recipient economies are obliged to pay back 
with interest (concessional rate), the higher component of loans in the economic infrastructure 
foreign aid is expected to boost the overall potency of foreign aid in the sector ceteris paribus.  
However, the study recognizes that just like with grants, other factors such as corruption might 
compromise the potency of loans and as such, having a higher loan component vis-à-vis grants 
will equally compromise the overall potency of infrastructure foreign aid (see Section 7.2.1 par 
3).  Accordingly, the foreign aid components in (7.5) will be interacted with the corruption 
index as in equation 7.6 below to ascertain the extent to which corruption compromises the 
potency of the different types of foreign aid, and hence, its overall potency in the sector.  
 𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                              (7.6) 
Where corr is the corruption index, and the rest of the variables are as defined above. 
In line with the inconsistencies in the foreign aid-growth literature, the sign of the β2 (total 
infrastructure foreign aid, loans, or grants) in the above equation 7.5 cannot be determined a 
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priori. However, we expect β6 in equation 6 to be negative as poor quality of institutions and 
governance (corruption) chokes off good investments (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 2002). It is postulated that there will be a decrease in economic infrastructure foreign 
aid inflows and thus a decrease in foreign aid-financed infrastructure investments with high 
levels of corruption and weak institutions. Thus, β2 in equation 6 is expected to be negative. 
Cognisant that most of the factors that affect prudent utilisation of foreign aid have a similar 
impact on domestic resources (savings), the sign of β4 cannot be equally determined a priori. In 
other words, just like with foreign aid, a country’s ability to productively invest its savings is 
equally crowded by policy and institutional quality (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). A negative 
sign is expected for β3 as higher levels of inflation are expected to erode the purchasing power 
and thus increase the overall cost of the infrastructure project. Guided by empirical evidence, 
which suggests that the lower the level of growth (income) and hence development, the higher 
the importance of economic infrastructure in growth and development (Kim, 2006; Garsous, 
2012), a positive sign is expected for β5 in COMESA countries.  
 
Figure 7. 2: Composition of Economic Infrastructure Foreign Aid in COMESA (2002-
2015) 
 
Source: OECD Database accessed on October 18, 2018 
 
 
7.4 Data  
Key variables in this chapter are i) AIDI which shows the level of economic infrastructure 
development per capita across Africa with higher values of the index representing better quality 
and quantity of infrastructure per capita (AfDB, 2013); ii) ODA as the flow of official grants 
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and concessional loans to developing countries with the main objective of promoting the 
economic and social development of the recipient economies (OECD, 2018); iii) Corruption as 
the extent to which public power is perceived to be utilised for private gains. The index values 
vary between -2.5 and 2.5, with the higher values reflecting perceived lower incidences of 
corruption (WGI, 2018).   
Figure 7.3 shows evidence of corruption in all the COMESA countries, although the perceived 
levels vary significantly. The countries are rated on a scale of 4 with corruption index scores 
between -2.5 to -1 representing very high levels of corruption; -0.99 to 0 high levels of 
corruption; 0.1 to 0.99 low levels of corruption; 1 to 2.5 very low levels of corruption. Since 
2006 Burundi, DRC and Libya have very high levels of corruption. Figure 7.3 further shows 
that very high levels of corruption have been persistent in Sudan and Zimbabwe for the entire 
period under study. There are also persistent high levels of corruption in all the other countries, 
with the exception of Mauritius, Rwanda, and Seychelles. While commendable improvements 
are visible in Rwanda in the three periods considered in Figure 7.3, corruption is perceived to 
have been increasing in countries such as Burundi, Eritrea, Libya, Madagascar, Sudan, and 
Uganda. However, the figure shows that on aggregate, corruption levels have been going down 
in the region. The respective annual scores from the countries in the region were interacted with 
the various annual corresponding components of foreign aid on the assumption that higher 
corruption levels in a recipient economy compromise foreign aid potency in infrastructure 
development. 
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Figure 7. 3: Control of Corruption Scores (2002-2015) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Governance Indicators, 2019. 
Note: The index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values indicating low levels of corruption. The trend shows a decrease in 
corruption levels in the respective COMESA countries. 
Apart from assessing the aggregate impact of foreign aid on infrastructure development in the 
region, ODA was further disaggregated into loans and grants to understand their relative impact 
in the region’s infrastructure development. During the earlier years of the study (2003-2006), 
Figure 7.2 shows that grants dominated the economic infrastructure foreign aid covering an 
annual average of about 55%, which slightly went down to about 47% in 2007 before rising to 
about 54% in 2008. The trend took a persistent downward trend from 2009 as loans gained 
prominence vis-à-vis grants rising to an annual average of 59% of the sector’s total foreign aid 
in the 2009-2015 period from an annual average of about 46% in the 2003-2008 period. 
Pursuing this trend, the disaggregation of ODA in the analysis remains imperative in 
understanding whether this foreign aid mix in the sector is beneficial for its growth and 
development. 
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Figure 7. 4: AIDI Annual Scores for COMESA Countries (2007-2015) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the African Infrastructure Database, 2019. 
Note: There are different scales on the embedded charts. 
Generally, economic infrastructure captures transport, electricity generation, ICT, and water 
and sanitation. However, this chapter noted that while the infrastructure index (AIDI)41 totally 
covered this, OECD foreign aid to economic infrastructure data does not include water and 
sanitation as it is covered under the social sector. As such, economic infrastructure in this study 
is treated as defined by the OECD database while minding the potential of underreporting 
foreign aid impact on the index, which includes water and sanitation. Except for Burundi, where 
its infrastructure index score has been somewhat constant at around 15, Figure 6.5 indicates 
improvements in the per capita infrastructure quality and growth across the region. However, 
the growth of such improvements for most countries has been very low except for Ethiopia 
 
41 For the methodology on generating the AIDI, see AIDI 2011:2 
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where it has been growing at an annual average of about 18%. While very low scores and hence 
infrastructure development are evident in most of the countries in the region as shown in Figure 
6.5, a few countries such as Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, and Seychelles have maintained good 
infrastructure with scores above 50 and have also maintained a steady increasing trend since 
2013. Other countries with promising infrastructure development in the region are Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Madagascar.   
Covering the period 2007 to 2015, the main data sources are the World Development Indicators 
(WDI),  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database, The 
World Governance Indicators, the African Development Bank (AfDB) socio-economic 
database, the AFDB African Infrastructure Database, the African Infrastructure Development 
Index (AIDI) 2011, 2013 and 2016 publications and the COMESA database.42 These sources 
were specifically chosen to ensure that the analysis only utilises highly credible data. The 
shorter period was preferred to ensure robust estimates from the GMM estimator. 
 
7.5 Results and Discussion 
7.5.1 Preliminary Tests 
To get consistent estimates from the GMM estimator, the data must meet several minimum 
conditions, including that the number of cross-section units in the panel be greater than its time 
dimension and that the error terms are independent across panels. Secondly, the right number 
of lags should be adopted in the analysis. Therefore, the study adopted the Imm-Pesaran-Shin 
(IPS) and Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) unit root test and confirmed that all variables were stationary 
in levels (Appendix 7.1), so that the GMM estimation of the level equation had the same level 
of integration for all its variables.  
7.5.2 Empirical Results and Discussion  
Having noted differences in the definition of economic infrastructure by the AIDI and OECD 
database, the model was run with and without adding foreign aid for water and sanitation. Apart 
 
42 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
   https://stats.oecd.org/qwids 
   www.govindicators.org 
   http://dataportal.opendataforafrica.org/ 
   http://infrastructureafrica.opendataforafrica.org 
   http://comstat.comesa.int/ 
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from minor differences in the magnitude of the coefficients, no differences were observed in 
their sign. Thus, the chapter only reports results that define economic infrastructure from the 
OECD perspective. All estimations were done using xtabond2 routine in Stata with the robust 
option. Overall, the  Hansen test confirms the validity of the instruments used in all the models, 
and with statistically insignificant AR (2) across the models, we also fail to conclude that the 
models suffered from second-order serial autocorrelation. 
The System GMM results in Table 7.1 show that apart from the foreign aid*corruption 
coefficient, all variables for model 1 have a priori expected signs. ODA coefficient is negative 
and significant at 5%, indicating that the potency of foreign aid in supporting infrastructure 
development in the region is highly compromised such that its net effect on infrastructure 
development is negative. A percentage increase in ODA is associated with a 0.072% decline on 
average in the per capita infrastructure development ceteris paribus. On the contrary, a positive 
and significant savings coefficient shows a positive influence that domestic savings have on 
infrastructure development in the region. This contradicts the assumption that similar factors 
such as institutional quality (corruption) and policies have similar effects on the utilisation and 
thus the potency of both domestic savings and foreign aid in stimulating growth.  
Table 7. 1: Effect of Total ODA on Economic Infrastructure 
Variable Coefficient 
lnAIDI_1 0.6011539*** 
lnODA -0.0722641** 
Inflation -0.0086445 
Real GDP 0.00301* 
Savings 0.0064628** 
Constant 2.406168** 
Number of Observations 152 
Number of Groups 19 
Number of Instruments 13  
GMM instruments lag (s) 1 
AR(1) [p-value] 0.205 
AR(2) [p-value] 0.486 
Hansen-test [p-value] 0.155 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10% 
 
While GDP has a positive and significant impact on the region’s infrastructure development, 
inflation is not significant despite having the right a priori expected to sign. Lastly, the table 
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shows that the lagged infrastructure development index is positive and significant. This 
indicates that the current level of infrastructure development in COMESA countries has an 
impact on the direction of their future investment plans.  
Table 7.2 shows results on the assessment of the impact of the quality of institutions/ 
governance that have been proxied by the control of corruption in the region. While foreign aid 
has an inverse relationship with the infrastructure development index in the table but the 
coefficient for its interaction with corruption has a significant and positive effect on 
infrastructure development in the region. Table 7.2 shows that a marginal effect of a change in 
the control of corruption has an increasing effect on infrastructure development of about 0.06% 
on average, given an increase in economic infrastructure foreign aid ceteris paribus. This result 
is better explained by the corruption and economic infrastructure development trends in Figures 
7.3 and 7.4. Notwithstanding the relatively high levels of corruption in most countries in the 
region, Figure 7.4 shows tremendous progress in infrastructure development in Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Seychelles, Egypt, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Zambia. In all these countries, there is a 
reciprocatively significant decline in corruption levels over the years, as shown in Figure 7.3. 
On the contrary, the table further shows stagnation or sluggish progress in infrastructure 
development in some countries, including Burundi, Malawi, Sudan, and Djibouti, where 
corruption levels have been increasing. However, Figure 7.3 shows that, on average, corruption 
has been decreasing at the regional level over the years. Thus, the positive and significant 
coefficient of the foreign aid-corruption interacted variable in Table 7.2 implies that the general 
decrease in corruption levels in COMESA countries have positive outcomes on foreign aid 
utilisation. 
The results are consistent with several empirical studies. For example, Akramov (2006) found 
that the potency of foreign aid is compromised by high levels of corruption. Disaggregating 
countries in his sample according to the corruption/governance levels, he confirmed an 
insignificant relationship between high levels of corruption/poor governance with foreign aid 
in the economic infrastructure sector. He, however found foreign aid in the economic 
infrastructure sector to be significant and positive for countries with low and medium levels of 
corruption. Akramov’s findings are in line with Tanzi and Davoodi’s (2002) who notes that 
apart from unnecessarily increasing the financial costs of infrastructure projects, high levels of 
corruption also lead to increased social costs due to the inefficient skewness of good 
infrastructure to areas associated with the political elite (either region where they come from or 
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where the respective infrastructure investments will necessitate their gains in political mileage). 
Among other things, they contend that this has seen an increase in the number of “white 
elephant projects,” unnecessarily large projects in terms of budget (effectively poor-quality 
projects) being implemented, and/or very little (if any) usage of sound economic and financial 
assessments in determining the viability of public infrastructure investments. Tanzi and 
Davoodi argue for better utilisation of foreign aid with low levels of corruption (better 
governance) as reflected by the outcome of this study. 
Table 7. 2: Effect of ODA on Economic Infrastructure (Controlled for Corruption) 
Variable Sectoral corruption effects Sub-sectoral corruption effects  
AIDI_1 0.6535643* 0.6208173** 
lnODA -.1135052*  
lnODA*corruption 0.0580861 ***  
corruption  0.1918199 
lntransport* corruption  0.0034408* 
lnICT* corruption  -0.0487853** 
lnenergy* corruption  -.0014452 
Inflation -.0150788 -.0058188 
Real GDP 0.000609** 0.00287* 
Savings 0.0018109 0.0085316* 
Constant 3.625775** 1.28425 
Number of Observations 152 152 
Number of Groups 19 19 
Number of Instruments 12 16 
GMM instruments lag (s) 1 1 
AR(1) [p-value] 0.231 0.127 
AR(2) [p-value] 0.231 0.134 
Hansen-test [p-value] 0.576 0.161 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10% 
Notwithstanding the overall positive impact of improvements of corruption on the potency of 
foreign aid in the region indicated in Table 7.2, the overall negative impact of foreign aid on 
the region’s infrastructure development indicates a potential that corruption is still minimally 
affecting foreign aid utilisation. While this holds for some countries, including Sudan, as shown 
above, the aggregate effect of such occurrences is still seen at the regional level when the 
respective infrastructure components are considered. This is clearly seen in the ICT subsector, 
where the marginal effect of a change in corruption reduces ICT infrastructure development by 
about 0.05% on average as foreign aid to the sub-sector increases ceteris paribus. Furthermore, 
the table continues to show that the general decline in corruption in the region is retaining 
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positive outcomes on foreign aid potency in the transport sub-sector, although its effects in the 
energy sub-sector are not significant, albeit potentially negative.  
Table 7. 3: Effect of ODA (Loans and Grants) on Economic Infrastructure 
Variable Coefficient 
AIDI_1 0.5480592** 
lngrants -0.1638836** 
lnloans 0.024403 
Inflation -.0159639* 
Real GDP 0.000341* 
Savings .0034852 
Constant 3.776748 ** 
Number of Observations 152 
Number of Groups 19 
Number of Instruments 15 
AR(1) [p-value] 0.132 
AR(2) [p-value] 0.475 
Sargan-test [p-value] 0.209 
Hansen-test [p-value] 0.416 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10% 
Substantiating the negative impact of foreign aid on infrastructure development, Table 7.3 
shows that both foreign aid components hardly contribute effectively to the overall development 
of the sector. While loans are insignificant, grants have a significant negative impact on the 
region’s infrastructure development. The table shows that a percentage increase in grants is 
associated with a 0.16% decline on average in infrastructure development ceteris paribus. 
Interacting these foreign aid components with corruption, Table 7.4 shows that corruption 
affects the two components differently as their respective coefficient are significant. While 
loans potentially have a higher potency than grants due to repayment obligations, the negative 
and significant coefficient indicates they are more prone to abuse vis-à-vis grants in the region. 
Consistent with the findings of Moyo (2009), increased levels of corruption in the region have 
an increasing effect on the overall costs of loans. In this regard, Moyo (2009) contends that in 
the presence of corruption, loans do more harm than good to most recipient governments by 
increasing their debt burden and hence, perpetuating foreign aid dependency. Table 7.4 
indicates that the marginal impact of a change in the control of corruption suppresses 
infrastructure development in the region by about 0.014% as concessional loans increases, 
ceteris paribus. Taken independently, the result disproves the idea that a substantial reduction 
in the region’s corruption levels, as shown above, has a positive and significant effect on the 
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overall foreign aid utilisation in the region. However, the positive changes in the control of 
corruption are positively reflected in the utilisation of grants. Table 7.4 shows that a change in 
control of corruption is associated with a 0.04% increase in infrastructure development on 
average as grants in the region increases, ceteris paribus. With the overall negative effect of 
grants on infrastructure development, these results mainly imply the existence of other factors 
and not corruption, that are currently compromising the potency of this foreign aid component.  
Table 7. 4: Effect of ODA (Loans and Grants) on Economic Infrastructure (Controlled 
for Corruption) 
Variable Short Run Coefficient 
AIDI_1 1.001103 *** 
lngrantscorr 0.0394111* 
lnloanscorr -.0137093** 
corruption -0.5597604* 
Inflation -.001882 
RealGDP -0.014554 
Constant 0.3516959 
Number of Observations 152 
Number of Groups 19 
Number of Instruments 16 
Gmm instruments lags 1 
AR(1) [p-value] 0.155 
AR(2) [p-value] 0.489 
Hansen-test [p-value] 0.134 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10% 
 
Overall, the results indicate that foreign aid is not effective in developing infrastructure in the 
region such that as foreign aid increases, the change in the level and/or quality of infrastructure 
development is less than the percentage increase in ODA. The results further indicate that this 
is a joint impact of both loans and grants. On the one hand, despite covering an annual average 
of 55% throughout the period under study, they are not significant in influencing the direction 
of infrastructure development. On the other hand, grants have a diminishing effect on 
infrastructure development, and its net effect is the same as that of the overall ODA. Interacting 
these foreign aid variables with corruption to ascertain the impact of the quality of institutions 
on their potency, the results reveal a negative impact of corruption on the potency of loans, 
while a positive and significant relationship is observed between corruption and grants in the 
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sector. With recent substantial improvements in corruption, particularly in countries that are 
currently leading in infrastructure development in the region, these results imply positive 
returns on net foreign aid utilisation following their efforts in successfully fighting corruption. 
However, with an overall negative and significant effect of corruption on infrastructure 
development following increases in concessional loans, this means that more efforts should be 
placed on disentangling loans from corruption effects in the COMESA bloc. As indicated in 
Table 7.2 above, the overall net effect of corruption on the potency of foreign aid in some of 
the subsectors (ICT) is negative. 
The lagged AIDI variable is positive and highly significant in all the models. With a coefficient 
range of 0.54 – 1.0, the results in Tables 6.1- 6.4 imply that the current quality and quantity of 
various components of the economic infrastructure are a strong predictor of a future 
infrastructure development path in a country.  In other words, the higher the infrastructure gap 
in a country, the higher its demand for new infrastructure development. Furthermore, the level 
of development as proxied by real GDP positively influences the demand for infrastructure 
development in the region. This is consistent with the vast literature on infrastructure 
development and growth, which postulates high new infrastructure development needs for 
developing than advanced economies as additional infrastructure is seen to have minimal 
impact on the growth of advanced (developed) economies.  
Despite having a positive sign, the coefficient for savings is only significant in the core results 
model presented in Table 7.1. Thus, the region still has the potential to do more in terms of 
infrastructure development from its own domestic resources and reduce its over-reliance on 
foreign aid. Lastly, current levels of inflation are not having any significant effect on 
infrastructure development, and this is consistent in all the models. 
7.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
Although the role of viable infrastructure in growth and development remains undisputable in 
economic circles, infrastructure gaps remain high in COMESA. These include poor and 
inadequate transport, power, and communication infrastructure that greatly undermines the 
region’s growth potential. With significant budgetary constraints to develop the sector as 
reflected by the low savings in most of the COMESA countries, foreign aid has remained a 
prominent source of foreign capital to close the infrastructure financing gap. This chapter, 
therefore, sought to unveil the extent to which foreign aid in the sector has been useful in this 
regard. The assessment was controlled for corruption, which is both theoretically and 
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empirically seen as a depressor of infrastructure development as it increases the overall costs 
of such investments (Tanzi and Davvodi, 2006; Moyo 2009, Ojong & Ejar, 2017). 
Overall, the chapter found that the aggregate impact of foreign aid in the sector’s development 
is negative, owing to the performance of both loans and grants in the sector. On the one hand, 
there was an insignificant relationship between its loans and infrastructure development, 
although loans have been accounting for an annual average of about 59% of the sector’s total 
foreign aid since 2009. On the other hand, grants have a negative impact on the sector’s 
development. Notwithstanding these results, corruption has a negative impact only on loans 
indicating that there are potentially other factors that are undermining the potency of grants in 
the region as its net impact on infrastructure development is negative. There is, therefore, a need 
to improve the performance of infrastructure loans to increase their value returns and minimize 
the probability of their becoming conduits of corruption. 
Except for Rwanda, Mauritius and Seychelles that have low levels of corruption with scores of 
0.09, 0.39 and 0.39 respectively, the chapter found that corruption in the rest of the COMESA 
countries is high with scores of between -1.11 and -1.34 in Burundi, Zimbabwe, and DRC and 
for the rest of the countries, the scores were between -0.41 and -0.91. These reflect low levels 
of transparency and accountability in the public system. Empirical evidence shows that low 
levels of transparency and accountability in the public system negatively affects the 
administration of most infrastructure projects (Elhiraika, 2015). However, a general decline in 
corruption from 2007 was observed for all countries in the region that have been leading in 
infrastructure development such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Egypt, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
and Zambia. Consequently, the net regional effect of corruption on foreign aid utilisation is 
currently positive, although traces of its negative influence remain evident in the ICT sector.  
Unless corruption is collectively and effectively addressed in all the countries in the region, 
imbalances in infrastructure development will remain evident at the regional level. Good 
progress in closing the infrastructure gap will only be feasible in the few countries that are 
effectively addressing corruption. While this has no significant issues at the respective country 
levels, infrastructure gaps in the other countries with high corruption will remain a hurdle for 
the collective attainment of regional trade, integration, and economic growth objectives. As 
highlighted in Section 1, with the current levels of infrastructure development in the region, 
intermodal transfer of goods is virtually unfeasible in some instances, and coupled with poor 
transport networks in some countries, transaction (transport) costs are very high and 
counterproductive to the collective regional goals. Furthermore, collective involvement in the 
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regional development of viable value chains will remain compromised as production, energy, 
and ICT infrastructure remain underdeveloped in some of the countries. This will remain the 
region’s status quo if the current spatial infrastructure development persists because of 
unchecked corruption in some countries.  
Although the study failed to ascertain a positive relationship between grants and infrastructure 
development, the insignificant relationship between grants and corruption provides optimism 
for effectively using this mode of foreign aid delivery for infrastructure development. A joint 
COMESA and donor partners study should be undertaken to assess the grants delivery and 
utilisation process and to understand the salient factors that are currently constraining the 
potency of the components of the grant. Further, the highlighted positive and significant impact 
of domestic resources on infrastructure development in the core model provides evidence for 
the need to enhance the synergy between ODA and domestic resources, while exploring other 
avenues of generating revenue to fast-tracking infrastructure development and enhancing 
economic growth in the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Summary of Results 
COMESA was officially established in 1994 with the primary objective of helping its member 
states attain sustainable economic growth and development. Thus, COMESA’s has focused on 
unleashing a comparable and balanced growth of the production and market structures of its 
respective member states. At the centre of such a process, is supposedly a coherent and 
consistent development financing plan for the essential investments across its sectors. However, 
with their minute economies, some countries have remained deficit spenders with the majority 
not being able to effectively meet their growth and development needs from their domestic 
savings augmented by foreign capital obtained through functional markets. Therefore, foreign 
aid has continued to anchor their growth and development platform with no evidence of 
termination in the near future for most of the countries in the region. Nevertheless, economic 
growth in most countries in the region has remained unsatisfactory, barely reaching the 7% 
minimum SDGs growth rate following decades of increasing foreign aid.  
This thesis has assessed the role of foreign aid in the region’s growth in a bid to unveil salient 
factors behind the seemingly poor performance of foreign aid. It adopted a multifaceted 
approach that encompassed both the aggregate and sectoral implications of aid receipts in the 
region without undermining the role of the factors that affect its utilisation as mostly discussed 
in the literature. The study focused on unveiling both direct and indirect effects of foreign aid 
in the region by assessing how foreign aid relates to its key growth elements and the nature of 
this linkage. Accordingly, the thesis addressed four key research questions. The first question 
sought to understand how the received aid fared against the region’s development financing 
gaps. The second question examined the aggregate impact of foreign aid in different countries 
in the COMESA bloc and its specific effects in relation to the region’s collective goals. The 
fourth question sought to understand the direct effects of foreign aid on growth, which were 
assessed through its role in the region’s core growth sectors, specifically the agricultural sector. 
And lastly, the fourth question wanted to get answers about the indirect effects of foreign aid 
through its impacts on the growth-supporting sectors.  
The thesis used trends analysis in Chapter 4 to assess the extent to which the received foreign 
aid volumes consistently filled their overall and specific sectoral development financing gaps 
in response to the first research question. Focusing on the role of foreign aid in development 
financing and hence growth, the chapter established that ODA remains a key source of foreign 
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capital to the region except for a few countries such as Seychelles and Swaziland that have been 
enjoying relatively better FDI inflows. Overall, foreign aid covers at least 60% of the 
development financing gaps in most countries in the region. However, this has not been 
translated into better growth outcomes in the region where most countries barely achieved the 
7% minimum SDG stipulated growth rate. The chapter identified several reasons for this trend. 
Firstly, the chapter noted that not all foreign aid in the region was meant to enhance growth. An 
annual average of about 24% since 2000 is disbursed for humanitarian assistance, which has 
been empirically validated to have week linkages with economic growth in the short to medium 
term (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Radelet et al., 2004 and Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2005). 
Secondly, the chapter found that aid disbursement in the region did not always follow 
systematic assessments of the region’s development financing needs. Notably, the chapter 
observed a few episodes (years) of foreign aid over and above what was required to fill the 
respective development financing gaps. Equally, the few episodes where substantial foreign aid 
inflows are observed for countries such as Zimbabwe, although their investment financing 
needs were fully covered by their respective domestic savings, thereby increasing the potential 
of foreign aid misallocation in these countries. Underscoring these trends, the chapter found 
that in Mauritius, Madagascar, Egypt, and Kenya, domestic savings fully accounted for their 
investments suggesting that the received foreign aid was either for humanitarian purposes or 
consumption through the social sectors for instance. Similar conclusions can be drawn for 
foreign aid receipts that were over and above what was invested in countries such as the DRC, 
Burundi, Rwanda, and Malawi. On the one hand, these trends reflect poor development 
financing resource needs assessment by the respective donors. But these could also potentially 
reflect that the recipient development financing needs and hence, growth, are not the primary 
determiner of the direction of foreign aid inflows. While these assertions were found not to hold 
in countries with a bigger need for humanitarian assistance in those periods, it remained true 
for several countries. Ultimately, such foreign aid did not translate into viable growth outcomes 
as highlighted by lower investment levels in most of these countries in years of more aid than 
required to effectively close their development financing needs. On the other hand, this reflects 
the quality of institutions and human capacities in the respective COMESA countries that 
chokes the efficient utilisation of foreign aid. 
Thirdly, the chapter established that foreign aid in the region is highly skewed towards the 
social sectors, particularly health and humanitarian assistance, directly or indirectly through 
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general government budget support. Nevertheless, foreign aid in the social sector largely funds 
recurrent consumption, as less than 10% is invested in education and/or health facilities and 
training in most COMESA countries with at least 17% of the total social sector allocation 
streamlined for government and civil society consumption at the regional level. Accordingly, 
foreign aid allocations to the sector are not effective in enhancing the region’s growth 
(Appendix 4.4). Furthermore, the chapter observed that high aid volatility is among the factors 
compromising aid potency in the region as development planning on volatile resources remains 
highly unfeasible. Overall, the chapter concludes that while the region receives substantial 
foreign aid volumes in relation to the respective development and financing gaps, the volatility 
and misalignment of foreign aid allocations both within and across sectors impair its potency 
in stimulating growth.  
Chapter 5 was developed in response to the second research question that sought to establish 
the aggregate impact of foreign aid on growth in the region. Contending for comparable growth 
effects of foreign aid across the countries in the region to effectively contribute to its collective 
regional growth and development goal, the chapter adopted the PMG estimator. The choice of 
this estimator was motivated by its ability to allow for country-specific short-run estimates and 
hence, country-specific policy inferences in the panel model. The chapter found that overall, 
foreign aid has a positive impact on growth in the region only in the short run with equally 
consistent SR effects in all its countries, albeit insignificant in a few countries. This implies that 
the marginal incremental effect of foreign aid on growth has been decreasing with increases in 
foreign aid over time. In other words, there are diminishing returns to aid in the region since 
that aid receipts in the region have been steadily increasing without being properly augmented 
with relevant human skills and economic infrastructure over time to enhance its potency. This 
is well supported by the findings in Chapters 4 and 7, which show that foreign aid in the region 
has not been effective in bringing out the desired growth outcomes in both the social and 
economic infrastructure sectors. As such, these continue to cripple the region’s efforts in pursuit 
of inclusive and sustainable growth.  
Notably, the chapter attributes the poor LR performance of foreign aid in the region to 
corruption as underscored by its negative impact on growth with increases in foreign aid in the 
LR. Despite decreases in corruption in some countries, the chapter found that corruption is still 
high in most countries rendering both loans and grants ineffective in stimulating growth at the 
country level. The chapter found that corruption in some countries was affecting loans and grant 
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with its effect on grants being negative contrary to its positive impact on loans, and vice versa.  
This finding confirmed the assertion that the effectiveness of the two components is not always 
affected by the same factors. Further, in line with this assertion, the chapter found that the 
magnitude of the impact of corruption was higher on loans. Overall, the chapter found that the 
overall net impact on corruption in COMESA countries was lower in countries whose 
corruption scores have been improving since 2007  
Notwithstanding comparable aggregate foreign aid effects on growth across the countries, the 
chapter found varying effects of loans and grants both at the regional and country level. Grants 
have a positive impact on growth only in the LR. At the country level, varying impacts of grants 
were observed in different countries in the region. Depending on the factors including 
corruption and the large component of humanitarian foreign aid that affect utilisation of loans 
and grants, the two components have different growth outcomes in different countries. Notably, 
relatively better performance of grants in the presence of corruption. Overall, the chapter 
established comparable SR effects of aid on growth across countries in COMESA, although its 
long-term effect is negative. While poor performance of grants was due to both the high 
component of humanitarian assistance and corruption, the negative effects of corruption on the 
utilisation of loans are the main factor in its poor performance.  
Research questions 3 and 4 sought to establish the direct and indirect effect of foreign aid on 
growth in the region through sectoral analysis of foreign aid in the core growth and growth 
supporting sectors, respectively. These were addressed in Chapters 6 and 7 that assessed the 
role of foreign in the growth and development of the agricultural and economic infrastructure 
sectors. The choice of these sectors for the analysis of the direct and indirect effects of aid on 
growth was guided by the OECD classification in which the economy comprises core growth 
and growth supporting sectors. The core growth sectors cover the primary sector (Agriculture), 
secondary sector (Industry), and the tertiary sector (Service). The primary and secondary sectors 
broadly constitute the production sectors as they are generally concerned with the extraction of 
raw materials and the production of goods. The growth supporting sectors comprise the social 
and economic infrastructure sectors. The education and health sectors constitute the social 
sectors, and the economic infrastructure covers roads, water, and sanitation, ICT, and energy 
sectors. However, water and sanitation were not included in the analysis as the component is 
covered under the social sectors in the OECD database. 
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Guided by the above sectoral classifications, the ultimate choice of sectors for an in-depth 
analysis was further informed by the recent debates on Africa’s inclusive and sustainable 
growth. These debates have focused on structural transformation as a critical priority in 
ensuring an inclusive and sustainable economic and development transformation of African 
economies (Lopes et al., 2017). In this regard, the thesis analyzed foreign aid on sectors with 
the current prominent contributions to this plight. A thorough understanding of the relative 
sectoral roles in this regard, vis-à-vis aid inflows, was essential in guiding the final choice of 
the sectors for detailed analysis in this thesis.  
It is well understood that the production sectors (agriculture and industry) constitute an 
economy’s primary and secondary (core growth) sectors. However, their relative roles on the 
development path of an economy are uniquely different, notwithstanding their complementarity 
in pushing a developing country onto a self-sustaining and inclusive growth path. Following 
the seminal work of Athur-Lewis (1954), empirical evidence continues to suggest that 
agriculture remains the hub for unleashing the desired structural changes for self-sustaining and 
inclusive growth (Lopes, 2019). This is particularly due to its ability to transfer labour and 
provide raw materials as demanded by the industrial and service sectors. However, its potency 
in effectively supporting the industrial sector overtime requires continued increased 
investments supported by the industrial sector proceeds until an equilibrium identified by 
comparable wages in the two sectors is reached (Fei and Ranis, 1961; Nurkse, 1961). In this 
regard, Lopes (2019) contends for the rapid growth and development of the agricultural sector 
to enhance the industrial push that is well supported by balanced investment in relevant 
industries. He notes that an effective structural transformation for inclusive and sustainable 
growth in Africa will require rationalisation of rural agriculture to significantly enhance its 
productivity while ensuring the existence of viable linkages with the industrial sector.  
The above approach remains relevant for COMESA as agriculture continues to be the hub for 
its industrial development and the key sustainer of livelihoods. With 12 of the 33 African LDCs 
housed in the region, agriculture remains key in sustaining livelihoods in these LDCs, covering 
between 70% and 92% of their total employment. Furthermore, it continues to support industrial 
development covering at least 50% of its needed raw materials. However, the sector continues 
to be among the least performing in the region, and therefore, it is not effective in unleashing 
the desired structural changes for a successful transformation of the economies in the region. 
Notwithstanding the marginal changes in the sectoral employment structure and contribution to 
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GDP, the region evidently has a long way to self-sustaining and inclusive growth through viable 
structural transformation. Notably, the share of agriculture share in GDP and employment has 
marginally decreased in most countries as the industry and/or the service sectors have been 
increasing. Among other things, the sector’s low productivity is reflected in the region through 
its inability to effectively unleash structural changes towards the industrialization of the 
respective countries. Currently, the industrial sector makes substantial contributions only to the 
GDPs of Egypt (30%), Libya (46%), Mauritius (27%), Zambia (32%), and Zambia (26%). And 
overall, it accounts for only 13% of the total employment in the region, which is also highly 
concentrated in these few countries, with agriculture continuing as the predominant sector both 
in its GDP share and employment in the remaining countries. Recognizing the important role 
of the agricultural sector to turn around this trend in the region (Lewis 1954; Fei and Ranis, 
1961; Hossein, 2012), the thesis opted for the agricultural sector in Chapter 6 for a detailed 
assessment of the direct effects of foreign aid on growth in the region. 
The chapter examined the response path of agricultural productivity and growth to the relative 
exogenous shocks in foreign aid using IRFs and FEVD. The results indicate a unidirectional 
causality from agricultural productivity (growth) to foreign aid and thus confirming the 
theoretical dispositions of the developmental role of foreign aid in the region. However, instead 
of complementing domestic resources in this regard, the results further indicate that foreign aid 
substitutes the government’s agricultural financing in the region and thus effectively 
compromising the potency of foreign aid by the substituted amount. Nevertheless, results 
further indicate that domestic resources have higher potency in stimulating agricultural growth 
and productivity in the region. It accounts for up to 14% of the variations in agricultural growth, 
while foreign aid explains only 0.4% of its variations. 
Contending for effectiveness within sector prioritisation of foreign aid receipts for enhanced 
aid potency, the chapter further assessed the relative contribution of the sub-sectoral foreign aid 
to the collective sectoral growth and development goals. Results suggest that the allocation of 
agricultural foreign aid in its subsectors is not beneficial in maximising its growth benefits. The 
chapter found that foreign aid in the sector is heavily skewed towards agricultural development. 
However, the results show that foreign aid in this sub-sector has a diminishing effect on the 
overall sector’s growth at the expense of other growth-enhancing sub-sectors, including 
extension, research, and training as well as water and land resources management. Although 
closely connected with rural agricultural development, the chapter further found that foreign 
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aid for rural development has a diminishing effect on both agricultural productivity and growth 
in the region.  
In line with the findings in Chapter 5 on the relative impact of corruption on foreign aid 
utilisation, the chapter also established that the net effect of corruption in the sector on aid 
utilisation is positive. While the chapter conclusively found that corruption does not 
compromise the aggregate potency of loans in the sector, it could not completely overrule traces 
of its negative impact on the utilisation of loans. The negative impact of corruption on the 
potency of loans is not statistically significant. Thus, the chapter contends that corruption in 
some countries potentially increases the fiducial risk associated with the GBS or sectoral 
support approaches that are used in the region, particularly through the concessional loan 
component. 
Lastly, for the indirect effects of foreign aid on growth in the region, the key growth supporting 
sectors were initially considered. On the one hand, the social sectors (health and education) 
were deemed key for the desired structural transformation in pushing the region onto a self-
sustaining and inclusive growth path. Among other things, vibrant social sectors entail the 
existence of skilled and health workforce, which is indispensable in the development of the core 
growth sectors as they remain a key input in the production function. On the other hand, viable 
and relevant economic infrastructure is equally indispensable in the pursuit of inclusive and 
sustainable growth. The sector remains key in determining the productivity and competitiveness 
of the productive sectors as they facilitate reallocations/movement of factors of production, 
among other things. However, an initial screening of the impact of sectoral aid in Chapter 4 
showed an inverse relationship between social sector foreign aid and growth in the region 
(Appendix 4.3) despite being the most heavily prioritized sector in the region. The chapter noted 
that this was because of the large foreign aid that falls into the consumption component either 
through humanitarian assistance or components with a significant positive lag (if any) effect on 
growth. Very little was observed to be efficiently utilized in the sector’s productive investments 
such as education, health, and training infrastructure. Moreover, the significant amounts being 
utilized in the population and reproductive health programmes are a significant lag in positively 
influencing the direction of economic growth. In this regard, a detailed analysis of the growth-
supporting sectors (indirect effects) only covered economic infrastructure in Chapter 7 on the 
assumption that all foreign aid receipts in the sector were productively invested.  
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Using the system GMM estimator, Chapter 7 found that both loans and grants have not been 
effective in the development of viable and relevant economic infrastructure in the region. On 
the one hand, loans that account for an annual average of about 59% of the total aid in the sector 
are insignificant in stimulating viable growth outcomes. This was largely an effect of corruption 
in most countries in the region, which increases the cost of loans such that the net effect of the 
loan in infrastructure development is negative. On the other hand, the results indicate that grants 
have a statistically significant negative impact on infrastructure development. However, this 
could not be pinned down on corruption, which had a positive and significant sign implying 
that the net effect of corruption on the potency of grants is positive. This result suggests that 
there are other factors that are responsible for the poor performance of grants that are yet to be 
statically established in the region.  
In line with the poor performance of both loans and grants as described above, the chapter found 
that the net effect of foreign aid in the sector’s development is negative. However, the chapter 
failed to solely attribute the negative outcome to corruption, which had a statically positive 
impact on the overall utilization of foreign aid in the sector. Corruption was statistically 
confirmed to compromise the potency of foreign aid in only the ICT sub-sector as its negative 
impact in the energy sector is not statistically significant. In the transport sub-sector, the net 
effect of corruption on aid utilization was positive. In line with these findings, further analysis 
indicated that corruption in countries that are leading to infrastructure development in the region 
has been decreasing since 2007. These countries include Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Egypt, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, and Zambia. However, the net negative impact of foreign aid in the sector 
with corruption still affecting the net utilization of loans still highlights that corruption 
continues to reduce the potency of aid in the region. This remains true in the whole bloc except 
for Rwanda, Mauritius, and Seychelles that have low levels of corruption with scores of 0.09, 
0.39, and 0.39, respectively. The thesis found that corruption in the rest of the COMESA 
countries is high with scores of between -1.11 and -1.34 in Burundi, Zimbabwe, and DRC, and 
the scores are between -0.41 and -0.91 for the rest of the countries. These values continue to 
reflect that low levels of transparency and accountability in the public system persist in most 
countries in the region, which, according to empirical evidence, negatively affects the 
administration of most infrastructure projects (Elhiraika, 2015). 
In sum, notwithstanding the comparable short-run positive effects of aid on growth across the 
COMESA bloc, the thesis could not establish that foreign aid positively contributes to the 
region’s long-term sustainable growth and development objective. While it marginally 
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enhances productivity and growth of its core growth sector, foreign aid in the region has not 
brought the desired changes in the growth-enhancing support sectors (economic infrastructure 
and social sectors). The performance of loans and grants varies significantly across countries in 
the region, with an overall net positive effect observed only from grants. The thesis did not find 
any significant net effect between concessional loans and growth in the region. 
High levels of corruption in some COMESA member countries, which potentially lead to 
unnecessary increases in the overall financial and economic costs of its loans and the 
substitution effect of aid on domestic resources, are among the critical factors for the poor 
performance of foreign aid. While both are functions of weak institutions in the region, GBS, 
SGBS, and SWAPs funding modalities boost the substitution effect of foreign aid. Moreover, 
poor alignment of foreign aid to the respective development financing gaps both across (within) 
sectors and countries is also vital in accounting for aid inefficiency in enhancing the region’s 
growth. There is evidence of a lack of systematic assessment on the part of the region’s 
development partners (donors) to properly align aid to the region’s development financing gaps 
as reflected by episodes of aid over and above existing development financing gaps. While the 
large component of humanitarian aid in some of the countries in the region comprehensively 
explains this mismatch, it does not provide an adequate explanation for other countries in the 
region, including those whose investments were fully covered by domestic resources in the 
presence of aid receipts. Poor sectoral prioritization of the received aid in the bloc in favour of 
non-growth enhancing consumption in the social sectors does not lead to the attainment of its 
growth-enhancing objectives. 
Lastly, it remains clear that foreign aid in the region will continue to be a critical source of 
foreign capital for development financing in COMESA. Following decades of foreign aid, the 
thesis noted that most countries in the region are still not able to generate enough domestic 
savings. They are also unable to augment their savings with foreign capital obtained through 
functional markets. Notably, the thesis noticed an increased potential of domestic savings 
(resources) over foreign aid in bringing about their desired changes for sustainable and inclusive 
growth. Domestic resources perform better than foreign aid despite being persistently below 
foreign aid volumes in most countries in the region.  
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8.2. Contribution to Literature 
Foreign capital (referred to as external financing in Chapter 4) remains an important component 
of development financing for both developed and developing countries. External financing is 
vital in complementing domestic savings for the required capital either to sustain the attained 
growth levels, particularly for developing countries. In the case of developing countries, 
external financing complements their domestic savings to raise the required capital and enables 
them to achieve at least a minimum 7% growth rate as stipulated in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). While developed economies acquire external financing through 
functional markets that are supported by well-developed and balanced productive capacities 
developing countries cannot achieve the same due to their underdeveloped production 
infrastructures, institutions, and human capital relevant for highly productive investments 
(Aluko and Arowolo, 2010).  
While developing economies experience FDI inflows and other external financing sources, 
these flows are generally very minimal to make any meaningful contribution to the countries’ 
capital investment needs. As a result, these countries rely on foreign aid as their key source of 
foreign capital for financing growth. However, theoretical dispositions of foreign aid posit that 
foreign aid remains a temporal gap filler such that, other sources of external financing get 
prominence as the foreign aid component steadily declines over time. This assumption assumes 
that the volumes of aid disbursed to the developing countries is sufficient to effectively cover 
their development financing gaps. This assumption has not been thoroughly tested as the 
empirical focus of the aid-growth nexus has been on qualitative factors such as recipient 
institutions and donor motives (Ranaweera, 2003). The first contribution of this thesis to this 
body of knowledge, therefore, lies in its focus on the relevance of the actual received foreign 
aid vis-à-vis the region’s development financing gaps in enhancing the potency of foreign aid.  
The second contribution is on the disaggregation of foreign aid in loans and grants in the 
assessment. While agreeing with previous studies on the role of specific factors, including the 
quality of institutions on the potency of foreign aid, the thesis argues that such an assessment 
is mostly done on the aggregated foreign aid receipts. The thesis contends that the implicit 
assumption of equal effects from the different components of foreign aid behind its aggregation 
in assessing the role of specific factors, including institutional quality as done in most studies, 
is misleading. The management of these components varies significantly across countries and 
sectors, rendering their vulnerable to different factors. Similarly, policy inferencing from the 
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assessments of the total effect of foreign aid are equally not effective as they fall short on the 
relative impact and factors affecting the respective components of foreign aid. 
The third contribution is on the emphasis of comparable effects of foreign aid across countries 
in the region if it is to meaningfully contribute to collective regional core growth objective. The 
thesis utilised the hardly utilised estimator (PMG) in the aid-growth literature to assess the 
relevance of the individual country impacts of foreign aid vis-à-vis the region’s core growth 
objective. Furthermore, the thesis provides one of the few assessments of infrastructure and 
economic growth, focusing on the role of financing in stimulating growth through infrastructure 
development. 
Overall, the main contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge is its multifaced approach 
in assessing the impact of foreign aid in the region. Previous studies focused on the aggregate 
impact of foreign aid on growth or on specific sectors of the economy. This thesis underscores 
the fact that different sectors have different roles to play in the pursuit of inclusive and 
sustainable growth and development. For example, while changes in the output of the core 
growth sectors have a direct impact on the overall GDP performance of a country, the good 
output from these sectors remains an illusion without the good performance of the supporting 
sectors. Thus, the thesis contends that effective aid policy inferencing should address the 
specific sectoral needs in line with the country’s (regional) growth objectives. The thesis 
provided detailed assessments of the impact of foreign aid on various key sectors of the 
COMESA economies. Therefore, the thesis presented insights on the key aspects or linkages of 
foreign aid with the fundamental components of growth in the region. This approach 
encompassed detailed assessments of both core and growth supporting sectors without 
undermining the potential differential impacts of the different components of foreign aid (loans 
and grants) on the specific sectors. 
8.3 Policy recommendations 
Although foreign aid is a critical capital resource supporting domestic financing for sustainable 
and inclusive growth, the thesis highlighted several factors that compromise its potency in the 
realization of this development goal. As discussed in the above section, high levels of corruption 
and foreign aid fungibility (foreign aid substituting domestic financing) choke aid in achieving 
its developmental role. While the net effect of foreign aid utilization is positive at the regional 
level, the thesis demonstrated that not all sectors are free from its negative impact. Loans are 
more prone to abuse. This means that the COMESA bloc should deal with corruption in order 
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to achieve the SDG minimum stipulated growth rates. At the regional level, countries that have 
been improving their corruption scores are doing better in many development aspects such as 
economic infrastructure development and overall growth. This implies that over time, those 
countries with high levels of corruption will continue to lag behind. This will have a negative 
effect on the region’s integration efforts towards an inclusive and sustained growth goal. Thus, 
it remains imperative that COMESA intentionally encourages strategies in its member states to 
strengthen institutional accountability in the use of both domestic and foreign aid resources. 
Key lessons in this regard can be drawn from countries within the region, such as Rwanda, that 
have reduced corruption levels over time. 
Empirical evidence suggests that funding modalities, such as SWAPs, GBS and SGBS, are 
associated with increased fiduciary risk as the recipient governments have increased flexibility 
on their usage. This risk becomes even higher with weak corruption monitoring mechanisms. 
However, addressing corruption alone in COMESA will not address fungible resources as 
signified by the substitution effect of foreign aid on domestic resources in the region. The thesis, 
therefore, recommends a comprehensive revision of foreign aid delivery modalities in the 
region. Focusing on eliminating fungible resources and corruption with their consequent 
unproductive investments, COMESA, and its development partners should enhance 
accountability and potency of foreign aid receipts by adopting Aid on Delivery approaches. As 
discussed in Section 5.1, future allocations of foreign aid under AoD approaches are strictly a 
function of a recipient country’s achievement of mutually agreed outcomes (see Stefan 
Leiderer, 2012:4). This will curb corruption and eliminate fungible resources as the delivery of 
the agreed outcomes are dependent on the agreed financing components (ODA and counterpart 
funding). Adoption of these AoD modalities would even be more effective if accompanied by 
good strategies for enforcing the adoption of the 5 pillars of the PDAE, which include mutual 
accountability. 
The thesis also identified poor alignment of foreign aid with the development financing needs 
both across the countries and sectors in the region. At the country level, this indicates poor 
development financing needs assessment by the respective development partners of COMESA 
countries. However, at the bloc level, poor sectoral allocations are largely the responsibility of 
the respective COMESA governments. Thus, the thesis recommends a joint donor-recipient 
financing needs assessments as well as COMESA wide capacities assessments for effective 
targeting to improve growth outcomes of foreign aid. Moreover, a thorough understanding of 
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the relative sectoral roles in pursuit of inclusive and sustainable growth by the COMESA 
member countries will further enhance equitable resource allocation.  
Lastly, the thesis argued that the large humanitarian assistance component in foreign aid reduces 
its efficacy in stimulating growth. As previous studies proved, this component takes a lot of 
time for its growth outcomes (if any to manifest). Thus, the thesis recommends the rethinking 
of the concept of ODA so that it excludes humanitarian assistance in its development financing 
definition. This would likely improve the efficacy of foreign aid in the aid-growth empirical 
analysis. 
8.4 Limitations  
The study used secondary data, which was not consistent. For instance, there were years where 
different values were registered for the same variable in the same year in different sources. This 
was problematic because it was difficult to distinguish the correct values. This might have 
affected the results of this study. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Appendix 1.1A : COMESA Real GDP growth (1985-2015) 
 
Source: OECD Database accessed on April 23, 2018 
 
Appendix 1.1B COMESA Real GDP and Real ODA growth (1985-2015) 
 
Source: OECD Database accessed on April 23, 2018 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Appendix 4.1: COMESA Sectoral Allocations (2002-2017) 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.2: COMESA Social Sector Allocations (2002-2017) 
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Appendix 4.3: Humanitarian Foreign Aid to COMESA countries (2002-2015) 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations from OECD Database accessed on 20th January 2018 
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Appendix 4.4.1: Impulse Response Function 
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Appendix 4.4.2: Stability Test for IRF Model 
     pVAR satisfies stability condition.
   All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.
                                      
     .1891621   .1088025    .2182208  
     .1891621  -.1088025    .2182208  
     .8667599  -.1071588    .8733589  
     .8667599   .1071588    .8733589  
                                      
      Real     Imaginary    Modulus   
         Eigenvalue                   
                                      
   Eigenvalue stability condition
. pvarstable, graph
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APPENDIX 5 
Appendix 5.1: Loans and Grants in COMESA (2002-2015) 
 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations from OECD Database, 2018 
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Appendix 5.2: Summary Statistics 
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Appendix 5.3: COMESA Trade Balance (1985-2018) 
 
Source: COMSTAT data accessed on 4-10-2019 
 
 
Appendix 5.4: Humanitarian Foreign aid and General budget support (2002-2015) 
Source: Author’s Calculations from OECD Database, 2018 
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 Appendix 5.5: Effect of Loans and Grants on Economic Growth: Controlled for 
Corruption  
  
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EC lngrants lnloans Grants*cor Loans*cor corr lngov lnsavings lnppln
LR 0.00360
*
-0.00476
*
-0.00194
***
-0.00505
***
-5.20592
***
-0.01779
***
0.00064
***
0.02491
***
SR
COMESA -0.92984
*** -0.00011 0.01137
*** -0.00443 -0.00407
*
4.89176
***
0.09286
***
0.01428
** 0.48933
Burundi -0.79501
***
0.03752
**
0.02406
* 0.00077 0.00630
** 4.18903 0.03534 0.00013 0.53145
Comoros -1.28663
***
0.02774
*
0.00511
* 0.00049 -0.00444
*
6.76554
***
0.04769
** 0.00032 7.32622
Djibouti -0.63773
***
0.03860
***
-0.01194
*** 0.00046 0.00725
***
3.51949
***
0.02656
**
-0.00132
***
-2.98696
**
DRC -1.38981
***
0.04006
**
0.03674
*** 0.00097 -0.00029 7.31278
** 0.02 -0.00032 -0.70039
**
Egypt -0.69310
*** 0.00305 -0.0009 -0.00227 0.00103
**
3.56154
*
0.06704
*** 0.0443 0.22294
Eswatini -0.87289
*** 0.02767 0.01489
* 0.03957 -0.22171
*
4.51829
** 0.05262 -0.00038 3.15582
***
Ethiopia -0.73920
*** -0.02946 0.02092 0.00026 0.00311
***
3.84506
** 0.1762 0.01228 -0.21686
Kenya -0.54270
*** 0.00606 0.01646 0.00412 0.00210
*** 2.88921 0.06584 0.02317
* 0.94508
Libya -0.75130
*** -0.01954 0.05909
***
-0.16047
*** 0.1487 3.98572
***
0.40732
***
0.10506
*** 0.05284
Madagascar -1.04724
*** 0.01523 0.02476
* 0.0049 -0.01192
**
5.45734
*** 0.13148 0.0007 2.3609
Malawi -1.32987
*** -0.01519 -0.00795 0.00223
* 0.01637 7.03636
***
-0.08224
** -0.00037 0.27451
Mauritius -1.09455
*** 0.00154 0.00112 -0.00083 0.00674 5.69906 0.037 0.04193 -0.49987
Rwanda -1.16053
***
-0.05197
* 0.01314 0.0011 0.01164 6.10882
***
0.31329
***
0.00544
***
1.21724
**
Seychelles -0.54123
*** 0.00277 0.00827 0.01006 0.00058 2.76292
***
0.19464
***
-0.00310
*** -0.28639
Sudan -0.67528
*** -0.01703 -0.00581 0.00367 -0.03943
** 3.52304 0.10433
*** 0.00892 -0.26524
Uganda -0.69903
*** 0.01519 -0.00725 -0.00029 0.00001 3.66438
***
0.05180
*** -0.00019 1.10457
Zambia -1.66604
*** 0.00874 0.00715 -0.00073 0.00185 8.96626 -0.07598
*** 0.01953 -5.69266
**
Zimbabwe -0.81506
**
-0.09294
** 0.00684 0.01618 -0.00108 4.24690
***
0.09863
*** 0.00088 2.26479
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APPENDIX 6 
 
Appendix 6.1: IPS Unit and Fisher-ADF Root Tests Result 
 IPS Fisher-ADF 
Variable levels 1st difference Levels 1st Difference 
agva -2.2646* 0.8596 119.4471*** 85.55.02*** 
agvaw -2.5442*** -9.2627*** 130.08*** 121.7669*** 
ODA -2.9448*** 0.3565 164.7906*** 43.9622*** 
Rural  -5.5710*** -2.3286*** 103.8134*** 46.7373* 
govt -2.5917*** -1.8073*** 52.2961** 91.5955*** 
pcGDP 0.9767* -1.7401*** 74.7420 97.0899*** 
inflation -2.1853*** -5.5635*** 128.7465 243.885*** 
policy  -2.7810*** -2.3331** 66.6765*** 105.5555*** 
agridevt -3.9527*** 0.2819* 208.2550*** 34.5648 
water & land -4.4582 0.0264** 128.2512*** 31.0401 
inputs -2.4660*** -1.7186** 88.8286*** 98.0613*** 
Food crops -4.0098*** -1.4012 94.9766*** 73.4304*** 
Industrial crops -2.5763* 3.7380 44.7810* 73.4304*** 
other -1.5383*** 2.5568 208.5250*** 34.5648 
Note:    i) ***, ** and * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5% and           
          10% respectively 
ii) Since the study is covering all COMESA member states, it assumed a finite N for the Fisher-ADF and therefore, 
only reported on the χ2 ρ. However, it should be noted that all the four tests under the fisher-ADF failed to accept 
the null hypothesis of a unit root in all the panels at 1%. 
iii) all variables are in their natural log transformation and due to unbalanced panels, IPS test was only feasible 
on demeaned levels and first differenced regressions of these three variables: water and land resource 
management; agricultural inputs; and other. 
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Appendix 6.2: Granger Causality 
Appendix 6.2a: Model 1 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.2b: Model 2 
 
 
                                                          
                     ALL       27.249    3        0.000   
              lnodarural        7.476    1        0.006   
                   lnoda       13.181    1        0.000   
                  lnagva        2.026    1        0.155   
   lngovt                                                 
                                                          
                     ALL       29.937    3        0.000   
                  lngovt       10.912    1        0.001   
                   lnoda       28.383    1        0.000   
                  lnagva        4.406    1        0.036   
   lnodarural                                             
                                                          
                     ALL      106.868    3        0.000   
                  lngovt       10.208    1        0.001   
              lnodarural       21.617    1        0.000   
                  lnagva        8.288    1        0.004   
   lnoda                                                  
                                                          
                     ALL       27.744    3        0.000   
                  lngovt       17.315    1        0.000   
              lnodarural        7.845    1        0.005   
                   lnoda        0.022    1        0.882   
   lnagva                                                 
                                                          
     Equation \ Excluded      chi2     df   Prob > chi2   
                                                          
    Ha: Excluded variable Granger-causes Equation variable
    Ho: Excluded variable does not Granger-cause Equation variable
  panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test
. pvargranger
                                                          
                     ALL       28.948    3        0.000   
              lnodarural        3.001    1        0.083   
                   lnoda       11.429    1        0.001   
                 lnagvaw        9.275    1        0.002   
   lngovt                                                 
                                                          
                     ALL       40.777    3        0.000   
                  lngovt        7.300    1        0.007   
                   lnoda       22.348    1        0.000   
                 lnagvaw       13.825    1        0.000   
   lnodarural                                             
                                                          
                     ALL       21.457    3        0.000   
                  lngovt        2.999    1        0.083   
              lnodarural        6.859    1        0.009   
                 lnagvaw        7.196    1        0.007   
   lnoda                                                  
                                                          
                     ALL        5.389    3        0.145   
                  lngovt        0.004    1        0.950   
              lnodarural        2.493    1        0.114   
                   lnoda        0.655    1        0.418   
   lnagvaw                                                
                                                          
     Equation \ Excluded      chi2     df   Prob > chi2   
                                                          
    Ha: Excluded variable Granger-causes Equation variable
    Ho: Excluded variable does not Granger-cause Equation variable
  panel VAR-Granger causality Wald test
. pvargranger
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Appendix 6.3: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         within                1.06e+07  -1.24e+07   1.26e+08       T =      10
         between                5384173       .001   1.72e+07       n =      17
other    overall     4746933   1.19e+07       .001   1.39e+08       N =     170
                                                               
         within                 7069558  -1.40e+07   4.50e+07       T =      10
         between                9693097    92817.4   3.12e+07       n =      17
extres~g overall     7949779   1.18e+07       .001   6.83e+07       N =     170
                                                               
         within                1.66e+07  -2.93e+07   1.70e+08       T =      10
         between                8015177       .001   3.35e+07       n =      17
foodcr~n overall     4230555   1.84e+07       .001   1.99e+08       N =     170
                                                               
         within                1.79e+07  -2.54e+07   2.21e+08       T =      10
         between                7120034       .001   2.92e+07       n =      17
inputs   overall     3495728   1.92e+07       .001   2.46e+08       N =     170
                                                               
         within                1.16e+07  -2.99e+07   8.41e+07       T =      10
         between               1.91e+07   742.5009   5.91e+07       n =      17
watera~s overall    1.31e+07   2.19e+07       .001   1.21e+08       N =     170
                                                               
         within                1.87e+07  -6.20e+07   1.10e+08       T =      10
         between               2.46e+07   1939.401   9.71e+07       n =      17
agricu~t overall    2.21e+07   3.04e+07       .001   1.85e+08       N =     170
                                                               
         within                 6761334   -7771879   4.70e+07       T =      10
         between                9290161    13349.3   2.48e+07       n =      17
policy~n overall     8976144   1.13e+07       .001   5.91e+07       N =     170
                                                               
         within                6.630966  -1.801047   37.61265       T =      10
         between                5.21366    .981021   21.23973       n =      17
inflat~n overall    9.362815   8.348915   -8.11517   44.35669       N =     170
                                                               
         within                372.7304   486.4055   4143.024       T =      10
         between               3304.993   230.2596   12217.18       n =      17
realgd~a overall      2217.4   3237.316   213.4056   14142.81       N =     170
                                                               
         within                 .147451  -1.088989  -.1753278       T =      10
         between               .6144156  -1.390651   .5325379       n =      17
corr     overall   -.6277346   .6157471  -1.544762   .8836011       N =     170
                                                               
         within                9.04e+07   7.69e+07   7.63e+08   T-bar =  9.4375
         between               3.33e+08   970783.8   1.24e+09       n =      16
govt     overall    2.95e+08   3.39e+08   436967.8   1.71e+09       N =     151
                                                               
         within                 9313504  -2.60e+07   6.94e+07       T =      10
         between               1.74e+07       .001   7.21e+07       n =      17
odarur~t overall    1.25e+07   1.94e+07       .001   1.29e+08       N =     170
                                                               
         within                2.08e+07  -4.10e+07   1.03e+08       T =      10
         between               2.65e+07       .001   8.55e+07       n =      17
loans    overall    2.11e+07   3.31e+07       .001   1.68e+08       N =     170
                                                               
         within                3.24e+07  -6.25e+07   3.33e+08       T =      10
         between               4.09e+07   370468.6   1.52e+08       n =      17
grants   overall    4.49e+07   5.13e+07       3232   3.55e+08       N =     170
                                                               
         within                4.35e+07  -1.04e+08   3.58e+08       T =      10
         between               6.26e+07   370468.6   2.38e+08       n =      17
oda      overall    6.64e+07   7.49e+07       3232   4.22e+08       N =     170
                                                               
         within                3.72e+08   1.26e+08   3.61e+09       T = 9.58824
         between               2.35e+09   1.83e+08   9.21e+09       n =      17
agvaw    overall    1.62e+09   2.35e+09   1.74e+08   1.12e+10       N =     163
                                                               
         within                1.53e+09   1.01e+09   1.14e+10       T =      10
         between               8.26e+09   2.48e+07   2.82e+10       n =      17
agva     overall    5.83e+09   8.18e+09   2.10e+07   3.12e+10       N =     170
                                                                               
Variable                Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max      Observations
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APPENDIX 7 
Appendix 7.1: IPS Unit and Fisher-ADF Root Tests Result in Levels 
Variable IPS Fisher-ADF 
AIDI -1.4530* 74.9844*** 
ln oda -2.5543*** 159.5298*** 
ln grants -2.4516*** 136.2613*** 
ln loans -3.0752*** 145.1916*** 
Inflation -1.6813** 112.9707*** 
Savings -1.6813** 81.2903*** 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10% 
 
 
Appendix 7.2: Summary Statistics of Variables (2002-2015) 
 
 
         within                1.55e+10  -6.94e+10   1.16e+11       T =       9
         between               5.31e+10   1.10e+09   2.32e+11       n =      19
realgdp  overall    3.04e+10   5.41e+10   8.47e+08   3.18e+11       N =     171
                                                               
         within                6.600443  -16.55429    31.4443       T =       9
         between                11.6866  -9.117238   33.49856       n =      19
saving~p overall    8.420032   13.18011  -20.71661   56.52283       N =     171
                                                               
         within                .1433219  -1.227661  -.2076608       T =       9
         between               .5761305  -1.372222   .4511111       n =      19
corrup~n overall   -.6365497   .5803856      -1.62        .88       N =     171
                                                               
         within                1765.001  -2564.893   21848.54       T =       9
         between               620.5536   1.353912   2714.504       n =      19
inflat~n overall    152.0098   1866.063   -8.11517   24411.03       N =     171
                                                               
         within                5.504928  -7.120237   27.21479       T =       9
         between               7.122286   -4.60517    19.7786       n =      19
lnloans  overall    12.76353   8.868148   -4.60517   20.41809       N =     171
                                                               
         within                1.140806   12.56049   19.94958       T =       9
         between               2.096122    12.6759   19.19167       n =      19
lngrants overall    16.41392   2.342733    8.82247   19.71693       N =     171
                                                               
         within                1.228384   12.52504   21.11048       T =       9
         between                2.13371   12.87149   20.14204       n =      19
lnoda    overall     17.2458    2.41814    8.82247   20.65646       N =     171
                                                               
         within                .1443736    1.99484   3.299988       T =       9
         between               .8106395   1.691381   4.423303       n =      19
lnaidi   overall    2.982389    .804398   1.266948   4.540205       N =     171
                                                                               
Variable                Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max      Observations
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